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“Life begins at the end of your comfort zone”,
- Neale Donald Walsch
I have always wanted to become a designer. God knows how I ended up at
the faculty of economics instead. Honestly, I was not particularly excited about
that. . . until I went to the University of Trento under the Erasmus Mundus
exchange program, where I discovered (and immediately fell in love with) a
very special branch of this science. I’m very grateful to prof. Luigi Mittone
for introducing me to the world of behavioral and experimental economics, for
encouraging me to apply for a doctoral program in this field that eventually
became my life, and for supporting me along the way.
The first year of doctoral program was just a hell: sleepless nights, tons of
new reading material, weekly assignments of advanced level of complexity, sore
muscles and itchy eyes after a whole day in front of a computer. Who knows
whether I could make it through without a kind support of my dear classmates
and colleagues. Together preparing for the exams and solving the most difficult
exercises we managed to survive the first year. Special thanks to my friend and
experienced researcher, Marco Ajelli, who could spend the whole day working
through the thick textbook of statistics with me and patiently explaining the
unclear concepts, or helping to write a code for computer simulations for a
course project.
A third of the first summer vacation I spent at the summer research camp.
In contrast to the majority of summer schools, which usually happen somewhere
on a beautiful Greek island or at least close to the public beach of Barcelona
and last about a week, the IMPRS summer school in Uncertainty and Decision-
Making takes place in a small German city called Jena and lasts for a month. It
was a taught, intense, and, ultimately, extremely valuable experience. I acquired
many new skills and was lucky to meet Alexia Gaudeul, who became my informal
research mentor and co-author of the first scientific paper. I am very grateful
to her for close attention to my work, patient guiding of my first steps in the
academic career, and a substantial selfless contribution in upbringing me as a
researcher.
The second year of doctoral program threw us into the sea of nearly inde-
pendent research. Suddenly we moved from the joint lectures and group assign-
ments to our small offices and started to work independently, each focused on
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4her own project. I was lucky to get a desk in the Cognitive and Experimental
Economics Lab (CEEL) in a cozy attic with a beautiful wooden ceiling and a
small window looking at the top of Monte Bondone. Although the diverging
research interests and chronic lack of time inevitably reduced our social inter-
action with classmates, at the same time it tied us tightly with an officemate
(and subsequently a dear friend). Thank you, Nives Della Valle, for our five
o’clock teas and stretching sessions, for watering my plants, and personal sup-
port. Whatever road you choose, I wish you success, satisfaction, and peace of
mind.
At the third year my PhD career made an abrupt turn, when I got a chance
to work with a guru in the field of economics of privacy during my visiting period
at Carnegie Mellon University. Prof. Alessandro Acquisti is not only a successful
professor and creative knowledgeable researcher, but also a fantastic supervisor
and wonderful human being. I thank you very much for profound inspiration,
fair critique, valuable advice, reliance and trust, for challenging ideas and belief
that I can realize them. Thank you for raising my bar of expectations. I will
do my best to meet them and surpass. I will also try to adapt your approach
of attentive and respectful leadership along the way.
I would like to express special thanks to academic co-advisor prof. Matteo
Ploner and company tutors, Michele Vescovi and Lorenzo Cordin, for attention
to my research, involvement, and helpful feedback. I also thank TIM Telecom
Italia for funding my scholarship, organizing seminars and workshops, and at-
tempts to build a national PhD student community; the University of Trento,
the School of Social Sciences, CEEL, professors and faculty members (especially
prof. Enrico Zaninotto and prof. Roberto Tamborini), and administrative staff
(especially Nicole Bertotti, Davide Santuari, and Stefania Valentini) for pro-
viding the facilities, equipment, assistance and support, organizing seminars,
and facilitating professional development and mobility experiences. I would
also like to express my gratitude to the CEEL lab manager Marco Tecilla for
technical advice, writing a computer program for a lab experiment, and as-
sistance during the experimental sessions. Many thanks to all the colleagues,
conferences/seminars/workshops attendees, PEEX lab members, and doctoral
committee for valuable comments, which helped to improve my research. I am
sincerely and profoundly grateful to my dear family, friends, and beloved ones,
who encourage and believe in me, and without whom it would never be possible.
I thank this PhD experience in general for opening my mind, boosting personal
growth, training curiosity, tolerance, and time-management, and teaching to
type in English faster than in Russian; thanks for letting me explore the new
worlds, learn new things, skills, and languages, meet a lot of amazing, interest-
ing and very smart people from all over the world, and be on the edge of the
modern progress dynamics.
That being said, I was enjoying what I was doing so far, but till a while ago
I was not sure whether I was doing the right thing, whether I should stay in
academia or search for a job in the industry, dedicate the whole life to research or
switch to a completely different field and start everything from scratch. Now,
by the end of the PhD program, I feel more comfortable and convinced that
5what I am doing is positively contributing to my own future and hopefully to
the future of the society. I wanted to design – I do design, of the experiments
and research studies for now. I’m adding on the User Experience and Interface
Design knowledge and skills. I’m discovering the forms of design that I was
not even aware before. I realize that both fields, Design and Social Sciences,
have a lot in common and share the similar methodology, and that all the time
I was confused about diverging away from my dream, I was actually enriching
my background and knowledge base. Hence, when I will eventually arrive to
the field of design full scale, it would be a lot different and qualitatively better
high-grade research-based design approach.
Although the PhD thesis project is a tough three-year long thorough work
on a very narrow research topic, full of obstacles, required huge commitment,
self-discipline, effort, and perseverance, once it is completed, a number of pos-
sibilities, opportunities, and doors, which would be otherwise inaccessible, are
opening in front of you. The journey continues. I do not need to start all
over again, I can choose your way more freely and make any desired transition
smoothly to continue self-development in multiple directions, always keeping in
mind my dream and pursuing the main goal. I can go ahead expanding the
horizon. I hope to be strong enough to push the boundaries even further and
always continue growing, learning something new, and conquer new heights.
Abstract
This doctoral thesis consists of three essays within the field of economics of
information privacy examined through the lens of behavioral and experimental
economics.
Rapid development and expansion of Internet, mobile and network technolo-
gies in the last decades has provided multitudinous opportunities and benefits
to both business and society proposing the customized services and personal-
ized offers at a relatively low price and high speed. However, such innovations
and progress have also created complex and hazardous issues. One of the main
problems is related to the management of extensive flows of information, con-
taining terabytes of personal data. Collection, storage, analysis, and sharing of
this information imply risks and trigger users’ concerns that range from nearly
harmless to significantly pernicious, including tracking of online behavior and
location, intrusive or unsolicited marketing, price discrimination, surveillance,
hacking attacks, fraud, and identity theft. Some users ignore these issues or
at least do not take an action to protect their online privacy. Others try to
limit their activity in Internet, which in turn may inhibit the online shopping
acceptance. Yet another group of users gathers personal information protection,
for example, by deploying the privacy-enhancing technologies, e.g., ad-blockers,
e-mail encryption, etc. The ad-blockers sometimes reduce the revenue of online
publishers, which provide the content to their users for free and do not receive
the income from advertisers in case the user has blocked ads. The economics
of privacy studies the trade-offs related to the positive and negative economic
consequences of personal information use by data subjects and its protection
by data holders and aims at balancing the interests of both parties optimizing
the expected utilities of various stakeholders. As technology is penetrating ev-
ery aspect of human life raising numerous privacy issues and affecting a large
number of interested parties, including business, policy-makers, and legislative
regulators, the outcome of this research is expected to have a great impact on
individual economic markets, consumers, and society as a whole.
The first essay provides an extensive literature review and combines the the-
oretical and empirical evidence on the impact of advertising in both traditional
and digital media in order to gain the insights about the effects of ad-blocking
privacy-enhancing technologies on consumers’ welfare. It first studies the views
of the main schools of advertising, informative and persuasive. The informa-
tive school of advertising emphasizes the positive effects of advertising on sales,
6
7competition, product quality, and consumers’ utility and satisfaction by match-
ing buyers to sellers, informing the potential customers about available goods
and enhancing their informed purchasing decisions. In contrast, the advocates
of persuasive school view advertising as a generator of irrational brand loy-
alty that distorts consumers’ preferences, inflates product prices, and creates
entry barriers. I pay special attention to the targeted advertising, which is typ-
ically assumed to have a positive impact on consumers’ welfare if it does not
cause the decrease of product quality and does not involve the extraction of
consumers’ surplus through the exploitation of reservation price for discrimi-
nating activities. Moreover, the utility of personalized advertising appears to
be a function of its accuracy: the more relevant is a targeted offer, the more
valuable it is for the customer. I then review the effects of online advertising
on the main stakeholders and users and show that the low cost of online ad-
vertising leads to excessive advertising volumes causing information overload,
psychological discomfort and reactance, privacy concerns, decreased exploration
activities and opinion diversity, and market inefficiency. Finally, as ad-blocking
technologies filter advertising content and limit advertising exposure, I analyze
the consequences of ad-blocking deployment through the lens of the models on
advertising restrictions. The control of advertising volume and its partial re-
striction would benefit both consumers and businesses more than a complete
ban of advertising. For example, advertising exposure caps, which limit the
number of times that the same ad is to be shown to a particular user, general
reduction of the advertising slots, control of the advertising quality standards,
and limitation of tracking would result in a better market equilibrium than can
offer an arms race of ad-blockers and anti-ad-blockers. Finally, I review the
solutions alternative to the blocking of advertising content, which include self-
regulation, non-intrusive ads programs, paywall, intention economy approach
that promotes business models, in which user initiates the trade and not the
marketer, and active social movements aimed at increasing social awareness and
consumer education.
The second essay describes a model of factors affecting Internet users’ per-
ceptions of websites’ trustworthiness with respect to their privacy and the in-
tentions to purchase from such websites. Using focus group method I calibrate
a list of websites’ attributes that represent those factors. Then I run an on-
line survey with 117 adult participants to validate the research model. I find
that privacy (including awareness, information collection and control practices),
security, and reputation (including background and feedback) have strong ef-
fect on trust and willingness to buy, while website quality plays a marginal
role. Although generally trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions
are positively correlated, in some cases participants are likely to purchase from
the websites that they have judged as untrustworthy. I discuss how behavioral
biases and decision-making heuristics may explain this discrepancy between per-
ceptions and behavioral intentions. Finally, I analyze and suggest what factors,
particular websites’ attributes, and individual characteristics have the strongest
effect on hindering or advancing customers’ trust and willingness to buy.
In the third essay I investigate the decision of experimental subjects to incur
8the risk of revealing personal information to other participants. I do so by using
a novel method to generate personal information that reliably induces privacy
concerns in the laboratory. I show that individual decisions to incur privacy
risk are correlated with decisions to incur monetary risk. I find that partially
depriving subjects of control over the revelation of their personal information
does not lead them to lose interest in protecting it. I also find that making
subjects think of privacy decisions after financial decisions reduces their aversion
to privacy risk. Finally, surveyed attitude to privacy and explicit willingness to
pay or to accept payments for personal information correlate with willingness
to incur privacy risk. Having shown that privacy loss can be assimilated to a
monetary loss, I compare decisions to incur risk in privacy lotteries with risk
attitude in monetary lotteries to derive estimates of the implicit monetary value
of privacy. The average implicit monetary value of privacy is about equal to the
average willingness to pay to protect private information, but the two measures
do not correlate at the individual level. I conclude by underlining the need to
know individual attitudes to risk to properly evaluate individual attitudes to
privacy as such.
Keywords: information privacy, lab experiment, survey, online advertising,
privacy-enhancing technologies, consumers’ welfare, trust, purchase intentions,
risk
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Chapter 1
The effects of advertising in




In this chapter I will review the economic and marketing literature on adver-
tising and apply it to the growing field of economics of privacy in order to
analyze the effects of online advertising, and more specifically, of ad-blocking
privacy-enhancing technologies, on consumers’ welfare. In a broad sense, by ad
blocking I mean filtering out advertising content on websites and in mobile ap-
plications. For the purpose of this literature review I will distinguish two large
groups of advertising: online and oﬄine. Oﬄine advertising is usually deliv-
ered through traditional channels, such as print media, radio, and TV. Online
(or web) advertising occurs in the Internet and is delivered to the consumers
through digital channels, such as personal computer, tablet, or mobile phone.
Interactive advertising, in particular, encourages active participation of a user
in a marketing campaign. Although first interactive marketing campaigns ap-
peared in the oﬄine world as interactive billboards, storefront windows, kiosks,
and vending machines, in the recent years the Internet took over the role of a
main medium for interactive advertising by using social media channels and rich
media ads, including pop-up and animated banner ads, videos, etc. In this chap-
ter I will use terms online advertising, web advertising, and digital advertising
interchangeably.
In the recent years online advertising has become a rapidly growing and
important market for global economy. Internet advertising revenues in Europe
has reached $41.1 billion in 2015 (Statista, 2015). In the end of 2015, U.S. online
16
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advertising revenue showed a 20% growth over the previous year and reached
$59.6 billion, accounting for about 29% of total worldwide advertising spending
(Goodman, 2016). Mobile advertising manifested even more striking growth of
66% during the same period (IAB, 2016).
A large proportion of increased advertising revenue comes from the introduc-
tion and development of fine-grained user targeting based on the vast database
of users’ personal information and online activities, and from the more detailed
analysis and reporting on advertising campaign performance. Empirical evi-
dence that I will discuss in greater details in section 1.3 shows that targeting
increases click-through and conversion rates (e.g., Farahat and Bailey, 2012;
Aziz and Telang, 2016). However, the extensive data collection and large vol-
umes of customized and sophisticated ads raise concerns and nuisance among
users. A number of surveys demonstrate that users generally are not supportive
of targeting and not comfortable with behavioral advertising (e.g., Turow et al.,
2009; Morales, 2010; Eurobarometer, 2015). In response to invasive advertising
strategies, some users adopt technological solutions that help to remove adver-
tising content from the visited websites and protect users from tracking of their
online behaviors.
Online advertising ecosystem continuously expands and claims to generate
economic wealth in a form of both, advertising revenues and increased product
and service sales, as well as to improve customer satisfaction through better
buyer-seller matching. However, it remains to a large extent unclear how this
wealth is distributed among advertising ecosystem stakeholders and how the
technologies deployed for users’ data mining, subsequent ad targeting, and ad-
vertising delivery affect consumers. Who appropriates the most of the generated
wealth: advertisers through an upsurge in sales, ad-selling companies and pub-
lishers through increased revenues, or end users through augmented surplus?
What are the negative effects of online advertising that are rarely spoken out
in the industry reports? Does the value added by each element of this grow-
ing chain is proportional to the cost of the supplement? If not, may the rapid
growth of digital advertising infrastructure turn into economic bubble? Is on-
line advertising era as new as it is proclaimed to be or more than a century of
marketing and economic research can help in predicting the trend of evolution
and economic impact of digital advertising? Answers to these broad and so-
phisticated questions lie at the intersection of marketing, information systems,
privacy, and economic fields.
In this chapter I focus on two main strands of literature: marketing literature
on traditional advertising, and recent research on the digital economy, in order
to address the following research question: what is the impact of ad-blocking
privacy enhancing technologies on consumers’ welfare? To gather the theories
and findings that may be applied to the modern online advertising practices I
first go to the roots of marketing research, analyzing the classic literature on
advertising value and the economics of advertising. Then I describe the current
situation in online advertising industry and the effects it has on the main play-
ers, including consumers, advertisers, publishers, and advertising companies.
Additionally, I briefly review some advertising-related issues from psychologi-
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cal and legal perspective, including fiscal policy, limitation of the consumers’
consideration set and exploration, cognitive and information overload, etc.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 introduces the most promi-
nent schools of advertising and approaches of measuring the consumer surplus
and welfare, provides an overview of theoretical predictions and empirical evi-
dence about the effects of advertising and targeting in traditional media on con-
sumers and net welfare, on product quality and consumer satisfaction, prices,
competition, and market structure; section 1.3 analyzes state-of-the-art in online
advertising industry, provides an overview of theoretical models and empirical
evidence on the effects of advertising and behavioral targeting in digital media;
section 1.4 summarizes the results of theoretical and empirical research on the
effects of advertising restrictions, discusses how these results may help to predict
the welfare implications of the modern privacy-enhancing technologies deploy-
ment, and suggests the alternative privacy-protecting solutions for regulating of
the online advertising industry; and section 1.5 summarizes and discusses the
results and concludes.
1.2 Advertising in traditional media
1.2.1 Views on advertising role
Over more than a hundred years of economic and marketing research on adver-
tising, three views on the role of advertising have emerged: informative, per-
suasive, and complementary. It is believed that Marshall (1890, 1919) first dis-
tinguished between constructive role of advertising conveying information, and
“socially wasteful” combative role of advertising redistributing customers from
one company to others and creating artificial product differentiation. Started
as a mere recognition of diversity of the functions that advertising performs,
with time the difference in views led to completely separate schools of adver-
tising, which based their models on distinct assumptions and therefore reached
diverging conclusions. I start from the introduction of three main schools of
advertising, and overview of their assumptions.
The main role of persuasive advertising is to influence the consumer choice
in favor of the advertised brand and to create brand loyalty. The conceptual
foundation of the persuasive view was first developed by Braithwaite (1928);
Bain (1949); Packard (1957, 1960); Galbraith (1958, 1967); Comanor and Wil-
son (1967, 1974); Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979), and further advanced by
Bloch and Manceau (1999); Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001); Banerjee and
Bandyopadhyay (2003); Chioveanu (2008); Baye and Morgan (2009), and oth-
ers (for a more detailed review see Bagwell, 2007). Persuasive school advocates
believe that advertising changes the utility function and tastes of buyers, dis-
torts consumption quantities, increases market share of larger firms in expense
of the smaller ones, augments concentration, leads to inelastic demand curve
and higher prices, accompanied by decrease in quality and entry deterrence.
The main role of informative advertising, as suggested by its name, is to
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inform consumers about the product existence, characteristics, price, and where
they can find and purchase it. The upraise of the adherents of the informa-
tive role of advertising dates back to the 1960-s, mostly among Chicago School
economists, including Ozga (1960); Stigler (1961); Telser (1964); Nelson (1970,
1974); Verma (1980); Nichols (1985), etc. They believed that advertising af-
fects the utility function only if contains valuable information for consumers,
which removes the information asymmetry. However, while advertising (es-
pecially customized for consumers’ preferences) may reduce consumers’ search
costs (Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Tam and Ho, 2006; Okazaki et al., 2009), some
studies predict the equilibrium incline in favor of bigger firms (Bagwell, 2007),
as such companies can afford a larger advertising volume.
Borden (1942b) warns that advertising “does not give consumers sufficient
information to enable them to buy with full economic effectiveness” (p. 98).
Nevertheless, he concludes that advertising, “though certainly not free from crit-
icism, is an economic asset and not a liability” (p. 99). Kaldor (1950) suggests
that subsidizing information delivery should benefit the society, as consumers
tend to underestimate the value of knowledge when market information is not
freely available. However, he criticizes the information provided in advertising
to be often biased or deficient because it is “supplied by interested quarters”,
and, therefore, “impartial and unbiased information could only be provided if
the writers of “advertisements” were financially independent of the products
advertised” (p. 5). Based on the Kaldor’s conclusion one may expect the con-
temporary phenomenon of user-generated content (e.g., in a form of consumer
reviews) to be a more socially desirable source of market information supply
than professional advertising campaigns. However, the efficiency of such con-
sumer feedback systems is limited by its ability to detect fraudulent reviews
and prevent manipulation of the content. Regarding the economic effect on the
market as a whole, informative view followers draw the pro-competitive effects
of advertising, more elastic demand curve, decrease in price, and increase in
product and service quality.
Interestingly, Nelson (1974) emphasizes that informative role of advertising
is greater for search goods; while for experience goods it is largely mediated by
increasing firm’s reputability rather than through delivery of explicit informa-
tion. In other words, information about search goods may help consumers to
make a more informed (if not better) choice of a product, while the marginal
value of supplied information about experience goods is limited because their
characteristics, important for quality evaluation, are often not measurable or ob-
jective and can be assessed only after consumers’ personal experience with the
product. The producers and vendors of search goods can successfully use both
informative and persuasive advertising. Once the customers have tried a certain
experience or credence good, difference in the value of informative advertising
for these types of products and search goods decreases, because experienced
users now can derive the utility from the information about price, sales point
location or discounts on the already familiar product. Therefore, search goods
manufacturers benefit from employment of informative advertising more than
manufacturers and sellers of experience and credence goods, which have to rely
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on rather persuasive advertising techniques to convince customers to try their
products or services and then make a decision about repeated purchases.
The third, and most recent, complementary view on advertising, has not
gained as much popularity as the two main approaches. According to comple-
mentary view, instead of merely influencing the utility, advertising enters the
utility function directly, complementing the consumption (Fisher et al., 1979;
Hochman et al., 1988; Wernerfelt, 1990; Becker and Murphy, 1993, etc.). This
substantive value of advertising is usually associated with the notion of social
prestige or image bundled with the purchased goods (Kaldor, 1950; Stigler, 1961;
Pastine and Pastine, 2002; Clark and Horstmann, 2005; Chwe, 2013, etc.). In
other words, when customer buys a product, she not only gets the physical ob-
ject or service, but also appropriates the part of reputation associated with its
brand constructed through the advertising messages. For example, brand adver-
tising of Dior fashion house creates an image of their customers as wealthy upper
middle class with refined taste and as experts of quality. People familiar with
this brand (and not even necessarily possessing its products) are then likely to
automatically judge the Dior bag’s owner as wealthy person having good taste
and appreciating high quality. Therefore, buying a genuine Dior bag, customer
is paying not only for the materials and labor force used to produce this bag,
but also for the social prestige that the use of a luxury product will transmit to
others. This is true not only for the haute couture brands. The same logic can
be applied to all different kinds of social images. For example, advertising makes
it possible for general public to recognize the eco-friendly or health-aware social
position signals of the owners of electric cars or people shopping in the grocery
stores that sell only organic products. Complementary view assumes that such
social recognition adds a direct value to the use of these cars and shopping in
these stores.
My brief overview of the roles of advertising illustrates the insight that the
impact of advertising is controversial because various schools derive distinct
effects of advertising on price, market structure, competition, and utility func-
tion. As the goal of this study is focused on the analysis of advertising impact
on consumers’ welfare, I start the next section from the overview of models that
attempt to measure consumer surplus, followed by the theoretical predictions
about the impact of advertising on it according to various schools, and finally I
investigate the empirical evidence of such effects.
1.2.2 Measurement of consumer surplus
In economic theory, social (or net) welfare is usually referred to as a sum of
consumer surplus and business revenues. The compensating and equivalent
variations based on the shift of the Hicksian compensated demand curve (Hicks,
1942) were adopted as traditional empirical measures of welfare change (see
Slesnick (1998) for the review of alternative approaches). Compensating varia-
tion (CV) is the amount of money necessary to bring consumer back to the initial
utility level after change in price or introduction of a new product or service.
In other words, CV represents the dollar amount required to achieve the initial
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level of utility given the current prices, while equivalent variation (EV) is the
amount required to preserve the initial prices to experience the current level of
utility. These two measures were widely used for welfare analysis in traditional
markets as well as for estimating welfare gain from IT investments (Bresna-
han, 1986; Brynjolfsson, 1996), personal computer adoption (Rosston et al.,
2011; Greenwood and Kopecky, 2013), proliferation of broadband (Greenstein
and McDevitt, 2009; Nordhaus, 2015), increased product variety in the digital
economy (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003), and specifically in e-commerce (Fan et al.,
2015), etc.
Brynjolfsson (1996) reviews other three approaches to measuring consumers’
surplus: the approach based on Marshallian demand curve, nonparametric ap-
proach, and the approach based on the theory of index numbers. They are less
common because the approach based on Marshallian demand curve does not
provide the exact welfare measure when the utility for consumers is kept con-
stant and the price changes are relative; the nonparametric approach assumes
income elasticity to be equal to one; and the approach based on the theory of
index numbers makes assumptions about the form of the utility function rather
than demand curve. Nevertheless, Brynjolfsson (1996) concludes that under ac-
curate functional form assumptions and small income effects, various methods
of consumers’ surplus measurement result in similar estimates.
It may be possible that price variation for the products in organic and spon-
sored listings is low, while time spent on the searching of the products differ
substantially between conditions with and without ads. On the one hand, online
ads may distract users’ attention and therefore increase the time she spends on
searching for a product. On the other hand, ads may reduce searching costs
by offering a shortcut to the customer, matching buyer to seller in a fast and
efficient way, and reducing the time necessary to find an appropriate product.
As the effect of advertising on product-searching time depends on a number of
factors, e.g., goal-oriented versus exploratory mode of the task (Shapiro et al.,
1997; Danaher and Mullarkey, 2003), hedonic versus utilitarian goods, position
in the purchasing funnel (Ghose and Todri, 2015; Hoban and Bucklin, 2015), I
do not make any assumptions about sign of the difference, however, I consider
time to be an important factor influencing the utility function.
A number of researchers suggested including time-related variables into the
utility function for computing consumer surplus. For example, in attempt to
measure the consumer surplus from Internet access, Goolsbee and Klenow (2006)
criticize the standard approach of measuring consumer welfare in traditional
markets for being inappropriate and, thus, welfare calculations being uncertain
in application to the use of Internet. To account for the low (or equal to zero if
monthly fee is fixed) marginal costs of Internet use and price variation that com-
plicate the estimation of price elasticity from expenditures, authors introduce
into expenditure function the value of time as a fraction spent in the Inter-
net in relation to the wage. Alternative measure of elasticity is based on the
opportunity cost of time (Hausman, 1981). Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) and
Brynjolfsson and Oh (2012) deployed the time-use survey data for validation.
The model of Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) was further developed by Hadhri
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et al. (2012), who allowed concavity of wage function and added non-income
variables. The proposed models can be easily adopted for the context of online
advertising. In the case of Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) model, for instance,
instead of comparing the prices for Internet and composite goods, one should
use the prices of products from organic and sponsored listings to compute the
consumer surplus generated by the presence of ads (or by their absence due to
the use of ad-blockers).
In the next section I review models and empirical evidence of advertising
effect on consumer surplus first from a purely economic perspective. Then I
discuss the extended models that include time costs and intangible components
of consumer welfare, such as product quality, consumer quality perceptions, and
satisfaction.
1.2.3 Effects of advertising
1.2.3.1 Effects of advertising on consumer and social welfare
According to Becker and Murphy (1993) consumer surplus generated by adver-
tising is appropriated by the firms through increased direct sales. Even the early
work of Braithwaite (1928) already views the manufacturing and selling costs
as the “true cost of production”, while advertising costs of creating reputation
as a component that adds mostly “artificial value”, substantially increases the
final price, and makes demand curve less elastic. Therefore, a firm that uses
advertising is more likely to be harmful for economic welfare than a monopoly
that does not employ advertising. Consumers gain only in the case where in-
troduction of advertising costs is accompanied by the reduction of production
costs and, therefore, of final price, which according to the author is, however,
unlikely to happen. Borden (1942a) in his extensive study of various commodi-
ties provides the evidence of the opposite: in many cases increased advertising
costs are offset by lower production costs. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that
the generalization of such conclusion is limited because sometimes the price for
consumers increases due to advertising.
Although Braithwaite (1928) does not deny the potential “educative” and
complementary effects of advertising, she argues that the vast majority of ads
appeals to emotions rather than reasoning and that advantages related to the
created firms’ reputation do not countervail the detrimental effect on consumer
surplus. The normative theory of persuasive ads predicts a growth of social
welfare only if the monopolist decreases price and advertising volume (Dixit and
Norman, 1978). His model is based on the assumption of positive relationships
between advertising intensity, price, and sales. However, this assumption has
spurious empirical support.
The complementary view advocate Kaldor (1950) argues that consumers buy
not just a product, “but a miscellaneous collection of services as well, such as
the assurance of quality as afforded by the reputation of the particular manu-
facturer” (p. 22-23). Because advertising value is directly included in the utility
function, image-creating effect contributes to the consumer surplus gain (Fisher
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et al., 1979). However, the value added not always recoups the incremental cost
and the ultimate impact on social welfare cannot be decided upon the economic
theory alone:
“If advertising is to be justified it must be by reference to its indirect
consequences rather than to its direct benefits; it must be justified
by demonstrating that improvements in productive and distributive
efficiency resulting from advertising more than offset both the direct
cost of advertising and the balance of further social losses caused by
distortion of demand, etc.” (Kaldor, 1950, p. 7)
Similarly, Nichols (1985) states that the necessary condition for positive con-
sumer benefit is the excess of “prestige productivity” over the price increase.
Butters (1977) shows that business and social benefits are not dependent
on prices of products and ads under the assumption of identical consumer unit
demand and informative advertising. This conclusion is derived from the fact
that firms either appropriate consumer surplus but may not attract rival’s cus-
tomers when send a high-priced ad, or does not appropriate consumer surplus,
but may steal customers from the rival firm when send an ad at a lower price.
Extension of the model in Stegeman (1991) assumes heterogeneous consumer
preferences and concludes that regardless of the ad price, increase in advertising
level augments welfare.
Stahl (1994) finds negative relationship between advertising cost and con-
sumer surplus and positive impact of convexity of advertising expenditures on
consumer and social welfare, but not on producer surplus. Kaldor (1950) how-
ever supposes that the expansion of demand due to unequal intensity of ad-
vertising among rival firms should not significantly influence the consumer and
total welfare.
Thus, as we can see, the conclusion about the effect of advertising on con-
sumers’ welfare largely depends on the assumptions about the role of advertis-
ing, ads’ and products’ prices, elasticity of consumers’ demand function, etc.
Moreover, the shift in demand curve may be caused by various factors, for ex-
ample, due to stockpiling, change in the level of consumption, prices, savings,
etc. Therefore, welfare outcome is influenced not only by the demand change
itself but also by the factors that induce this shift. I further provide an overview
of empirical evidence on the impact of such factors.
Expansion of demand due to price change Empirical analysis of the
cross-sectional data on dog food and aluminum foil sales in Kanetkar et al.
(1992) shows that advertising increases price elasticity and decreases prices.
Sheng (2004) observed the general opposite effect in the Canadian accommo-
dation market. However, he concludes that welfare implications depend on
various factors, such as type of advertising (price versus non-price), revenue,
and marginal costs. Namely, in line with Kaul and Wittink (1995), he found
that price advertising increases price sensitivity and decreases prices.
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Expansion of demand at the cost of savings Kaldor (1950) agrees that
shift of the demand curve is possible due to increase in the general propensity to
consume or use of intended savings. The reduction in savings is expected to be
higher for the middle and upper class because saving rates of the lower class are
inelastic. However, he claims “impossible to test this hypothesis statistically”
and to measure the exact economic effect (p. 9).
Expansion of demand due to switching, redistribution, and other sales
promotion effects Marketing literature provides an extensive research and
empirical evidence of the effects of sales promotion. The most prominent effects
of sales promotion are stockpiling, reduction of non-promotional retail sales and
demand for competing brands, increased consumption, cross-category, brand
and store substitution (Kumar and Leone, 1988; Walters, 1991; Bucklin and
Lattin, 1992; Bell et al., 2002). Because advertising is one of the most popular
approaches to the sales promotion, it carries out all of the above-mentioned
effects. We will discuss them now in detail.
Due to stockpiling, retailers shift a part of inventory costs to consumers
(Blattberg and Neslin, 1989). The evidence of stockpiling effect was found in
a number of studies (see Shoemaker, 1979; Gupta, 1988; Blattberg and Neslin,
1989; Jain and Vilcassim, 1991; Bucklin and Gupta, 1992; Chintagunta, 1993;
Neslin et al., 1995; Bucklin et al., 1998; Mela et al., 1998; Van Heerde et al., 2000;
Macé and Neslin, 2004). Borden (1942a) argues that advertising does not di-
rectly shift the demand curve but rather “speed up the expansion of demand that
naturally would have come without advertising, or check or retard an adverse
trend” (p. 433-434). Indeed, without increase in consumption, stockpiling may
be associated with either purchase acceleration, by moving earlier in time the
purchasing event that would have been occurred anyway (Doyle and Saunders,
1985; Krishna, 1992), or purchase deceleration, because of consumers postpon-
ing the purchase due to expectations of promotion (Krishna, 1994; Gönül and
Srinivasan, 1996; Mela et al., 1998). Both of these effects result in subsequent
dip in sales. In contrast, the absence of the post-promotion sales decline may
be related to the increased consumption, repeat purchases effect, and consumer
inventory insensitivity (Neslin and Stone, 1996).
Increase in consumption is described through the three interrelated mecha-
nisms: a larger number of purchasing occasions, fewer cases of stock out, and
higher consumption rates. Early models assume constant usage rate. However,
a flexible usage rate behaviorally is more reasonable (e.g., Ailawadi and Neslin
(1998) propose spline and continuous nonlinear functions1). Other potential
reasons of the growth in consumption rates are related to a higher inventory
capacity, and as consequence, to a higher flexibility of consumption at desired
level (Assunção and Meyer, 1993) and higher awareness of the product within
the household (Wansink and Deshpandé, 1994). The relation between inventory
levels and consumption rates can be also explained by the “scarcity theory”: peo-
ple tend to value the smaller quantities more than bigger ones, and therefore,
1See also Bell et al. (1999); Silva-Risso et al. (1999).
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to slow down the consumption with respect to desired level (Wansink, 1996).
Finally, advertising attempts to encourage consumers to use products more of-
ten or at larger amount (e.g., by suggesting to take two chewing gums at a time
instead of one, and after every meal rather than once a day) also contributes to
the growth of consumption rates.
Cross-category effects of promotion appear in a form of 1) complementar-
ity, e.g., buying a non-promotional tomato sauce together with promotional
spaghetti pasta, and 2) substitution, e.g., buying promotional spaghetti pasta
instead of non-promotional elbow macaroni (Manchanda et al., 1999; Mulhern
and Leone, 1991; Walters, 1991). Walters and MacKenzie (1988) showed that
trade-off between the two effects results in the in-store fall of non-promotional
sales.
The redistributive effects of advertising were acknowledged already in Mar-
shall (1890, 1919). Kumar and Leone (1988) attribute store substitution to the
cross-shopping (“cherry-picking”), especially for frequently purchased and high-
priced products and to the store’s offers of a particular promotional blend of
products rather than featuring one single product. Their analysis of the store-
level scanner data shows that price promotion leads to the most extensive brand
substitution within a given store. However, they found the empirical evidence
of store substitution only on a weekly level and for the stores within a relatively
close geographic proximity.
The promotion effects described for traditional marketing channels directly
apply to the era of online advertising, further expanding the horizon of effective-
ness they may achieve. Shift to electronic trade and cloud storage has decreased
the inventory and transaction costs and lead to an increase of consumption and
stockpiling. Home libraries and multimedia collections are not limited by the
size of a bookshelf anymore – electronic memory and cloud computing together
with portable devices, such as smartphones, music players with Internet con-
nection, electronic books, and tablets, made it possible to access vast amount
of information at any time and from any place. Shopping has never been that
easy. Amazon’s “1-Click” buying technique that stores users’ payment details for
future purchases allows customers to buy online with only one click (Hartman
et al., 1999). Amazon’s Prime account offers free delivery, Netflix’s subscription
provides virtually unlimited access to its movie and TV shows library, further
facilitating online shopping and decreasing transaction costs due to scaling up
effects. Internet makes the advertising communication more prompt and fine-
grained to the consumers’ preferences. Information about promotions, newslet-
ters, and stock availability is now more frequent and well-timed than before.
Finally, sophisticated recommendation algorithms, accessibility of comparison
shopping, and online product reviews facilitate cross-category, store- and brand-
switching. On the other hand, a requirement to create an account on almost
every website, smart design of platforms’ architecture, and lock-in business mod-
els ensure customers’ loyalty.
Existing models of welfare analysis often overlook or underestimate the
above-mentioned effects of the marketing activities on the distribution of sur-
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plus. While companies are focused on calculation of the return on investment
and on assessment of advertising campaign effectiveness, privacy advocates of-
ten disregard businesses’ economic incentives in desire to protect consumers’
benefits. Despite widely discussed intangible “harmful” effects of annoying and
obtrusive advertising on consumers, the impact of advertising on their welfare
lacks scrupulous research. This section highlighted that certain promotional ac-
tivities result in mere reallocation of resources among business players (limited
by consumers’ budget constrains) without change in the net welfare (e.g., due
to store- and brand-switching, purchase acceleration and deceleration). Some
other marketing activities lead to a real structural change (e.g., increased con-
sumption, increased sales of non-promotional goods due to complementarity
effect). The valence of substitution effect depends on various factors, for ex-
ample, whether the purchase of advertised good increases consumer surplus or
satisfaction with respect to substituted product. Therefore, for construction of
the accurate models of consumer welfare it is important to take these effects
into consideration. However, decomposition of the total effect remains a serious
issue2. Other methodological challenges include multi-collinearity, serial corre-
lation between observations, measurement errors due to multi-channel nature
of both purchasing behaviors and marketing campaigns, etc. Thus, rigorous re-
search is required in the area of welfare analysis of advertising influence. Greater
attention should be paid to the long run and indirect effects of advertising. I
present an overview of the studies about such effects in the next section.
1.2.3.2 Effects of advertising on quality and satisfaction
Indirect and long run effects of advertising include changes in the reference prices
(Winer, 1986; Kopalle et al., 1996), baseline sales (Kopalle et al., 1999), and
brand franchise that may either undermine brand attitudes and loyalty or, con-
trariwise, reinforce brand positioning (Blattberg and Neslin, 1989). Moreover,
in the long term, these effects may influence consumer satisfaction, expansion
of product selection, and quality improvement due to enhanced competition,
while in the short run they may result only in a “trivial and foolish” product
differentiations (Borden, 1942b). Because product quality and satisfaction are
important factors affecting consumers’ welfare, I will focus on their relationship
with advertising in greater detail.
The effects of advertising on consumer satisfaction according to Kaldor
(1950) are oppositely-directed. On one hand, pleasure received from the pur-
chasing of advertised brands increases satisfaction and shopping convenience,
while on the other hand, it “leads to a constant tendency for actual satisfaction
to fall short of expectation” (p. 8). Satisfaction in turn is closely related to the
quality of goods.
Nelson (1974) finds positive correlation between advertising and quality, par-
ticularly for experience products. He attributes this relationship to the following
2See early works on decomposition of sales promotion effects: Gupta (1988); Chiang (1991);
Dillon and Gupta (1996); Bucklin et al. (1998); Bell et al. (1999); Silva-Risso et al. (1999).
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main effects: repeat-business, signaling-efficiency and quality-guarantee, and
match-product-to-buyers.
According to the repeat-business effect customers satisfied with the high-
quality goods of a certain brand are more likely to purchase the products of
this brand again. Telser (1964) suggests the higher quality control as one of the
factors increasing prices of advertised goods because a better quality control
increases the marginal production cost. The model in Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) predicts the separating equilibrium: when marginal costs are high, high-
quality firms are better off when increase price and advertising intensity, while
the situation is reversed for the low marginal cost situation.
The repeat-business effect is often observed together with the signaling-
efficiency effect, which predicts that only efficient companies with low-priced
and high-quality products are incentivized to advertise more heavily. Kihlstrom
and Riordan (1984), for example, suppose that only high-quality firms with large
mark-ups could afford the additional expenditures on advertising. Positive rela-
tionship between advertising and quality was further supported by Marquardt
and McGann (1975); Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1976); Wiggins and Lane (1983);
Kwoka (1984); Matthews et al. (1990); Bagwell and Ramey (1991); De Bijl
(1997); Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001); Fluet and Garella (2002), and in
the empirical work of Archibald et al. (1983). In the analysis of Consumer Re-
ports data Caves and Greene (1996) found positive relationship between quality
and advertising only for innovative goods and goods that possess both experi-
ence and search qualities. Experimental studies of Kirmani and Wright (1989);
Kirmani (1990); Homer (1995), and Kirmani (1997) showed the inverted-U re-
lationship between advertising expenditures and consumer expectations about
quality: while reasonable advertising intensity signals the producers’ greater
confidence about product quality, excessive volumes of advertising may imply
the producers’ “despair” to sell the low-quality good without aggressive pro-
motion. Empirical evidence in Haas-Wilson (1986); Tellis and Fornell (1988);
Horstmann and MacDonald (1994); Zhao (2000), and Orzach et al. (2002) fur-
ther support the idea that efficient firms are more prone to inform consumers
about high quality, while they have less incentive to advertise low-quality goods
especially on the later stages of product life cycle. In contrast, Horstmann and
Moorthy (2003) argue that advertising is more beneficial for the low-quality
companies in low-demand states. Rogerson (1988) found that quality degrada-
tion due to price advertising is accompanied by the welfare improvement, since
advertising in this case simply sorts the consumers by price segments.
The quality-guarantee effect is closely related to reputational argument. An
established brand name is supposed to reassure even new customers about the
quality of the products. Fogg-Meade (1901); Shaw (1912), and Marshall (1919)
are among early supporters of the idea that large advertisers have bigger in-
centives to offer high-quality products than smaller companies. The notion of
“quality-assuring price” that triggers the consumer quality perceptions was first
discussed by Telser (1980) and Klein and Leﬄer (1981), then formally introduced
by Shapiro (1983) and developed by Rogerson et al. (1986); Stiglitz (1989), etc.
Braithwaite (1928), however, predicted only a modest quality-guarantee effect
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of advertising, because elevated reputation is not always translated into high
quality and because consumers are limited in their capabilities to judge quality.
Persuasive advertising advocates also largely support the negative social effects
of advertising.
The match-products-to-buyers effect is less related to the product quality it-
self but rather to the value of correspondence between products and consumers’
preferences. The matching role of advertising is discussed in Rosen (1978);
Bagwell and Ramey (1993); Anand and Shachar (2005), etc. Theoretical mod-
els of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) examine the conditions (on the level of
fixed costs and advertising technology) under which match-products-to-buyers
effect creates the benefits for consumers and businesses. They suppose that
in the case when an additional unit of advertising does not increase the num-
ber of informed consumers, the “wasteful” consumer-capture effect overrides the
matching effect. Even when advertising purpose is purely informative, private
benefits are higher than social gain. Lewis and Sappington (1994); Meurer and
Stahl (1994); Johnson and Myatt (2003), and Lewis and Wang (2013), how-
ever, predict that social surplus is not monotonic in advertising because better
matching can be accompanied by a reduction in sales. Anderson and Renault
(2006) found that consumer surplus is positive when search costs are low and
the value of match is high, otherwise, advertising message is required to signal
expected search benefits to induce consumer to incur search cost.
Generally, the supporters of informative role of advertising tend to derive
positive effects of advertising on sales, competition, product quality, and con-
sumer satisfaction. The advocates of persuasive view on advertising, in contrast,
are more inclined to emphasize the entry deterrence and adverse effects of ads
on consumer surplus and prices. Although theoretical predictions and empirical
evidence on causal relation between advertising and quality are mixed, a com-
mon trend, observed across various research studies, suggests that this relation
is positive, at least under certain conditions. These conditions include the level
of marginal costs of production, final products’ prices and position in the life
cycle, innovation, demand, consumers’ expectations, etc.
1.2.4 Targeted advertising in traditional media
Targeting has been a reliable tool in marketing campaigns for decades. Mar-
keting literature associates targeting primarily with market segmentation and
reaching the consumers potentially interested in a product. Economic litera-
ture, in contrast, views targeting as instrument of consumers’ reservation price
elicitation. Therefore, from the marketing point of view, targeting helps to im-
prove the marketing campaign’s success by reaching the “right” audience with-
out “wasting” advertising budget on those, who will not eventually purchase the
product, and in parallel, to meet the consumers’ interests and tastes. From the
economic perspective, targeting helps to maximize revenue through extraction
of consumer surplus using discriminating practices based on elicited reservation
price. While advertising industry usually emphasizes benefits of targeting for
consumers by offering more customized and relevant ads, it often suppresses the
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discussion about its economic consequences. Hence, in this section I will provide
an overview of welfare implications of targeted advertising.
As a special promotional tool based on price discrimination coupons have
been especially popular in 1980-s. Various models analyze the effects of mar-
ket segmentation and the isolation of price-sensitive consumers through coupon
targeting. For example, Bester and Petrakis (1996) view the welfare gain from
receiving a coupon as a result of decreased brand-switching costs. Consumer
surplus is negatively related to the transportation and couponing costs. There-
fore, lower advertising cost leads to the producers’ waste of money and, more
often, to the brand-switching among consumers. Another model of couponing
in Moraga-González and Petrakis (1999) reveals that consumer surplus is posi-
tively related to the degree of product differentiation and negatively correlated
with the marginal cost of advertising.
Adams and Yellen (1977) show that socially desirable equilibrium can be
achieved without distorting tastes and preferences and changing reservation
prices even when advertising is costless:
“If rich exhibit higher surplus on both brands than do poor people,
then advertising may be used to make the rich disdain what the poor
are urged to buy and covet what the poor cannot afford” (p. 444)
The classic “snob” and “keeping up with the Jones” effects support the above-
mentioned idea (Veblen, 1899; Mitchell, 1937; Duesenberry et al., 1949; Gal-
braith, 1958; Baran and Sweezy, 1964). Adams and Yellen (1977) conclude that
price-discriminating practices based on market segmentation are necessary for
the increase in social welfare under Pareto-optimal solutions because they allow
extraction of benchmark surplus generated by advertising from high-surplus con-
sumers without changing the extraction of surplus from low-surplus consumers.
Hernández-García (1997) considers the effect of targeted advertising on so-
cial welfare to be the most harmful when consumers’ product valuations are
high. The increase in price for the low-demand consumers is relatively small
and, therefore, leads to consumer and social welfare gains. However, increased
efficiency due to targeting is more likely to exceed the increment of monopolistic
market power.
A more recent model of Galeotti and Moraga-González (2003) suggests that
informative targeted advertising increases prices in more expensive segment and
decreases prices for the less expensive goods. However, authors do not derive the
welfare implications. Esteban et al. (2007) also consider informative targeted
advertising with price discrimination but for vertically differentiated rather than
homogeneous products market. They find a stronger positive impact of targeting
on aggregated consumer surplus than on producers’ gain. They also emphasize
a strong relation of targeting benefits to quality. Namely, the profit of a high-
quality firm decreases due to targeting.
Iyer et al. (2005) predicts more extensive advertising for comparison-shopping
segment when reservation prices increase, as it allows firms to extract more
consumer surplus from the buyers with stronger product preferences. He also
considers a positive relationship between targeted informative advertising and
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prices. Moreover, targeted advertising is expected to have a bigger effect on
profits than targeted pricing. Similarly, Esteban et al. (2001, 2006) find positive
relationship between targeted advertising and prices when consumers have high
valuations for a product, while Bester and Petrakis (1996) show the opposite
relation for low valuation buyers.
Hermalin and Katz (2006) draw attention to the importance of the level
of targeting technology development: while perfect targeting is expected to
increase efficiency, a moderate ability to target consumers reduces social welfare.
Likewise, Johnson (2013) assumes a quasiconvex U-shaped utility function of
online targeting, where consumers dislike imperfectly targeted ads but start to
appreciate benefits once the technology reaches a certain degree of precision and
sophistication.
Roy (2000) predicts a socially efficient equilibrium where all consumers have
homothetic identical preferences, are captive and divided among mutually exclu-
sive segments, in which advertising volume is minimized to a socially desirable
level and companies appropriate all consumer surplus.
According to Esteban et al. (2001) consumer surplus and social welfare loss
caused by the increased monopoly power due to targeting outweigh the gain
from prevention of advertising wasting. Moreover, they predict the growth of
market prices and media specialization beyond the socially optimal level.
In a later development of the model, Esteban et al. (2006) distinguishes
between the high- and low-end quality, dependent on whether willingness-to-
pay for a better quality is high or low. They find that the use of customer-
directed advertising in the high-end case increases price and quality and is less
likely to create a social welfare loss. The effect of upsurge in price and quality
on the market power in this case is oppositely-directed. In contrast, the use
of targeting in low-end case strengthens market power through a reduction of
quality, regardless of the change in prices, creating, however, a social welfare loss.
Finally, authors conclude that private and social incentives to use targeting are
balanced, while quantity and quality supply incentives are misaligned. Further
welfare implication analysis in Esteban and Hernández (2016) concludes that
targeting is always beneficial for social welfare compared to the mass media
advertising. Although low advertising prices and low specialization of targeting
increase consumer surplus, and thus, are Pareto superior, they may have a
downsizing effect on consumer surplus when specialization reaches a sufficiently
high level. This has a particularly important implication in the context of digital
advertising.
Persuasive targeted advertising causes an increase in prices and producers’
profit by raising reservation price rather than by reducing search or transporta-
tion costs (Egli, 2015). Gnutzmann (2014) predicts the detrimental effect of
dynamic behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) on consumer surplus and
social welfare, when switching costs exceed the price reduction arisen from a
stronger competition. Esteves and Cerqueira (2014) show price growth in the
first period followed by a subsequent drop in the second period causing negative
effect on consumer welfare. Although the model considers product heterogene-
ity and imperfect information market, it makes several assumptions that are
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not likely to hold in the real world, e.g., inability of consumers to buy a prod-
uct without receiving an informative ad, and the guaranteed purchase by all
informed consumers.
Chen and Pearcy (2010) view BBPD model from a perspective of time-
dependent preferences: when correlation is strong, BBPD increases consumer
surplus.
Thus, the effect of targeting on welfare depends on a number of factors,
including product quality, consumer valuations and preferences, accuracy of
targeting, and whether the ad is informative, price or non-price, etc. The con-
clusions of various schools of advertising are controversial. However, the impact
of targeting in advertising is expected to be positive if it is not accompanied by
the extraction of consumer surplus through price-discriminating practices, and
decrease in quality. The effect of personalized advertising offers on consumers’
welfare positively relates to the accuracy of an employed targeting technique.
So far I have been focused on the literature related to the traditional ad-
vertising channel. In the next section I move attention towards a more recent
marketing tool - online advertising. I first describe the current infrastructure
and state-of-the-art in that industry, then I analyze the models of targeting
in online advertising; finally, I discuss how Internet advertising influences the
well-being of the various elements of its ecosystem.
1.3 Advertising in digital media
Online advertising industry has complex and dynamically expanding infrastruc-
ture often referred to as advertising ecosystem. In a nutshell, there are publish-
ers (websites that release content in the Internet, e.g., news, search engines or
video-sharing websites) and advertising networks that play a role of brokers con-
necting publishers with advertisers (firms that pay for the placement of their
advertising content on the publishers’ websites, e.g., retailers or car produc-
ers). Finally, audiences are the users that visit websites and receive publishers’
content together with the sponsored content. In this section I will discuss the
influence of digital advertising on each of these advertising ecosystem’s compo-
nents. To start I first briefly explain how the programmatic ad buying (PAB)
system works.
PAB is a fully automated system of individualized buying and selling of ad-
vertising inventory in real time. The assignment of ad impressions to advertis-
ing slots happens through an auction called real-time bidding (RTB). Typically,
when user visits a website she prompts a bid request that goes from the pub-
lisher to an ad exchange. This bid contains a parcel of information about the
user, e.g., demographics, location, browsing history, etc. Tracking of the users’
past activities in the Internet in general or on the seller’s website specifically,
usually by placing a cookie on their devices, gave rise to behavioral targeting, a
special kind of targeting based not only on the demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of the user, but also on his browsing history. Behavioral target-
ing made it possible for advertisers to identify the profile of a certain user before
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placing a bid and, therefore, to target ads more accurately. Being a platform
facilitating the buying and selling of advertising inventory, ad exchange reveals
the bid request to multiple ad networks and collects the advertisers’ bids. The
ad impression of the highest bidder is then served on the publishers’ website.
The whole process just described usually takes about 100 milliseconds from
submitting the bid request to serving an ad. Therefore, RTB happens automat-
ically, based on the parameters set by advertisers. These parameters include
the upper boundary of bids, advertising campaign budget, user-related criteria
of bidding, such as their demographics, conversion data, behavioral profiles, etc.
Special technologies, based on the probabilistic models of user clicks and con-
versions depending on their profiles, help to determine in real time the value
of individual impression. Advertisers use such technologies, called demand-side
platforms (DSP), for organizing the workflow and reporting on ad-purchasing
transactions. To manage the transactions with multiple advertising networks,
publishers also use specific technologies, called supply-side platforms. Due to
the two-faced nature of interactions, RTB is usually described as a two-sided
market.
Internet advertising pricing models may be broadly divided into two large
groups: 1) cost-per-impression (CPI); and 2) cost-per-action (CPA), also re-
ferred to as cost-per-acquisition, or cost-per-conversion. CPI model is derived
from traditional advertising and was adopted at the early stages of online ad-
vertising development. According to CPI, advertiser pays for each impression
viewed by a potential customer. As the volume of advertising is usually large,
especially on the web, the cost is often defined for a thousand impressions, or
cost-per-mille (CPM). However, it is not always possible to determine whether
a customer has actually seen the ad. Therefore, CPA model emerges, where
advertisers pay only for the ads for which an acquisition has occurred. This
acquisition specified in the terms of agreement with publisher can be defined
as click on the ad, contact request, registration, newsletter sign up, purchase,
etc. For example, in the cost-per-click (CPC) model, the most popular form of
CPA, advertisers pay only for the ad impressions that were clicked by the cus-
tomers. CPA is better adapted to the measurement of advertising effectiveness
than CPI, as it provides the metrics of users’ interest and attention toward an
ad due to enhanced ability to track users’ behaviors and individual reactions to
a certain ad.
Programmatic ad buying and behavioral targeting have revolutionized the
way online advertising is traded now: it has became much easier to target a
certain population precisely and at a low cost and to personalize the offers on
the basis of the consumers’ preferences inferred from the past online behaviors.
Therefore, consumers are supposed to receive more relevant ads and save more
on searching costs. Advertising industry report, based on a conjoint market
research, claims that consumers absorb two thirds of the total Internet welfare,
mostly through information- and communication-based consumer services (IAB,
2010). The distribution of consumer surplus is skewed with 60% of the gain
captured by young aﬄuent users living in big cities.
PAB seems to benefit the other side of the market as well. In 2014 it com-
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prised one-fifth of the total digital advertising revenue, which was divided be-
tween ad-tech companies and publishers in proportion of 55/45 (IAB, 2015a).
The use of automated buying systems claims to increase the efficiency and reli-
ability of ad inventory management and to decrease costs. The decreased price
of advertising, however, results in excessive volumes: ComScore reported that
in total 5.3 trillion of display ads were served in 2012 (Morrissey, 2013).
However, white papers are often apt to subjectivity. Therefore, in the next
section I will focus on scientific sources to scratch the surface of a modern
dilemma on who eventually gains and who bears the burden of online advertising
deployment? I will summarize both the theoretical predictions and empirical
evidence on the effects of digital advertising first on advertisers and industry as
a whole, and then on consumers.
1.3.1 Theoretical predictions on the impact of digital ad-
vertising on consumer surplus and net welfare
Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) provide a comparative welfare analysis of ad-
vertising in traditional and digital media. They acknowledge positive relation
between targeting and social welfare due to improved matching, but point out
that the effect of targeting on producers’ revenue depends on the size if the
business: small and large companies gain from targeting and medium size firms
may experience losses on the early stages of targeting employment.
Informative view of advertising emphasizes the positive effect of ads on re-
duction of search costs, which is especially beneficial for consumers with high
time costs or when alternative methods of acquiring information are inefficient
(Verma, 1980; Laband, 1986; Sauer and Leﬄer, 1990). Malheiros et al. (2012)
see an additional benefit of ad offers’ personalization on the reduction of irrele-
vant ads and prices of the products and services, together with the granted free
access to the websites’ content.
Ehrlich and Fisher (1982) view advertising incorporated in a broader theory
of selling efforts and thus being interdependent on the decisions about alter-
native informational services, such as trade shows, customer services or store
displays, their prices and welfare impact. They found an empirical evidence of
detrimental effect of advertising on time cost, which, in turn, is derivative of
search efforts. Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) also directly include the opportunity
cost of time into their model of Internet users’ surplus calculations.
Stivers and Tremblay (2005) consider the strong positive effect of informa-
tive advertising for the search goods on consumer surplus and social welfare
and negative effect in the case of persuasive advertising as it does not affect the
consumers’ search costs. Instead of looking on advertising from only one angle,
Hoffmann et al. (2014) consider ads as informative and persuasive simultane-
ously. In this condition behavioral targeting increases consumer welfare if they
are aware about data collection practices (e.g., through consent mechanism) and
when firms are not involved in price discrimination. Intense competition among
firms protects unwary consumers from being exploited.
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Johnson (2013) finds that the reduction of advertising intensity leads to
the social benefits by making both consumer and producer better off only if
cost/benefit ratio for the buyers exceeds such ratio for the sellers. While tar-
geting is lucrative for all firms, it is more beneficial for the niche firms that
are able to reach “the long tail of the Internet” and match their offers to the
niche consumers, making them better off as well. However, on the general pop-
ulation of consumers, the proliferation of targeting has two oppositely directed
effects: increased relevance of ads and increased advertising volume. Therefore,
consumers, subject to advertising avoidance, may react on excessive advertising
intensity with the ad-blocking activities. Such blocking causes the loss of firms’
surplus but benefits all consumers, first, by reducing the advertising volume,
and second, by removing irrelevant ads from circulation.
De Corniere and De Nijs (2016) include the privacy component and ad plat-
form revenue in their welfare analysis. They found that the disclosure of per-
sonal information increases net welfare and leaves a bigger portion of profit to
the winning bidder, which otherwise would be completely absorbed by the plat-
form. Better preference matching may outweigh consumers’ welfare loss from
increased prices and, therefore, firms have an incentive to avoid personalized
pricing.
Advertising (especially in the case of repeated exposure) increases the proba-
bility of the product to be included in the consideration set (Shapiro et al., 1997;
Mehta et al., 2003; Terui et al., 2011). If targeted offer has high-value for con-
sumer, then according to the consideration set formation model (Hauser and
Wernerfelt, 1990) she would be discouraged from continuous exploration and
evaluation of other options. Therefore, although from the firms’ perspective,
personalization leads to a higher level of competition due to the low differentia-
tion (Zhang, 2011), from the users’ perspective, targeted advertising can inhibit
exploration in goal-oriented search (Fong, 2012). That has a particularly nega-
tive effect on sales for the products about which consumers have low awareness
or familiarity. It violates the prescription of a normative theory to start explo-
ration from the higher variance options (Weitzman, 1979) and therefore, may
be sub-optimal for the consumer welfare, especially in the long run.
In their game theoretic model, Xu et al. (2012) argue that although organic
listings may reduce firms’ revenues in the short run, they improve social welfare
and long-term business prosperity due to increase in consumer surplus, sales
diversity, consumer base growth, and adjustment of the bidding outcome.
Anderson et al. (2007); Anderson and De Palma (2013) predict a positive ef-
fect of ad price increase on consumers’ surplus and firms’ revenues due to crowd-
ing out the low-quality messages and increasing the probability of remaining ads
to be examined.
Bruestle (2014) derives a model of strategic ad platform inefficiency, where
interests of advertisers and ad-tech companies are misaligned to a point where
ad seller even has an incentive to show ads to the “wrong” consumers, which are
less likely to buy the advertised product. In the pay-per-click pricing model, in
which advertiser pays to advertising platform for an ad only if a user has clicked
on it, ad seller is trying to maximize the number of clicks. By showing the ad
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to the low-valuation consumers, who are not expected to make a purchase, ad
platform induces the reduction in product price that in turn makes consumers
more likely to click on the ad of such product, increasing the advertising industry
revenue, but not the firms’ sales. Bruestle (2014) shows that take-it-or-leave-
it pricing model in which ad platform influences ad price rather than number
of clicks leads to a more efficient targeting. However, the models proposed by
Bruestle (2014) lack the empirical evidence.
For the similar reason advertising agency is not incentivized to eliminate the
ad inventory for a certain product from the circuit of exposures to a particular
user, even after this user has already bought a product. For example, imagine a
user searching for a new smartphone. This user is tagged as “interested in buying
a smartphone”. Therefore, the advertising of smartphones may be considered
as relevant for this user, satisfying the idea of both informative and persuasive
schools, because companies deliver the information about their products that
may satisfy the detected need and, at the same moment, try to persuade the
user to buy a product of a particular brand. After the consumer has bought the
smartphone, ad platform is often informed about this event because it is tracking
consumers’ online activities, and technically is able to remove the tag of “interest
in buying a smartphone” from this particular user. However, in reality it does
not remove the tag in order to preserve the revenue flow. This action violates the
primary role of advertising to match sellers to buyers. Therefore, such actions
may be considered as examples of strategic ad platform inefficiency.
Thus, targeting is expected to have positive effect on the net and consumer
welfare if it improves buyer-product matching and reduces search and trans-
portation costs. Excessive volumes of advertising, non-transparent and dis-
criminating practices that often accompany targeting deteriorate the net and
consumer welfare. As an additional spillover targeting is found to inhibit con-
sumers’ exploration activities that may be sub-optimal in the long run. In the
next section I turn to the empirical evidence of the influence of digital advertis-
ing in general, and targeting in particular, on the industry and consumers.
1.3.2 Empirical evidence on the impact of digital adver-
tising
1.3.2.1 The effects of digital advertising on industry
Together with artificial intelligence technologies the programmatic advertising
facilitates the use of behavioral data generated by numerous online tracking sys-
tems for fine-grained targeting of advertising offers to the particular audiences.
Search ads (i.e. sponsored links on the search engine result pages) increase
the number of websites’ visits by 15%, and sales by 48% (Sahni, 2015). On-
line display ads, which appear on the publishers’ websites in a form of banners,
pop-up windows, videos, etc., increase site visits by 16% and conversion rates
by 8% (Johnson et al., 2015b). 18% of online advertising revenue accounts for
behavioral targeting (IAB, 2010). On average, targeting increases CTR by 65%,
brand search ad effectiveness by 40% (Farahat and Bailey, 2012), and consumer
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welfare by 60% (Jeziorski and Segal, 2015). Counterfactual experiments in Yang
and Ghose (2010) show increase in click-through-rates (CTR) (6.6% vs. 2.77%)
and in conversion rate (5.71% vs. 1.67%) for paid search results compared to the
organic listings. This is translated into 3.1 times growth of the advertiser’s rev-
enue. The willingness to pay the price for the targeted ads is 2.68 times higher
than the cost of run-of-network advertising, suggesting the generally positive
value of targeting for advertisers (Beales, 2010). Aziz and Telang (2016) ana-
lyze the bid requests and subsequent purchasing data and find that targeting
is effective, and that some privacy-intrusive temporal information (e.g., about
past visits of the advertiser’s website) improves advertising effectiveness by 30%
with regard to random targeting. Johnson et al. (2016) find that retargeting
increases website visits by 17%, the number of transactions by 12%, and sales
by 11%.
However, other empirical studies conclude that the effect of advertising can
be often overestimated. Some big companies, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co.,
publicly admit that targeted advertising campaign in Facebook is less effective
than general advertising with broader audience reach (Terlep and Seetharaman,
2016). I further support the discussion of the factors that may impede the
actual effectiveness of digital advertising and targeting with empirical findings
from the literature.
One of the reasons, why industry-stated effectiveness rates may be exagger-
ated, is related to the methodological mistakes. For example, once controlled
for category and brand interest, consumers do not respond to targeted ads
differently from untargeted users (Farahat and Bailey, 2012). Another method-
ological issue is a self-selection bias: people with higher purchase intent, and
therefore, higher probability to convert, are more likely to click on the ad or paid
search result. Indeed, Aziz and Telang (2016) show that targeted advertising is
positively correlated with the users’ baseline purchase probability.
Based on the self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), Summers et al. (2016)
study social labeling effect of behaviorally targeted advertising and concludes
that the positive influence of such personalized offers on purchasing intent is
mediated by the relevance of implied label, i.e. by the accurate prediction of
the close connection between social label and the consumers’ past behavior.
The timing also matters. Lambrecht and Tucker (2013) show that target-
ing may be less effective on the early stages of purchasing process. Empirical
study in Yan et al. (2009) demonstrates that the value of behavioral informa-
tion decreases over time: targeting based on one-day old search history causes a
670% improvement in CTR, whereas the information about one-week old search
queries increases CTR only by 300%.
The research conducted by Google (2014) finds that 56.1% of served impres-
sions are not even viewed by the users, mostly because of the page position,
ad size, and device screen settings. The Interactive Advertising Bureau called
the advertising industry to recognize and transit from 2015 to the new trans-
action principles aiming to separate the served impressions into measured and
non-measured, and to account for the 70% viewability threshold for the latter
group. Interestingly, this requirement demands publishers to deliver “all make-
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goods <. . . > in the form of additional viewable impressions, not cash” (IAB,
2015b, p. 3). In other words, advertisers’ expenses spent on the ads that even-
tually were not viewed are not going to be reimbursed, but converted into addi-
tional bundle of viewable impressions. It means that because of its detrimental
effect on advertising industry’s revenues, no question is arisen about reduction
of the gross ad volume, which could have had a positive impact on consumers’
attention. Instead, advertising industry offers to increase advertising intensity
by providing the second chance to deliver an ad that was not viewed, this time
“for free”.
Nevertheless, even delivered and viewable ads are not necessarily noticed by
consumers. The phenomenon of “banner blindness”, when users avoid looking
at banner ads, was first introduced by Benway (1998). Numerous studies used
eye-tracking technologies to investigate the phenomenon and found affirmative
evidence (Drèze and Hussherr, 2003; Lapa, 2007; Chatterjee, 2008; Hervet et al.,
2011; Owens et al., 2011; Resnick and Albert, 2014).
The tiny fraction of viewable and seen ads still does not necessarily trans-
late into action. CTR has been shown as imprecise measurement of the ad
effectiveness, because only a little proportion of clicks on banner ads converts
into purchase (Chatterjee et al., 2003; Moe and Fader, 2004), while nonetheless
may contribute to the enforcement of brand positioning, awareness, and loyalty.
Pretarget and ComScore analysis of 263 million ad impressions collected over
9 months across 18 advertisers from various industries revealed that Pearson
correlation between gross impressions and conversion is only 0.17, providing
the evidence of the low efficiency of the “spray and pray” approach (ComScore,
2012). Moreover, clicks on ads are often accidental (Felix, 2012) or represent
shortcuts for faster access to intended websites (Blake et al., 2015).
Another source of error in the ad accountability is the lack of transparency
of advertising system to advertisers themselves. Although ad-selling companies
provide frequent reports and analytic tools to monitor the advertising cam-
paigns’ performance, advertisers, in fact, do not have control over reliability
of this information. Neither do they know whether a particular user was tar-
geted correctly nor whether the impression was served to the specified audience.
Google AdSense terms and conditions state that advertising payments are cal-
culated on the basis of AdSense’s accounting, not on the advertisers’ traffic
analysis. The very process of RTB auctions remains opaque. For example, the
platform can adjust the payments by any amount “arising from invalid activity,
as determined by Google in its sole discretion” (Google, 2016).
Finally, the impact of various fraudulent attacks on effectiveness metrics has
been hotly debated over the last decade (Mungamuru and Weis, 2008; Stone-
Gross et al., 2011; Alrwais et al., 2012; Mladenow et al., 2015). These attacks
include activities of hired clickers, remotely controlled compromised computers
(e.g., clickbots), misdirected human clicks (so called “ghost clicks”), keyword or
impression stuffing, etc. The Association of National Advertisers predicted the
$7.2 billion loss in 2016 due to fraudulent ad impressions (ANA, 2015). Zain
(2015) reports that, on average, 50% of impressions are served to bots rather
than to human in-target audience. However, in 79% of campaigns only 1% of
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ads are served to non-human traffic (Lella and Lipsman, 2015). This means
that the loss is not equally distributed among advertisers, but rather a small
number of campaigns experience a large proportion of loss being heavily com-
promised by fraudulent attacks. If the victims of such attacks have a common
profile, for example of the small local businesses, the created misbalance may
hurt competition and shift the equilibrium. What are the campaigns typically
subjected to attacks and what is the effect on market structure and net welfare
are the relevant questions for future research, both theory- and evidence-based.
Ohm (2013) heavily criticizes the popular and often cited studies that em-
phasize the benefits of behavioral targeting (e.g., Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011b;
Beales and Eisenach, 2014) for being “based almost entirely on dubious and un-
stated assumptions” (p. 11), for using self-reported answers instead of solid real
behavioral observations, and for methodological and statistical analysis weak-
nesses (such as large variance, outliers, collinearity, and low model fit). More-
over, he draws attention to the fact that some studies (for instance, Beales,
2010; Deighton and Quelch, 2009) are funded by marketing associations, and,
therefore, might be subject to conflict of interests. Finally, he notes that such
studies seem to deliberately avoid comparison of behavioral and contextual ad-
vertising effectiveness, “cherry-picking” the cases that would qualify for research
purposes.
Strandburg (2013) argues that the main reason of contradictive evidence
on the supremacy of behavioral versus contextual advertising is related to the
difficulty of accurate effectiveness assessment. The results of 25 field experiments
with large U.S. retailers conducted by Lewis and Rao (2014) further support
the statistically small advertising effect and discuss such methodological issues
as selection bias, noise, and large confidence interval on return on investment
that impede the analysis of advertising campaign performance. They also point
out that randomized control trials with over 10 million users would improve the
reliability of statistical results but limit feasibility of such approach only to the
largest companies.
Moreover, the current structure of advertising eco-system raises an antitrust
issue. In Q4 2015, 75% of digital advertising revenues were concentrated within
top-10 advertising selling companies (IAB, 2016). Multiple functions, services,
and affiliations of online advertising value chain, such as publishers, ad networks,
ad exchanges, are often consolidated and controlled by a single leadership. In
other words, different players in the wide advertising eco-system are part of
few large companies. The most prominent example of such conglomerates is
Alphabet Inc. (informally refereed to as Google) that among other subsidiaries
and services includes advertising networks AdSense (advertising sales channel
and content targeting) and AdWords (media buying channel), AdMob (mobile
advertising), DoubleClick (bid manager), Invite Media (display advertising and
exchange bidding), and Google Analytics (web traffic analytics). High concen-
tration in the industry may be a perturbing signal of potential distortion of the
market equilibrium in favor of monopolistic stakeholders under a secure protec-
tion of legal departments, especially in the case of further relentless upholding
of their interests without an appropriate attention to the more disaggregated
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and unprotected parties, among which consumers are often pushed to the very
background.
On the other hand, small companies often experience difficulties with com-
pliance with the legislative regulation, which is becoming more and more strict
nowadays, due to the lack or large costs of legal advice and limited budget for
testing and deployment of privacy and security protective solutions. With this
regard large companies can offer a higher level of privacy control and protec-
tion, also because their established reputation is at stake. The consequences
of potential data breach may cost more than expected revenue gain due to the
introduction of a privacy-invasive practice. Finally, consolidated systems have
a greater market power and are able to offer better deal conditions leaving more
profit share to the publishers rather than dividing it between numerous ad-tech
companies. However, such effect will hold only in case of the presence of market
competition among advertising agencies, not at the monopolistic market. In
sum, consolidation processes in the advertising market has a potential for im-
proving the security and control over the advertising quality, ensuring privacy
compliance, and balancing the revenue allocation between ad-tech industry and
publishers (in the absence of monopoly), while increasing market concentration,
ubiquitous control, and expanding its power to a bigger number of aspects of
human lives, such as political opinions, knowledge, health management, etc.
Thus, the effects of online advertising in fact appear to be more opaque and
complicated than optimistic and enticing affirmations of advertising industry
to boost marketing campaigns effectiveness and revenues claim. Fig. 1.1 sum-
marizes the thorny path that each ad impression is supposed to overcome in
order to reach the promised success. The main reason why advertisers continue
the walk across this minefield is that the cost of failure to deliver an online ad
impression successfully is extremely low, so they untiringly pour fire of excessive
and intrusive advertising on consumers’ heads. Is it a shortsighted strategy in
the long run?
In this section I have summarized the effects of online advertising primarily
on the advertisers’ and ad networks’ revenues found in the theoretical and em-
pirical research studies as well as in the industry reports. In the next section I
focus on the effect of digital advertising on the end consumers.
1.3.2.2 The effects of digital advertising on consumers
Although theoretical models predict the reduction of search and transportation
costs, free access to the websites’ content, and increased seller-buyer matching
due to targeted advertising, the collection of vast user data, sometimes with-
out even clear idea about intended use and means of confidentiality protection,
poses a threat to information privacy and security, resulting in users’ discom-
fort, stress, and other negative psychological effects. Moreover, abundance of
the advertising content leads to a serious information overload, hindering the
cognitive abilities. Finally, targeted advertising sometimes creates the market
inefficiencies and negative economic consequences for consumer welfare. I now
will discuss each of these effects in detail.
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Figure 1.1: Decision tree for assignment of the cost of online ad impression
delivery under the pay-per-impression model
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Psychological effects Two-thirds of American users are not supportive of
behavioral advertising (Turow et al., 2009; Morales, 2010), one third is uncom-
fortable (Hastak and Culnan, 2010), and 67% of European users expressed con-
cern about lack of control over their information revealed online (Eurobarom-
eter, 2015). Although 74% of the interview respondents say that they would
prefer targeted ads to non-targeted, over 60% find targeted ads harmful, annoy-
ing or too persuasive (Melicher et al., 2015). Other surveys show even lower
acceptance of behavioral advertising (see Turow et al., 2009; TRUSTe, 2011).
While industry claims advertising to be a necessary condition for preserving
the “free” status of the prevalent proportion of the Internet content, 91% of
U.S. respondents disagree that it is fair to exchange the collection of personal
information for a discount (Turow et al., 2015).
Melicher et al. (2015) find that the level of users’ comfort with tracking
technologies heavily depends on contextual factors such as type of data being
tracked, frequency of website visits, and whether the tracker is a first- or third-
party entity. Very often tracking technologies are deployed against particularly
assailable population, such as children, people with health problems or in diffi-
cult situation in life (Angwin, 2010; CDD, 2012).
People are reluctant to share sensitive data (Leon et al., 2013), especially
when they perceive it as irrelevant for advertising or may be misused (Leon
et al., 2015). Imperfection of marketing data, in turn, accounts for imprecise
targeting (Van Zandt, 2004). Ill-customized ads lead to the consumers’ dis-
comfort (Malheiros et al., 2012), irritation (Thota and Biswas, 2009), reactance
(Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Edwards et al., 2002; Fitzsimons and Lehmann, 2004;
Ying et al., 2009), and sometimes even to embarrassment (Agarwal et al., 2013;
Melicher et al., 2015). Increased attention to an ad due to the application
of intrusive personalization techniques, for example, using consumer’s photo or
name, is offset by amplified users’ discomfort (Malheiros et al., 2012) that in turn
can affect purchase intention (Van Doorn and Hoekstra, 2013). However, the
justification of personalization deployment and high perceived positive product
utility considerably offset reactance (White et al., 2008).
Information overload Average U.S. Internet user is exposed to 1,707 ban-
ner ads per month. Millennials (24-35 year old) are served even more, over
2,094 banner ads per month (Goo, 2014). In the model of network of targeted
communication Van Zandt (2004) acknowledges that although information from
a single sender may be optimal, the total amount of information sent to a single
receiver may be overloading due to limited attention abilities. Therefore, the
average value of such information decreases. Moreover, the perception of inter-
ruption, advertising content incongruence with the task, and cognitive intensity
are recognized antecedents of perceived intrusiveness and subsequent ad avoid-
ance (Edwards et al., 2002). The empirical evidence proves that Americans are
most likely to ignore online banner ads (73%), followed by the social media ads
(62%), and search engine ads (59%). Millenials are likely to ignore digital ads
more than traditional ones (Morrissey, 2013).
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Although many studies confirm that generally users do not pay attention to
banner ads, Burke et al. (2005) show that banner blindness comes with a cost
for users by hindering visual search and augmenting the perceived cognitive
workload.
Since a seminal work on “Information processing models of cognition” (Si-
mon, 1979), a number of studies have investigated the consequences of informa-
tional overload (see Edmunds and Morris (2000) and interdisciplinary review
of Eppler and Mengis (2004)). Among the main effects and symptoms of in-
formation overabundance researchers highlight cognitive tension and stress, de-
creased accuracy of decisions (Malhotra, 1982; Schick et al., 1990; Hwang and
Lin, 1999) and greater error rate (Sparrow, 1999), increased time required to
reach a decision (Jacoby, 1984; Hiltz and Turoff, 1985), hurdles in identifying
relevant information (Jacoby, 1977) and reduced ability to use this informa-
tion for decision-making, often referred to as “paralysis of analysis” (Bawden,
2001), high selectivity and the neglect of a big portion of information (Hiltz and
Turoff, 1985; Herbig and Kramer, 1994; Sparrow, 1999; Bawden, 2001), lim-
ited search directions (Cook, 1993) and loss of differentiation (Schneider, 1987),
negative effects on satisfaction (Jacoby, 1984; Jones, 1997), and overconfidence
with respect to security because of the uncertainty reduction (O’Reilly, 1980;
Jacoby, 1984; Meyer, 1998). In the online experiment with over 1200 partici-
pants, Goldstein et al. (2013) find that when exposed to attention-captive ads,
subjects perform an e-mail classification task with less accuracy than subjects
in “good ads” or “no ads” conditions. Authors also attempt to measure the cost
of annoying ads as compensative wage differential, and estimate the premium
for low-quality ads to be $1.53 click-per-mille (CPM) with respect to no ads,
and $1.15 CPM – with respect to non-intrusive high-quality ads.
Market inefficiency Apart from psychological discomfort and privacy is-
sues, targeting can cause the real economic harm to consumers, for example,
through the price or offer discrimination (Angwin, 2010; Mattioli, 2012; Datta
et al., 2015), price steering (Hannak et al., 2014), etc. Not all consumers are
aware of such practices.
Ohm (2013) states that:
“Almost nobody can ever be persuaded by online ads. <. . . > Ads
simply do not work on the vast majority of people, and the only
reason they are worth outlay is because they are so cheap.” (p. 30)
He further underlines the big potential of subliminal effect of advertising and
warns that subconscious thinking is involved in 95% of buying decisions (Zalt-
man, 2003).
Hoofnagle and Whittington (2014) and Strandburg (2012) analyze the mar-
ket inefficiencies of online behavioral advertising deployment from the point of
view of transaction cost economics and traditional economics market failure ap-
proach. Based on their discussion, Ohm (2013) summarizes the reasons of such
inefficiencies as information asymmetry due to the lack of transparency, anti-
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competitive and entry-detrimental effects arisen from networking externalities,
and consumers’ failure of risk and cost assessment due to bounded rationality.
Diversity Empirical evidence suggest that targeted and personalized offers,
recommendations, and comparison matrices decrease the customer search activ-
ities (Häubl and Trifts, 2000; Tam and Ho, 2006; Fong, 2012), and therefore,
reduce the customer-level sales diversity (Xu et al., 2012), while increasing the
probability of finding and purchasing the niche products (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2011). As a solution, Rutz and Bucklin (2011) suggest the consumers to start
from generic search of the products and information, gradually increasing the
specificity through the filtering functions or brand search.
In this section I showed that online advertising, especially behaviorally tar-
geted, induces the high level of concerns, psychological discomfort, and real eco-
nomic harm among users. As the result of reactance, consumers start to take
vigorous actions in protecting their interests, e.g., blocking ads, using encryp-
tion and other privacy-enhancing technologies. The deployment of such tools
is disturbing both advertisers and ad-selling companies and is nudging them
towards the further sophistication of marketing techniques in order to overcome
the burdens imposed by users. The next section summarizes research about
privacy-enhancing technologies and its role in modern online environment.
1.4 What’s next?
In the previous sections I provided an overview of the theories, models and pre-
dictions of the various schools of thoughts on the role and impact of advertising
in traditional media that has been developed in the past. I then summarized
the results of empirical studies, including lab and field experiments, surveys,
and econometric analyses, carried out in the last two decades in the field of eco-
nomics of advertising, with a specific focus on online advertising and targeting.
In the present section I expand the argument to the topics emerged in the most
recent times and examine the ways in which users react to the development of
online targeted advertising and provide an overview of the technological solu-
tions aimed to help consumers to exert control over their online privacy. I then
analyze the potential effects of the deployment of privacy-enhancing technologies
in general, and the ad-blocking tools in particular, through the lens of theoret-
ical predictions and empirical evidence on the advertising restrictions. Finally,
I discuss the potential future of online advertising and the alternative routes
and strategies that advertising industry may adopt in response to consumers’
reactions, attitudes, behaviors, and needs.
1.4.1 Privacy-enhancing technologies
By privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) I broadly refer to a set of tools, ser-
vices, and protocols that can be deployed to protect individuals’ privacy through
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a variety of strategies, e.g., plugins, browser extensions, mobile applications,
that block ads, manage cookies, prevent third-party tracking, etc.
For the purposes of this chapter, I distinguish and focus on two functionalities
related to the protection from online advertising and targeting that could be
achieved using PETs: ad-blocking and tracking prevention. Note however, that
this distinction is contingent, because many of the tools that prevent websites
from tracking of the users, are also able to block ads.
Survey results in Chanchary and Chiasson (2015) show that users find track-
ing prevention tools (TPT) to be more useful than ad blocking tools (ABT) (55%
vs. 37%) and that 72% of them would prefer TPT to ABT. Similarly, in a 2,912-
participant online study Leon et al. (2013) find that willingness-to-pay for TPT
is higher than for ABT ($3 vs. $2.25).
The number of global monthly active users of various types of ad-blocking
software achieved 198 million in 2015, representing a 41% growth over the pre-
vious year and a $21 billion loss in revenues (PageFair, 2015).
However, the way ad blocking works now does not seem to allocate the
liability for losses among advertising ecosystem elements equally. An advertising
slot is put up for auction, using RTB systems various advertisers made a bid, the
ad inventory has been eventually sold, ad-tech companies have appropriated the
profit, but the ad exposure did never happen if the user enabled the ad-blocking
software. Therefore, the employment of ad blocking usually backfires to the
advertisers and publishers but not to the ad-sellers.
In response to development of PETs aimed to protect users, another body
of technological solutions is emerging from the advertisers’ side. For instance, a
tool called ClarityRay3 or a free JavaScript program offered by PageFair monitor
ad blocking on the websites (Ryan, 2016). When publisher detects the ad-
blocking activities it can explicitly ask users to disable ad-blocker or to whitelist
the website in order to access its content, like it is doing now forbes.com, for
example. The cost of deployment of such technologies again largely rests on the
shoulders of publishers, and the end consumers will inevitably incur the part of
these costs.
Interestingly, once the user allows a website to show ads, this website is
likely to remain whitelisted for a long period of time, even when the conditions
of the initial “contract” change, because users often tend not to revise their
decisions due to status quo bias. Some companies strategically exploit such
behavioral biases, for example by providing the limited default ad-blocking and
anti-tracking functionalities, and leaving the manual configuration of the setting
for the customers. As a result, 80% of users stick to the default settings that
provide the mediocre protection and only 15% of AdBlock Plus users set up the
plugin in a way that ensures a good level of protection from advertising content
and online tracking (Wills and Uzunoglu, 2016). Moreover, some websites do
not ask to disable the ad blocker right after detecting it. Instead, they first
engage user in reading an article, and then request whitelisting in exchange for
the access to full text. In this case user may feel too involved in reading an
3https://clarityray.com
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article and overestimate the benefit of immediate discovering of the rest of the
content over the more uncertain benefits of keeping the ad-blocking tool on.
Therefore, strategic exploitation of present bias may lead people to make the
myopic decisions that in a long run could harm their privacy.
Some companies (e.g., Admiral, Secret Media) go even further and create
anti-ad-blockers that “reinsert” ads and promotional videos into the websites
where they would be otherwise blocked. Practically, they make ads undetectable
by the most ad-blockers (Terlep and Seetharaman, 2016). Similarly, Facebook
announced in August 2016 an intention to make its ads more difficult to detect
and force the ad exposure on users of ad-blocking software. Vice president of
advertising and business platform in Facebook, Andrew Bosworth, agrees that
forced exposure to online ads of the users, who are actively trying to avoid them,
may increase the level of irritation among them. However, he prioritizes the ad
revenue matters over potential harm of customer experience. He also believes
that Facebook’s efforts to ensure relevance and appropriateness of ad volume
and to give control over the type of ads the users see are sufficient to keep the
“ad load” in a “good zone” (Marshall, 2016). Nevertheless, the criteria defining
relevance, appropriateness, and “good zone” boundaries are opaque and in the
whole discretion of the company.
The outcome of this ongoing conflict of interests, allocation of the surplus
generated by advertising, and the role of PETs in the “arms race” is unknown, or
at least uncertain, by now. In order to understand the effect of ad blocking on
consumers’ welfare one need to understand how the elimination of advertising
influences market equilibrium. Therefore, in the next section we investigate the
existing literature about models and empirical evidence (primarily from the field
and natural experiments) on the impact of advertising restrictions.
1.4.2 Advertising restrictions
Although the ad-blocking technological solutions are quite novel and specific for
the online industry, the idea of restricting advertising intensity in general is not
new. Since early 1970-s the researchers were interested in the examination of the
economic impact of constraints introduced to the traditional advertising indus-
try and developed a number of theoretical models, while the state regulators’
tests of the various advertising restriction policies and bans provided a great
opportunity to collect the empirical data for validation of the models through
the natural and field experiments. In order to understand and make the predic-
tion about the influence of modern ad-blocking tools on consumers’ welfare and
market equilibrium I start from reviewing the academic literature on theoretical
models and empirical evidence of the impact of advertising restricting policies.
1.4.2.1 Theoretical predictions on the effects of advertising restric-
tions
A model in Adams and Yellen (1977) shows that a ban on advertising may
reduce the producers’ costs by eliminating advertising expenditures, increase
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the monopolists’ benefits. The effect on social welfare, however, depends on
whether the prohibition of advertising creates or eliminates the gap between
equilibrium and socially optimal supply.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) find the Pareto deterioration effect of advertis-
ing ban, where the only remaining opportunity for a firm to signal the product
quality is through the price. Therefore, the consumers are worse off, because
they acquire the same information but for a higher price4. Kwoka (1984) also
predicts the detrimental effect of advertising restrictions on quality.
Bester and Petrakis (1995) link the welfare effect of ban on advertising to
the elasticity of demand: the welfare gain is expected in elastic demand market,
while in inelastic market, advertising and consumer transportation costs exceed
social benefit from the augmented output.
Repetition of advertising messages increases brand awareness, recall, and
chance to attract attention (Drèze, 1999; Pieters et al., 2002; Chatterjee et al.,
2003; Nottorf, 2014). Therefore, when the price of advertising message is low,
advertising intensity can exceed the socially optimal level. As the instrument of
regulation of advertising clutter, alternative to the complete ban, Anderson and
De Palma (2013) consider a cap on the number of advertising messages sent to
each consumer. The impact of such regulated cap depends on the outcome of
counteraction between the two opposite effects: the reduced congestion and the
limited ability of the higher-profit firms to stand out.
Thus, the theoretical models predict a negative effect of advertising restric-
tions on quality, while its influence on welfare depends on demand elasticity,
volume, and advertising role. Next section summarizes the results from empir-
ical research about restrictions on advertising.
1.4.2.2 Empirical evidence on the effects of advertising restrictions
The natural experiments based on the U.S. state-level differences in legal regime
of industry advertising conducted by Benham (1972); Cady (1976); Maurizi and
Kelly (1978); Feldman and Begun (1978, 1980); Kwoka (1984); Becker and Mur-
phy (1993) and a large-scale survey in Schroeter et al. (1987) have become the
classic examples of the impact of regulations applied to informative advertising.
The highest prices were observed in the states where advertising was banned
completely, slightly higher in the states with only non-price advertising, and
the lowest - in the states with no advertising restrictions. As the informative
school of advertising suggests, legal restrictions hinder the free flow of informa-
tion creating the entry-deterrence effects for the low-price firms (Benham and
Benham, 1975; FTC, 1980; Haas-Wilson, 1986). Glazer (1981) study of the im-
pact of two-month newspaper strike on the supermarket food prices, and the
longitudinal studies on restrictions of the price advertising in the liquor industry
in Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) and Luksetich and Lofgreen (1976) support the
conclusion about price increase after the introduction of advertising limitations.
However, as Benham (1972) points out, greater attention should be paid to the
4His model, however, analyses only market of the new experience goods rather than estab-
lished brands.
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possible endogeneity problem and to the disentangling of the possible confound-
ing factors that may affect both, the retail prices and advertising restrictions,
e.g., formation of the alliances among advertisers.
While Farr et al. (2001) agree that advertising restrictions increase prices,
their welfare analysis of U.S. cigarette industry suggests that elimination of
such restrictions increases social welfare only if the external costs of smoking
are low. The degree of consumer surplus reduction following the advertising
restrictions depends on the nature of such advertising: the effect is the smallest
when advertising is purely persuasive, moderate when it is informative, and the
strongest when ads are mostly image-creating.
Using data from American brewery industry Tremblay and Tremblay (1995)
found that the reduction of advertising expenditures below equilibrium level
causes price increase, while the complete advertising prohibition, in contrast,
decreases prices. Anderson et al. (2007) reach the similar conclusion: allowing
users to opt-out from receiving messages is socially preferable to the complete
advertising ban, while whether opt-out practices would outperform open access
is less clear and depends on the surplus gain and total number of opt-outs.
In the context of online advertising, Johnson (2013) considers three online
tracking restrictions policies: opt-out and opt-in plans that forbid or permit
firms to track users by default, and a tracking ban that prohibits user tracking
under any circumstances. Empirical analysis of the vast online ad-auction data
suggests that under those conditions online publishers’ profits drop by 3.9%,
34.6%, and 38.5%, that can be translated into $52, $471, or $523 million losses,
respectively. Advertisers’ harm is estimated even higher – 4.6%, 40.9%, and
45.5% of revenue losses under each policy.
Goldfarb and Tucker (2011b) analyze 3.3 million of survey responses and
demonstrate that introduction of the European Union Privacy Directive, which
limited the firms’ ability to collect and use customers’ data for targeting pur-
poses, reduced the advertising effect on purchase intentions by 65%. In a field
experiment conducted in the United States, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011a) show
that in the states, where alcohol advertising is banned, survey respondents have
8% lower purchase intention for such beverages. The between-states difference
drops to only 3% for the consumers exposed to online advertising, suggest-
ing that substitutability of digital and traditional advertising may reduce the
effectiveness of legal regulation of oﬄine channels. Additionally, the larger detri-
mental effect of advertising regulations on the novel and low-awareness products
provides evidence for the informative role of advertising.
Ohm (2013) points out that the firms may react on advertising bans by
increasing the level of ad obtrusiveness to overcome the “harm” inflicted by the
privacy regulations. He does not provide a formal economic model of the effect of
advertising, but predicts a potential short-term decrease in advertisers’ revenues
and increase in the unemployment rate for the advertising agencies that fully
rely on behavioral targeted advertising.
Thus, the empirical evidence on the effect of advertising restrictions is mixed:
in support of the informative role of advertising, ban may result in higher prices,
entry deterrence, and impeded information flow. However, policies that restrict
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advertising and online tracking, rather than ban the industry completely, may
make both consumers and companies better off. Therefore, researchers and
policy-makers should look for the more intricate tactics of advertising control.
Next section summarizes some attempts to find an alternative solution for bal-
ancing buyers and sellers interests in the field of online advertising.
1.4.3 Alternative solutions
The concept of “intention economy” (Searls, 2013) is seeking to empower users’
control over the access and use of their personal data. It argues that nowa-
days the companies are trying to react to the noisy signals about consumers’
needs and preferences by sending them sometimes not accurately targeted or
irrelevant offers, and sometimes even try to manipulate their behaviors and
purchasing intentions (Calo, 2013). In response Searls (2013) suggests to invert
the way the market is working now by giving the right to initiate the transaction
back to consumers. He believes that the optimal equilibrium will be reached
if the consumers will clearly state their needs on the marketplace, creating the
competition among companies for the possibility to satisfy these needs. Uber
and Airbnb are the popular examples of the first attempts to implement this
idea.
Ohm (2013) sees a great potential in using less intrusive forms of targeted
advertising, tailored to the context of the content, rather than to the users’
online activities. He also predicts the rise of paid services, such as paywalls,
in-app purchases, freemium business models, etc. Introducing payment for on-
line services may reduce market inefficiencies and improve welfare by better
matching the consumers’ preferences and firms’ offers through the price and
reputation mechanisms (Strandburg, 2012). The back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions in Budak et al. (2014) support the idea that a couple-of-dollar-fee for
monthly subscription would cover the revenue loss generated by tracking prohi-
bition. Some websites, for example wired.com and youtube.com, have already
successfully adopted that strategy.
Strandburg (2012) strongly believes in legal reinforcement, development of
technological solutions and privacy protective tools, business’ self-commitment
to treat users’ data in ethical way, and wider adoption of such practices as
privacy-by-design or Do Not Track (DNT) to be the important steps in the
process of online advertising industry development.
Advertising industry itself tries to introduce and comply with some self-
regulatory principles limiting tracking of the users FTC (2009). However, these
programs are usually limited to affiliated organizations (such as DAA, AAAA,
ANA, BBB, DMA, IAB) and require high awareness and proactive steps on
the part of consumers. For example, opt-out cookies, which demand the man-
ual updating and periodical renewal, can negatively affect user experience, and
may be removed either by the third parties or, unintentionally, by the user him-
self (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012). Online behavioral advertising notices, such
as AdChoice icon (Hastak and Culnan, 2010; Komanduri et al., 2011), and
self-regulatory opt-out pages fail at conveying clear information about advertis-
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ing practices (McDonald and Cranor, 2010) and suffer from usability problems
(Leon et al., 2012). Moreover, Hernandez (2011) finds that only one out of ten
examined ads contained the AdChoice icon. Thus, user choice mechanisms are
shown to perform poorly and may undermine the faith in effectiveness of such
methods and, therefore, discourage users from protective actions.
Users seek hopes in the deployment of ad-blockers. However, Madden (2015)
reports that 54% of survey respondents think that it is difficult to find and de-
ploy PETs, mostly due to lack of time and expertise, low motivation or disbelief
that such tools are effective in preventing tracking. Apart from the usabil-
ity problems (Leon et al., 2012), most of the current PETs fail to provide a
fine-grained control based on contextual factors that affect privacy preferences
(Melicher et al., 2015). Recently developed software, e.g., Adnostic (Toubiana
et al., 2010), Privad (Guha et al., 2009), RePriv (Fredrikson and Livshits, 2011),
and CoP (Bilenko et al., 2011), limit the tracking of users’ activities rather than
just prevent exposure to targeted ads, destroying the root of privacy concerns
instead of merely suppressing the visible symptoms. Nevertheless, the adoption
of such sophisticated innovative tools requires changes in the advertising indus-
try infrastructure that is currently poorly aligned with the ad-tech companies’
interests.
Another trade-off between industry revenue and user benefits is to control the
level of intrusiveness of online advertising and to allow only the least annoying
ads to be displayed. For instance, Forbes5 offers to its online readers “ad-light
experience”, but only for a limited time of 30 days. Upon expiration of the in-
dicated time, it requires either to whitelist the website in order to enjoy its free
content or to create an account providing personal details. Similarly, PageFair
offers to publishers the services that show only not targeted “magazine-like” ads
without animation. The more well-known Acceptable Ads program6 launched
by a popular ad-blocker, AdBlock Plus, calls advertisers, publishers, and ad
networks to join them in manifesting recognition of not disrupting, annoying,
or distorting the webpage content, but transparent and appropriate ads. How-
ever, Eyeo GmbH has been shown to accept payments from about 70 companies
(including Google and Microsoft) in return for being whitelisted in the default
configuration of the AdBlock Plus software (Marshall, 2015). This fact again
impugns the effectiveness, transparency, and integrity of the self-regulatory ap-
proach.
Finally, Ohm (2013) calls for rising consumer awareness about data prac-
tices employed by companies, “encouraging social shaming”, and triggering the
active social movement against privacy-invasive practices, which unfortunately




1.5 Discussion and conclusion
In the recent years online advertising has become a rapidly growing and im-
portant market for global economy. Online marketing channels are believed to
reduce the cost of advertising and to improve the seller-buyer matching due to a
better understanding of consumers’ preferences and personalized offers. Adver-
tising industry emphasizes the positive influence of online advertising on market-
ing campaign effectiveness, business revenues, and even consumers’ convenience.
Nevertheless, the white papers may be apt to subjectivity. The customers-
related consequences of online advertising do not gain enough attention in such
discussions and sometimes are not even taken into consideration, while the fine-
grained behavioral targeting comes with a cost for consumers: the vast amount
of user data is collected over the Internet, triggering the rise of privacy concern.
Moreover, low cost of digital advertising leads to excessive advertising intensity
in the Internet and provokes reactance and nuisance among the users. As a re-
sult, many users are seeking protection by the privacy-enhancing tools. One of
the most popular technological solutions is ad-blocking that filters advertising
content on websites and in mobile applications.
The aim of this chapter was to summarize the evidence, both from industry
report and, more importantly, from scientific sources, on the impact of online
advertising on economy in general and on customers in particular, and to un-
derstand the role of privacy-enhancing technologies on consumers’ welfare.
I started from the description of the state of the art in the fields of online
advertising and ad-blocking technology and introduced the main terminology.
In section 1.2 I summarized the theoretical findings and empirical evidence on
the impact of advertising in traditional channels, such as print media, radio,
and TV. I drew the particular attention to the models of targeted advertising
in the traditional sense, i.e. tailoring ads to a general set of demographic and
socio-economic characteristics of a particular audience. The conclusions of the
scholars from various schools of advertising differ drastically and often oppo-
sitely directed. The advocates of informative role of advertising that see the
main goal of ads in delivering the information about the brand, product, its
price, and characteristics tend to derive positive effects of advertising on sales,
competition, product quality, and consumer satisfaction. The supporters of
persuasive view on advertising assume that advertising distorts the consumers’
preferences and promote irrational brand loyalty. They are inclined to empha-
size the entry-deterrence and adverse effects of ads on consumer surplus and
prices. As explained by the both schools, the expansion of demand curve due
to advertising may be related to different factors, such as change in product
price; brand-, store-, or category-switching; redistribution; increased consump-
tion; stockpiling; or use of savings. The predictions about consequences of the
shift of demand depend on the assumptions of a particular model and on the
view on advertising. The most popular effects of advertising on objective and
perceived product quality and consumer satisfaction include repeat business,
efficiency signaling, quality guarantee, and product matching. The conclusions
of various groups of scholars are again controversial. The impact of targeting in
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advertising is typically viewed as positive if the practice does not preclude the
exploitation of the consumers’ reservation price for extraction of their surplus
through price-discrimination, and quality deterioration. Moreover, the effect of
personalized advertising on consumers’ welfare positively depends on the accu-
racy of an employed targeting technique: the more relevant is the personalized
offer, the more utility for a consumer has been generated due to targeting.
Although early theoretical models and empirical research studies did not
take into account the peculiarities of online advertising, the distinction between
roles of advertising holds for both online and oﬄine advertising, and the general
reasoning, patterns and most of the conclusions can be applied to the mod-
ern Internet advertising. First, the caution of all advertising school suggests to
control advertising intensity, because excessive advertising volume blocks the
generation of consumer surplus and social welfare growth, especially when the
increase in advertising intensity is not accompanied by a decrease in product
prices. The problem of excessive advertising volume is especially relevant for In-
ternet channel, because programmatic ad buying, cloud storage and computing,
RTB auction drastically decreased the cost and speed of advertising transac-
tions. Web advertising did not substitute the traditional one, but augmented,
while social media and proliferation of smartphones and mobile Internet have
farther expanded the horizon of advertising space capacity, leading to virtually
constant advertising overabundance. Such overabundance is one of the main
barriers of social welfare in traditional models of advertising.
Second important aspect highlighted in the traditional marketing literature
is related to targeting. It is true that modern technology permits the fine-grained
personalization of advertising offers, increasing the relevance and timeliness of
advertised products for the consumers. However, this targeting precision comes
with a cost of extensive personal data collection, which in the models of tra-
ditional marketing channels used to be more limited. The tradeoff between
personalization and privacy concerns is to be examined in the new models of
online targeted advertising.
Third, the brand-, store-, and category-switching effects identified in tradi-
tional literature on sales promotion effects gains a larger scale in the electronic
market. Aggregating websites (e.g., Amazon, Trivago) have increased the sub-
stitutability of the products, and enhanced the comparison shopping. On the
other hand, registration and creating profiles on the online vendors’ websites
generate users lock-in effects, impeding the customers switching. While tra-
ditional models predict redistribution of the resources and promotion of the
competition rather than structural change in consumers’ welfare, as a result of
consumers switching behavior, the tradeoff between enhanced comparison shop-
ping and strong lock-in and network effects is open to discussion in the modern
research on Internet advertising.
Because the literature on traditional advertising gave many helpful insights
about general impact of advertising on consumers’ welfare, but did not answer
to the novel questions specific for Internet advertising, in section 1.3 I moved
the attention to the more recent literature on economics of advertising in digital
media. As traditional advertising had a limited access to the user data, pri-
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vacy implications of targeting in the early studies were often ignored. With the
development of online tracking technologies, the amount of data collected from
the users, often invisibly and without their awareness, has been grown expo-
nentially, inevitably raising privacy concerns among the consumers. Therefore,
excessive volumes and non-transparency conquered their places among the im-
portant factors negatively affecting the consumers’ welfare through information
and cognitive overloading, psychological reactance and discomfort, decreased
productivity and accuracy of the decisions. While price discrimination has
been already discussed in the early models of targeting in oﬄine advertising,
it gained even more attention in the theories about online targeted advertising
as the ability, scale and precision of the reservation price extraction has been
increased after the introduction of online behavior tracking technologies. More-
over, the dynamic nature of the Internet and search engine algorithms granted
popularity to the price- and offer-steering practices manipulating the order of
the shown products, for example, by demonstrating the most expensive prod-
ucts first to the customers that potentially have a higher reservation price. In
line with the results of traditional advertising models online advertising mod-
els predict the positive effect of targeting on matching buyers and sellers, and
reduction of the search and transportation costs, even though the latter as-
pect is becoming a less important factor in the e-commerce setting compared
to the brick-and-mortar-store case. Omnipresent personalization of online in-
formation, from search results to ads, is shown to have a novel spillover of the
reduction of consumers’ exploration activities. With the support of empirical
evidence from the literature I have shown that advertising message is required to
overcome a number of obstacles, including, viewability issues, fraudulent clicks,
ad-blockers, and mere users’ attention limitations, in order to effectively reach
a certain audience. Most of the times, the cost of failed impression rests on
the shoulders of advertisers, publishers, and consumers, calling into question
the claims of advertising industry about effectiveness of online advertising and
behavioral targeting.
Moreover, the low transparency of tracking technologies and advertising ac-
countability per sé, high concentration combined with the self-regulated man-
agement calls for action the antitrust authorities to investigate the market struc-
ture and underlay practices in greater detail. Currently one relies on the market
forces to solve the conflict of stakeholders’ interests, as most of the issues in on-
line advertising are presently self-regulated by the industry. However, better
understanding of the factors that can rock the boat of marketing campaigns’
success may improve the predictability of advertising effectiveness and provide
to policymakers the tools for regulation of the industry practices with a better
protection of the customers’ interests and market equilibrium.
Finally, as ad blocking may be considered a user-initiated advertising restric-
tion practice, in section 1.4 I reviewed the theoretic and empirical literature on
the effects of policies restricting advertising in order to derive the impact of
privacy-enhancing technologies on consumers’ and net welfare. The low cost of
online advertising often pushes its overall volume beyond the socially optimal
level, hurting both the businesses and their customers. At the same time the
CHAPTER 1. 53
complete ban of advertising may lead to decrease in the quality of products,
increase in prices, search and transportation costs, etc. Introduction of cap on
the number of ad impressions per user or letting them to opt-out from receiv-
ing a certain type of advertising messages appear to be the better solutions
for consumers’ and net welfare. A better control of the advertising quality is
required as well. Other alternative solutions for improvement of the market
equilibrium include non-intrusive advertising requirements and their legal en-
forcement and intensity control, programs increasing consumer awareness and
business transparency (e.g., through consumer education and introduction of
special informative icons and messages), and deployment of the new business
models in which publishers’ revenues do not heavily depend on advertising but
rather on the monthly fees, additional paid services (e.g., paywalls, freemium
models, in-app purchases, etc.). However, a great attention is required to the
potential side effect of introducing such payments as it may impede the access
to information, especially for low-income and disadvantaged groups of people,
complicating the existing inequality issue even further. Moreover, if the access
to information from the independent and private media will be limited, it may
increase the power of public information providers, hurting the competition and
creating the favorable environment for politicization, information monopoly,
opinion polarization, and governmental propaganda, especially in the countries
under certain political regimes, with limited freedom of speech and loose moni-
toring and protection of the fundamental human rights.
Another group of scholars promote the development of intention economy, in
which users prompt their purchasing intentions and companies compete for the
right to satisfy the announced need. The success of the positive change in the
established situation in the first place requires a shift in the social paradigm,
which currently views the users as passive receivers of advertising content in
bundle with the online services. Online users often find themselves helpless
against the imposed conditions of using the Internet, with only few taking active
steps towards protection of their rights, for example by using ad-blocking or anti-
tracking tools. Enhanced awareness, and control are called to empower online
users rights and privacy, to improve their experience and welfare, and eventually









With development of World Wide Web and mobile technologies, electronic com-
merce has become a main driver of the digital economy. In 2016 e-commerce
market achieved US$322,171 million revenue in the U.S. (Statista, 2016), ac-
counting for 8.1% of total U.S. sales and 15.8% growth with respect to retail
e-commerce sales a year ago (DeNale and Weidenhamer, 2016). In Europe,
about 296 million online shoppers generated €455.3 billion e-commerce rev-
enue in 2015, demonstrating a 13.3% increase with respect to the previous year
(Willemsen and van Welie, 2016). However, the full potential of e-commerce
has not been reached yet, as only about 43% of the European adult population
shop online (Ecommerce News Europe, 2016). Therefore, investigation of the
factors that may help e-commerce to reach its full potential is of high demand
and relevance.
One of the main issues related to e-commerce is management of extensive
flows of information, containing terabytes of personal data. Large amount of
transactions and interactions between customers and companies now occur via
online platforms and mobile devices. Together with benefits and reduced costs
for market players, companies, and customers, it implies risks that range from
nearly harmless to significantly pernicious, including tracking of online behavior
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and location, intrusive marketing, data breaches, etc.
Since online shopping precludes disclosure of personal information (e.g.,
name and surname, credit card details, email and shipping address, etc.), it
inevitably creates privacy concerns for some consumers, which, in turn, nega-
tively affect their behavioral intentions (Dinev and Hart, 2006; Taylor et al.,
2009). For instance, 61% of surveyed Internet users refused to buy online due
to privacy concerns (Ryker et al., 2002) and 64% did so because they were
not sure about how their personal information would be used (Culnan, 2001).
As the result, inability to address privacy concerns induces customers to limit
their activity in the Internet (Hoffman et al., 1999; Arnott et al., 2007; Doolin
et al., 2007; Poon, 2007) and, in particular, inhibits online shopping acceptance
(George, 2004) and leads to multi-million-dollar losses in online sales (Odom
et al., 2002).
Many economic exchanges have experience- or even credence-quality nature,
i.e. the quality and risks cannot be assessed before a transaction happens, and
sometimes it cannot be estimated even after a transaction took place. Therefore,
engagement in economic exchanges requires trust (Tullberg, 2008). According
to social exchange theory, trust is one of the main business assets (Zucker, 1986;
Luo, 2002). As e-commerce presumes virtual buyer-seller interactions rather
than real, trust gains an even more crucial role in online shopping context than
in brick-and-mortar stores. Therefore, trust becomes an important factor that
drives online purchase intentions (Jarvenpaa et al., 1999; Grazioli and Jarven-
paa, 2000; Bélanger et al., 2002; Bhattacherjee, 2002; George, 2002; van der
Heijden and Verhagen, 2002; Corritore et al., 2003; Gefen et al., 2003; van der
Heijden et al., 2003; Pavlou and Gefen, 2004; Bart et al., 2005; Wu and Chang,
2005; Flavián and Guinalíu, 2006; Zhou et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2008a, 2012;
Tariq and Eddaoudi, 2009; Chiu et al., 2010; Delafrooz et al., 2011; Islam et al.,
2011; Al-Swidi et al., 2012; Ponte et al., 2015), and the lack of thereof prevents
customers from completing e-commerce transactions (Wang et al., 1998; Furnell
and Karweni, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1999; Gefen and Straub, 2000; Gefen, 2002;
Grabosky, 2001; Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002; Lee and Turban, 2001; Pavlou, 2003;
Kim et al., 2008a, 2011). For instance, NECTEC (2006) found that about 63%
of online users prefer not to engage in online shopping due to lack of trust.
Consumers are more likely to accept the perception of vulnerability when the
website is trustworthy (Pavlou et al., 2006). Furthermore, the high level of
trust propensity increases customers’ satisfaction and positively influences re-
purchase intention (Chen et al., 2015) that may further improve online sales.
Therefore, privacy perceptions and trust are important factors influencing
the success of business-to-customers e-commerce. A number of studies further
demonstrated the negative correlation between privacy concerns and online trust
in online shopping context (Cheung and Lee, 2000; Kim, 2001; Martin Jr et al.,
2001; McKnight et al., 2000; Ngai and Wat, 2002; Malhotra et al., 2004; Eastlick
et al., 2006; Van Dyke et al., 2007; Kim, 2008). For instance, consumers’ privacy
concerns were shown to decrease trust in vendor (Camp, 2002; Wu et al., 2012),
while trust, in turn, reduces privacy concern (Milne and Boza, 1999; Taylor et al.,
2009). Although Ponte et al. (2015) did not find the evidence of positive impact
CHAPTER 2. 56
of perceived privacy on perceived trust in the presence of other, potentially
stronger factors, the provision of privacy-friendly services may contribute to the
construction of good reputation and help to gain trust that is proved to be one
of the core elements mitigating concerns related to online shopping (e.g., P&AB,
2005; Culnan, 2001).
Academic literature recognizes the presence of privacy concerns as one of
the main inhibitors and trust as one of the main facilitators of online shopping
acceptance. Because users often judge the trustworthiness of companies’ web-
sites based on the inspection of surface elements (Kim and Benbasat, 2003), it
is important to understand what cues influence users’ beliefs about credibility
of these firms, and how these beliefs affect their willingness to buy from the ven-
dors’ websites. Therefore, present study aims at investigating the antecedents
of consumers’ perceptions of companies’ trustworthiness with respect to privacy
and the impact of these perceptions on subsequent purchase intention.
We present a model that maps the influence of various websites’ attributes
about companies’ practices on the consumers’ perceptions of companies’ trust-
worthiness with respect to privacy, and their impact on purchase intentions.
Using focus group we calibrate and then empirically test the model in an online
survey with 117 adult participants. We found that privacy (including awareness,
information collection and control practices), security, and reputation (includ-
ing background and feedback) have strong effect on trust and willingness to
buy, while website quality plays a marginal role. While generally trustwor-
thiness perceptions and purchase intention are positively correlated, in some
cases participants were likely to purchase from the websites that they judged
as untrustworthy. We further discuss how behavioral biases, decision-making
heuristics, and engagement in weighting risks and costs with expected bene-
fitsmay explain the discrepancy between perceptions and behavioral intentions
found in our study. Finally, we analyze and suggest what factors, particular
websites’ attributes, and individual characteristics have the strongest effect on
hindering or advancing customers’ trust and willingness to buy.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 reviews related literature,
presents a research model and related hypotheses; section 2.3 describes method-
ology; section 2.4 provides analysis of the results and testing of the hypotheses;
and section 2.5 summarizes findings and concludes.
2.2 Previous studies and proposed research model
2.2.1 Definitions and concepts
Electronic commerce (hereinafter e-commerce) represents a system of “consumer-
oriented storefronts, business-to-business applications as well as behind-the-
scenes business functions like electronic payment systems and order manage-
ment” (Conhaim, 1998; p. 13) and may take a form of business-to-consumer
(B2C), business-to-business (B2B), and government-to-constituents (G2C). B2C
e-commerce defines electronic business relationship between companies and in-
CHAPTER 2. 57
dividual consumers, B2B – between corporations, and G2C – between govern-
ments and different constituents (e.g., firms, individuals, government agencies).
In this study we focus on B2C e-commerce, defined as electronic business trans-
actions conducted by a company electronically through its website directly to
consumers.
Business models in electronic markets are broadly divided into 2 categories:
e-marketplaces (or online exchange, brokerage) and e-tailers (or online retail-
ers, merchants, e-shops) (Timmers, 1998; Applegate, 2001; Rappa, 2003; Hong,
2015). E-marketplace plays an intermediary role between buyers and sell-
ers, matching them and providing web-based transaction services based on a
brokerage fee (e.g., NASDAQ, e-Bay, Amazon.com, Taobao, Kayak, etc.). E-
marketplaces often aggregate the products from multiple sellers. E-tailer, on the
other hand, is a storefront of independent merchant, usually an online version
of traditional store (e.g., Apple Store, Nike.com, etc.). In our study we will fo-
cus on e-tailers, to avoid the potential confounding between the trustworthiness
perceptions toward a product manufacturer and a website selling it.
Trust is a multifaceted concept that includes interpersonal trust (in other
individuals or groups of people), institutional trust (in institutions, such as gov-
ernment, university, financial market, healthcare, communication media, etc.),
and organizational trust (in specific organizations and companies), and spans
across a number of sectors, such as communication, politics, business, etc. While
different types of trust are interrelated (e.g., individual’s organizational trust in
a certain bank depends on one’s institutional trust towards banking in general
and interpersonal trust towards the staff and managers of this bank), the im-
pact they have on decisions may differ. For example, interpersonal trust may be
more subject to the influence of contextual cues (such as mimics, clothes, voice,
mood), organizational and institutional trust is supposed to be more persistent
and stable over time, and rely primarily on reputation and fundamental beliefs.
For the purpose of this study we focus on organizational trust that occurs be-
tween customers and online merchants. Kim et al. (2008a) defines trust in an
Internet vendor (including trust in the website itself, its brand, and a firm as a
whole) as “a consumer’s subjective belief that the selling party or entity will ful-
fill its transactional obligations as the consumer understands them” (p. 545) 1.
To control for the influence of interpersonal and institutional trust, we also col-
lect information on general trust disposition, online shopping preferences, and
the general attitude towards e-commerce. Most of the existing studies exam-
ined the impact of general organizational or institutional trust. As e-commerce
raises high privacy concerns due to the extensive collection of personal informa-
tion, which have a great impact on trust and purchasing behavior, we believe
that a deeper exploration of the drivers and effects of domain-specific privacy-
related trust on purchase intentions is worth studying. Therefore, present study
1See Czepiel (1990); Beatty et al. (1996); Jarvenpaa et al. (1998); Ratnasingham (1998);
Hoffman et al. (1999); Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000); Gefen (2000, 2002); Urban et al. (2000);
McKnight and Chervany (2001); Bhattacherjee (2002); McKnight et al. (2002); Ba et al.
(2003); Corbitt et al. (2003); Gefen et al. (2003); Pavlou (2003) for alternative definitions of
trust in e-commerce context.
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focuses on a particular type of trust in an online vendor that occurs with re-
spect to companies’ privacy-related practices. We define trust with respect to
information privacy in e-commerce context as a set of specific beliefs about an-
other party not being engaged in opportunistic behavior such as selling, sharing,
or other misusing of consumers’ personal information. Such trust is expected
to positively influence the individual’s intention to conduct online transaction
(Preibusch, 2013). Hence, perception of trustworthiness with respect to privacy,
in our study, is a consumer’s belief about characteristic of a company and its
website that reports the level of online trust with regard to treatment of her
personal data. Our definition of trustworthiness perception is close to the no-
tion of privacy assurance in Lowry et al. (2012), based on the works of Kim and
Benbasat (2003) and Rifon et al. (2005). They define privacy assurance as an
“attitude that reflects how strongly a customer feels that their private informa-
tion will be kept private by a website with which the customer is interacting”
(Lowry et al., 2012, p. 756).
Some studies examined the positive relations between trust and willingness
to provide personal information (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1999; Cranor et al., 2000;
Schoenbachler and Gordon, 2002; Bansal et al., 2015). Although personal in-
formation disclosure is usually a necessary step in online purchasing process
(Ackerman et al., 1999) and may indirectly affect the likelihood of online trans-
action, in our study we focus directly on the willingness to make purchase as
a measurement of behavioral intention. Online purchase intention is defined
as a situation in which a consumer is willing and intends to make an online
transaction (Pavlou, 2003). While actual purchasing decisions would be a more
accurate measurement of consumer choices, the collection of such data is more
problematic due to a larger cost of experiment, increased heterogeneity, and
necessity of limiting the context to a certain product category and related price
range, which would negatively affect the external validity and generalizability of
the results. Although one may argue that willingness to buy a product does not
always translate in the real purchase, the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and
Fishbein, 1980; Featherman and Pavlou, 2003) and theory of planned behavior
(Ajzen, 1985, 1991) states that transaction intentions are positively correlated
with actual transaction behavior. Therefore, we believe that purchase intention
is an acceptable and reliable measurement of behavioral intent in our study.
2.2.2 Research model and related hypotheses
A number of models were developed in order to understand what influences
users’ online trust. For example, Cheskin and Archetype/Sapient (1999) report
distinguishes six building blocks of trustworthiness: seals of approval, brand,
navigation, fulfillment (including protection of personal information), presen-
tation, and technology. Model in Corritore et al. (2003) consists of external
and perceptual factors. External factors are related to trusters (consumers),
object (website), and situation (level of risk and control). Perceptual factors
include perception of credibility, ease of use, and risk. Bart et al. (2005) point
out the heterogeneity across websites categories and consumers’ characteristics
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and distinguish three main groups of antecedents of trust: consumer segment
(demographics and personal characteristics), company’s category, and website’s
characteristics.
Most of the trust models view trust as a general concept, while our study fo-
cuses on the trust particularly with respect to privacy. Liu et al. (2005) propose
a privacy-trust-behavioral intention model that has the most relevant structure
to the scope of our study. Empirical test of this model shows that privacy has
a strong impact on users’ trust in e-commerce, which in turn influences their
behavioral intentions. Similarly, Chen and Barnes (2007) show that perceived
usefulness, privacy, and security drive online initial trust, which then determines
purchase intention. However, our model differs from the one in Liu et al. (2005)
in several ways. First, we extend the number of privacy dimensions by including
information collection, control, and awareness (Malhotra et al., 2004) instead
of following the categorization of fair information practices (FTC et al., 2000).
Second, we separate security and privacy features. Third, we include website
quality and company’s reputation that are shown to be the strong predictors
of consumers’ trust. Finally, we focus on willingness to make a purchase as be-
havioral intention measurement, because it has the most direct economic effect
than websites visits, recommendations, or positive remarks about website.
Although we use our own model structure, we rely on the previous litera-
ture in choosing the factors for inclusion in the research model. Appendix A.1
presents the list of questionnaire items for our model. Factors influencing the
perception of companies’ trustworthiness regarding basic service provision (e.g.,
shipment, ease of use, navigation, return policy, etc.) rather than information
privacy were not taken into consideration in this study as they are beyond the
scope of the research question.
While trying to estimate the trustworthiness of transactional partners, in-
dividuals rely on three main criteria: reputation, performance, and appear-
ance. Reputation is viewed as retrospective of past behavior, performance –
as overview of actual practices and present conduct, and appearance – as self-
presentation (Sztompka, 1999). Following this taxonomy of trustworthiness as-
sessment criteria, we include four dimensions of antecedents of trust in our
model: privacy and security (performance criterion), website quality and visual
appearance (appearance criterion), and reputation (reputation criterion). We
will now discuss each of the dimensions in detail.
2.2.2.1 At construct level
Privacy Most of the trust models comprise privacy and security as the main
cogwheels for online shopping acceptance (Keisidou et al., 2011), for establishing
reliable long-term loyal relationship between companies and customers, and as
antecedents of trust (Yousafzai et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2008a; Escobar-Rodríguez
and Carvajal-Trujillo, 2014; Ponte et al., 2015).
Privacy assurances are shown to decrease privacy concerns, and increase
trust (McKnight et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2004, 2005; Pan and Zinkhan, 2006;
Lauer and Deng, 2007; Wu et al., 2012) and behavioral intentions (Wang et al.,
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2004; Meinert et al., 2006; Hui et al., 2007; Peterson et al., 2007; Tsai et al.,
2011). However, some studies show insignificant (Wang et al., 2004; Metzger,
2006) and even negative (Arcand et al., 2007) effect of privacy policies on trust.
Bansal et al. (2015) explain the contradictory nature of empirical evidence by
the lack of attention to the level of privacy concerns as the factor mediating the
effectiveness of the privacy assurance statements. Therefore, in our model we
include the control variables that measure general level of privacy concerns.
Some factors included in our model are positive (e.g., regarding transparency
in providing information about privacy policies), while others are negative (e.g.,
the prohibition to edit the list of permissions required during the installation of
a mobile application) or even may have an unpredictably ambiguous effect on
subjects’ valuations (e.g., when company asks a permission to use customer’s
current geographical location, on the one hand, it gives control over this piece of
information to the user, but on the other hand, the intention to use geolocation
may raise a privacy concern per sé). Therefore, we predict a significant influ-
ence of privacy-related practices on trustworthiness perceptions and purchase
intention, but leave the sign of these relations open for exploration instead of
imposing our personal opinion on that.
H1a: Privacy-related practices have significant effect on trustworthiness
perceptions.
H1b: Privacy-related practices have significant effect on purchase inten-
tions.
In categorization of privacy factors we follow the notion of Internet Users’
Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) (Malhotra et al., 2004) by including
collection, control, and awareness about privacy-related practices.
Collection considers the extent to which individual is concerned about the
amount of personal data in possession of others relative to the perceived benefits
and values. Collection is one of the main dimensions in the concern for infor-
mation privacy (CFIP) scale (Smith et al., 1996) as well. Information collection
category includes the aspects of business practices regarding the requirements
and ways of the users’ data collection, including deliberate information disclo-
sure, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and implicit inferences about users’ characteristics
from observed behavior, e.g., via tracking technologies such as cookies.
Control is related to the consumers’ freedom of choice and ability to ac-
tively control (e.g., approve, modify, opt-out, delete) their personal information
(Caudill and Murphy, 2000). In the control dimension of our model we include
the ability of users to grant permissions to the web services about access to the
personal data, retention of the information, and freedom to choose a registration
option.
Finally, awareness indicates passive control over personal information through
being informed and understanding of the privacy-related organizational prac-
tices. It is related to transparency about collection, storage, use, and sharing of
the information. Clear and credible privacy policies are shown to be helpful in
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building trustful relationships between online vendors and consumers (Schoen-
bachler and Gordon, 2002). FTC et al. (2000) recommendations about fair
information practices suggest to use notices and appropriate disclosures about
data procedural fairness in order to ensure consumers’ awareness. Therefore,
we include privacy policy statements and notice about use of cookies as factors
designed to enhance user awareness.
Security Security issues have been found of a serious concern among online
shoppers (Rao, 2002; Tsai and Yeh, 2010). Security perception indicates an ex-
tent of individual’s beliefs that the website of online merchant is reliable against
security threats (Meskaran et al., 2013). Security threats are “circumstances,
conditions, or events with the potential to cause economic hardship to data or
network resources in the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data,
denial of service, and/or fraud, waste, and abuse” (Kalakota and Whinston,
1996). A number of studies include security system assurances into antecedents
of trust perceptions (Ambrose and Johnson, 1998; Kini and Choobineh, 1998;
Teo and Liu, 2007; Ponte et al., 2015) and purchase intentions (Meskaran et al.,
2013). Following the studies of Hawk (2004); Efendioglu et al. (2005); Meskaran
et al. (2010, 2013), we also include a type of payment option as one of the an-
tecedents of security perceptions.
H2a: Security features have significant effect on trustworthiness perceptions.
H2b: Security features have significant effect on purchase intentions.
Third-party assurance seals, which guarantee to the users that the visited
website complies with the quality standards of particular operating practices
and privacy policies, and ensure secure payment systems (Shapiro, 1987; McK-
night et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2004) are strong predictors of security perceptions
(Kimery and McCord, 2002; Furnell, 2004; Sharma and Yurcik, 2004; Jiang
et al., 2008; Kim and Kim, 2011; Özpolat et al., 2013; Ponte et al., 2015)
and credibility in relation to privacy (Xu et al., 2009; Lee and Cranage, 2011).
While privacy seal is supposed to guarantee the website trustworthiness (Moores,
2005), a study of Edelman et al. (2006) shows that websites displaying TRUSTe
certification are actually more likely to be engaged in privacy-invasive activities
than uncertified websites. The evidence of the effect of third-party seals on trust
is also contradictory (Özpolat et al., 2013): some empirical studies find a posi-
tive impact (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2000; Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy, 2002;
Rifon et al., 2005; Wakefield and Whitten, 2007; Yang et al., 2006; Hu et al.,
2010), while others do not (Kovar et al., 2000; Bélanger et al., 2002; Mauldin
and Arunachalam, 2002; Pennington et al., 2003; Bart et al., 2005; Hui et al.,
2007; Kim et al., 2008a; Ray et al., 2011). Lowry et al. (2012) attribute such
inconsistencies in empirical findings to a measurement error (indirect versus di-
rect assessment of privacy assurance) and omitting of other important factors
in the trust models. Supporting the finding in McKnight et al. (2002) they sug-
gest website quality and brand image to have the strongest influence on privacy
CHAPTER 2. 62
valuation. However, as Hoffman et al. (1999); Dayal et al. (2003), and Ovans
(1999) argue, reputation and website quality features influence trust only after
security concerns are addressed. We, therefore, test the relation between various
factors in our model, and control for the familiarity with certifying agencies and
for the understanding of the technical security features.
Some studies include security features in the notion of privacy (Liu et al.,
2005), or even use privacy and security interchangeably (Ray et al., 2011). Oth-
ers view the effects of privacy and security aspects separately (e.g., Jarvenpaa
et al., 1999; Bélanger et al., 2002; Casalo et al., 2007b; Tariq and Eddaoudi,
2009; Delafrooz et al., 2011). For instance, Bélanger et al. (2002) find that
security features have greater effect than privacy statements, because security
is a more concrete concept, which is easier for users to understand, than pri-
vacy. Similarly, empirical studies in Pavlou and Chellappa (2001) and Kim
et al. (2008b) show a weaker effect of perceived privacy on trust compared to
perceived security. Carlos Roca et al. (2009) argue that due to a better fa-
miliarity with security technologies, relative ease of recognition of its features
(e.g., certificates, encryption keys, password-composition requirements), and in-
clusion of some privacy guarantees in security assurance, perceived privacy has
a smaller impact on trust for experienced users. Therefore, in our study we
separate the impact of privacy from the impact of security features, and control
for the technical and Internet experience of the participants.
Website quality and visual appearance Although privacy and security
policies, statements, and seals are designed to directly influence privacy per-
ceptions, they are shown to be more effective when combined with other, more
peripheral, cues, such as brand image and website quality (McKnight et al.,
2002; Lowry et al., 2012). Websites’ design appeal is a course of attractiveness
related to the visual presentation and structure of the website (Bansal et al.,
2015) that signals website quality (Wells et al., 2011), expertise and profession-
alism, and develops trusting beliefs (Wakefield et al., 2004; Mayer et al., 2005;
Dhamija et al., 2006). Fogg et al. (2001) consider aesthetics of the website as one
of the important drivers of trust. Egger (2001) focuses on interface properties
and design features, based on the assumption that consumers’ trust in online
business starts to form even before any online interaction has taken place. In
his model of trust for e-commerce, pre-interactional filters that antecede inter-
face properties are followed then by informational content. Moreover, trusting
beliefs are positively correlated with the absence of errors on a website (Bart
et al., 2005), accurate, current, and complete information (Kim et al., 2005),
and correct spelling, grammar, and syntax (Koehn, 2003).
Another reason why visual cues are important antecedents of trustworthi-
ness perceptions is explained by the signaling theory. Poor website quality or
slow performance does not enforce users’ beliefs that the company behind that
website will do any better in privacy and security protection, or delivering ser-
vices to customers (Bouch et al., 2000; Sillence et al., 2004; Bansal et al., 2015).
Positive beliefs about firms’ reliability, integrity, and professionalism are also
CHAPTER 2. 63
related to the amount of time, effort, and money that company has invested
in development and maintenance of the high-quality website, which is expected
to proliferate and have an effect on other organizational practices including pri-
vacy and security related (Dawar and Parker, 1994; Duncan and Moriarty, 1998;
Schlosser et al., 2006; Ray et al., 2011).
Hence, based on the findings in previous research, we include in our model
the aesthetical quality factors, such as professionalism of the general visual
appearance of the website and presence of the broken links and typographical
errors on it. As users tend to believe that online advertising follow the norms
of the websites containing this ad (Stewart, 2003), we include the presence of
suspicious banner ads as one of the aspects influencing the assessment of website
quality as well.
H3a: Negative visual cues about websites quality negatively affect users’
trustworthiness perceptions.
H3b: Negative visual cues about websites quality negatively affect users’
purchase intentions.
Firm’s reputation Reputation (or store image), as a result of social evalu-
ation and judgment, is a significant factor influencing the perception of web-
site’s trustworthiness (Smeltzer, 1997; Jarvenpaa et al., 1998, 1999; Grazioli
and Jarvenpaa, 2000; Peszynski and Thanasankit, 2002; Yoon, 2002; Koufaris
and Hampton-Sosa, 2004; Chen, 2006; Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006; Casalo et al.,
2007a; Sillence et al., 2007; Song et al., 2007; Teo and Liu, 2007; Kim et al.,
2008a; Meskaran et al., 2010) and purchase intentions (van der Heijden and
Verhagen, 2002). Similarly to the visual appearance of the website, reputation
of the company may serve as heuristic in signaling the reliability (Parasuraman
et al., 1985; Dawar and Parker, 1994; Ganesan, 1994; Hosmer, 1995; Grazioli
and Jarvenpaa, 2000; Gefen et al., 2003) and quality (Duncan and Moriarty,
1998) of the firm. Even though reputation is a primarily important antecedent
of trust on the initial stages of the vendor-buyer interactions (Koehn, 2003),
Ray et al. (2011) argue that it does not lose its role at the later stages of on-
going relationship due to the credence-quality nature of privacy, i.e. the level
of privacy is difficult to assess even after the transaction has taken place, and
therefore, users need to perpetually rely on a combination of sources to build
and maintain trust throughout their relationship with a vendor.
H4a: Good reputation positively affects users’ trustworthiness perceptions.
H4b: Good reputation positively affects users’ purchase intentions.
In our study reputation is comprised of two main components: firm’s back-
ground, and consumers’ feedback about the company and its products.
Earp and Baumer (2003) report that consumers express higher willingness
to disclose personally identifying and financial information to companies with
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well-known brand names. Brand image influences trust (Lowry et al., 2008).
Familiarity in general has been shown as an important condition of trust in
e-commerce (Luhmann, 1979; Bhattacherjee, 2002; Shim et al., 2004; Mollering,
2006). It reduces uncertainty (Gefen et al., 2003), concerns (Gulati, 1995), and
increases perceived security control (Ray et al., 2011). Display of the informa-
tion about company on the website, especially related to its oﬄine presence
(e.g., physical address, contact details), reduces the uncertainty about other-
wise “faceless” e-commerce (Fogg et al., 2001; Kim and Benbasat, 2003; Mayer
et al., 2005; Kuan and Bock, 2007; Bansal et al., 2015). The impact of using
photographs on the websites as a mean of creating the perception of social pres-
ence has no univocal empirical evidence. While some studies find a positive
effect (Steinbrück et al., 2002), others show insignificant (Riegelsberger et al.,
2003) or mixed results, and even consider photos as attempts to manipulate the
consumers’ online trust (Riegelsberger and Sasse, 2002). Therefore, background
aspects in our study include well-known brand name, the number of years in
business, and information about company’s history, and names and photos of
key people working there.
Jøsang et al. (2007) define reputation in e-commerce as a collective measure
of trustworthiness based on referrals or ratings from members in a community.
This definition is the closest to our notion of feedback. Customers’ feedback
(Resnick et al., 2000; Koehn, 2003; Walczuch and Lundgren, 2004; Lowry et al.,
2010), third-party assessments (e.g., rating services (Toms and Taves, 2004))
perceptions of social presence (Gefen and Straub, 2004; Hassanein and Head,
2004; Cyr et al., 2007; Hess et al., 2009), and, in particular, word-of-mouth
within social network (Kuan and Bock, 2007) are shown to increase trust. There-
fore, our feedback category includes customers’ reviews, opinions in online social
networks, and rating of the company in independent sources.
2.2.2.2 At item level
Selecting the items for survey we primarily focus on their relation to the main
factors influencing consumers’ attitudes that we will use later for the construc-
tion of indices. Analysis of the impact of these factors on trustworthiness per-
ceptions and purchase intentions is the primary goal of this study. However, we
are also interested in subtle differences between related aspects. For example,
with respect to company’s ranking we are interested whether there is a differ-
ence between online and oﬄine sources of this ranking, or whether there is a
difference between publishing customers’ reviews on the company’s own website
or on the independent website, etc. Hence, we distinguish the following groups
of related items: consumer feedback (FT/FP items 1, 2, and 5), ranking source
(FT/FP 3 and 4), access conditions (LT/LP 4 and 5), source of information for
recommendations (LT/LP 2 and 3), tracking (LT/LP 1 and 3), and app permis-
sions (NT/NP 4 and 5). We will now discuss our predictions of the difference
between the impact of the items within those groups.
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Consumer feedback Online review credibility is positively related to the ar-
gument quality of reviews (Cheung et al., 2012). Unbiased pieces of information
are more likely to be trusted (Sillence et al., 2004). Therefore, we predict that:
H5a: Customers’ feedback on independent websites has stronger impact on
trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions than users’ reviews on the
company’s own website.
About 30% of favorable reviews are fraudulent (Liu, 2012) and authors of
such manipulated opinions are often paid to promote companies and their prod-
ucts (Mayzlin, 2006; Hu et al., 2011b,a; Streitfeld, 2011; Kost, 2012; Tuttle,
2012). Consumers, aware of opinion fraud, may suspect overwhelmingly positive
reviews to be fake. As consequence, a moderate amount of negative information
in consumer review, as a proof of objectivity, increases its credibility (Crowley
and Hoyer, 1994; Jensen et al., 2013). Such two-sidedness of exposure to both
positive and negative aspects has been shown to have a bigger impact on be-
lief change inducing fewer counterarguments and decreasing source derogation
(Kamins and Assael, 1987; Kamins and Marks, 1988). However, in judgment
and decision-making tasks individuals tend to rely more on negative informa-
tion than on positive (Kanouse and Hanson Jr, 1987; Weinberger et al., 1981;
Skowronski and Carlston, 1987; Herr et al., 1991; Feldman, 1966; Ahluwalia and
Shiv, 1997). Metzger et al. (2010) find that users rely on negative reviews more
heavily than on positive ones, possibly because negative information is per-
ceived as more instructive and useful than positive information (Maheswaran
and Meyers-Levy, 1990; Ahluwalia, 2000). Negative reviews have been to shown
to have a greater impact on purchase intent as well (Weinburger and Dillon,
1980). Therefore, on the one hand, negative reviews may have a strong adverse
effect on consumers trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions than
positive ones, but on the other hand, presence of the solely positive feedback
may appear suspicious to the customers, as some companies are known to pay
for fraudulent favorable reviews. To test this idea, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H5b: Mixed (both positive and negative) customers’ feedback has less impact
on trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions than only positive users’
reviews on the company’s own website.
Ranking source When source of information is perceived as more reliable
and expert on a topic, consumers tend to associate a higher level of credibility
to the message content from such a source (Giffin, 1967; Pornpitakpan, 2004;
Ko et al., 2005). Improved ability of online media to aggregate information
better enhances the determination of credibility than the traditional authorities
(Flanagin and Metzger, 2008). The study of (Johnson and Kaye, 1998, 2000) and
focus group results in Metzger et al. (2010) show that users perceive information
found in online sources as more (or at least equally) credible than information
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in traditional sources. However, the “authority” heuristic (Hilligoss and Rieh,
2008; Sundar, 2008) suggests that users may perceive traditional sources of in-
formation as primary or official, and, therefore, develop a higher level of trust
compared to the online ones. Traditional sources of information are believed to
be unbiased and accurate (Mashek et al., 1997; Kiousis, 2001) due to established
professional standards and social pressure (Finberg et al., 2002), while websites’
content is not always subject to editorial review and factual verification (Flana-
gin and Metzger, 2000), even though Klein (2000) claims that the standards of
accuracy are the same for both types of media. Moreover, social presence model
(Short et al., 1976) claims that people tend to select the communication media
with the highest level of social presence. Since social presence is positively corre-
lated with trust (Gefen and Straub, 2004; Hassanein and Head, 2004; Cyr et al.,
2007; Hess et al., 2009), while new (i.e. electronic) media is more suitable for
the tasks requiring low social presence (Rice, 1993; Perse and Courtright, 1993),
then, given the similar content in both sources, the oﬄine source of information
may gain a higher level of reliability and credibility than online one.
H5c: Firm’s high rating in the traditional media has a stronger positive
effect on trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions than high rating
in online sources.
Access conditions As take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offers do not allow con-
sumers to access or use the services without personal information sharing, some
users have to provide false personal information (Phelps et al., 2001) or aban-
don the website (EPIC, 2000). Hence, users are expected to dislike TIOLI offers
more compared to the situations where they have more freedom in choosing the
level of information disclosure.
H5d: Users have higher perceptions of trustworthiness and purchase inten-
tions towards websites that allow access to its content without personal infor-
mation provision compared to the websites that do not grant such permission.
Source of information for recommendations Privacy concerns include
tracking through cookies and browser history (Wang et al., 1998). Perceived
risk related to the online behavioral tracking may negatively affect the long-
run relationships between online sellers and buyers (Jai et al., 2013), especially
when consumers are uninformed about such practices (Nowak and Phelps, 1995;
Lanier Jr and Saini, 2008; Turow et al., 2009). For instance, websites often track
users for the sake of data collection and its use for remarketing and targeting
purposes, i.e. delivering advertising related to the previous searches or other
online activities. Aguirre et al. (2015) found that click-through-rates are lower
when data for personalized online advertising was collected in a covert (vs. overt)
manner. This effect may be related to the sense of vulnerability. Therefore, we
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expect users to generally dislike covert information collection practices over
proactive information provision.
H5e: Websites that explicitly ask to share information about tastes and
preferences receive a higher score of trustworthiness perceptions and purchase
intentions than those that implicitly collect such information using tracking tech-
nologies.
Tracking The majority of users find targeted ads harmful, annoying, and
“pushy”, however, they are more comfortable with the first-party than third-
party tracking, which is related to the higher degree of trust to the tracking
party (Melicher et al., 2015).
H5f: Third-party tracking has a more negative effect on trustworthiness
perceptions and purchase intentions than first-party tracking.
App permissions A finding about drop in click-through-rates after users have
realized that information about them was collected without consent (Aguirre
et al., 2015) provides evidence of the importance of both control over one’s data
and awareness about practices involving processing of personal information.
Taylor et al. (2009) argue that the level of control over personal information
does not have a significant effect on trust, but mediates the negative relationship
between privacy concerns and behavioral intentions. To test this conclusion we
add the following hypothesis:
H5g: Trustworthiness perceptions about the web services that grant control
over degree of personal information collection and willingness to purchase from
them are higher than for the web services that do not provide such control.
2.2.2.3 Covariates
Angst and Agarwal (2009) claim that more persuasive messages are required to
affect the beliefs of highly concerned consumers. In accordance with Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984; Sussman and Siegal, 2003),
when assessing the trustworthiness, users, especially in their low-involvement
and low-privacy concern state, tend to directly rely on the source credibility pe-
ripheral cues, such as reputation and visual design, instead of spending cognitive
energy on effortful thinking (Taylor, 1981; Petty andWegener, 1999; Bhattacher-
jee and Sanford, 2006; Wells et al., 2011; Bansal et al., 2015).
Although some studies show that disposition to trust plays an important
role in assessment of credibility (Gefen, 2000; Kimery and McCord, 2002; Kim
and Benbasat, 2003; Salam et al., 2005; Teo and Liu, 2007; Lowry et al., 2008),
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others do not find a significant support of such relation (Koufaris and Hampton-
Sosa, 2004; Ponte et al., 2015). Lee and Turban (2001) demonstrate a mediating
effect of propensity to trust on the impact of website attributes.
Internet experience is positively correlated with trust towards e-commerce
(Corbitt et al., 2003). However, Aiken and Boush (2006) find an inverted U-
shape relationship, where trust increases at the early stages of using web and
then starts to decline because of rising privacy and security concerns.
Based on the suggestions of the previous literature, we collected via survey
(appendix A.2) the information about participants’ socio-demographic char-
acteristics, such as gender (Q3), age (Q4), whether they live in urban area2,
source of income (Q10), monthly expenditures (Q11), technical3 and Internet
proficiency (Q13), online shopping preferences (Q17) and frequency4, privacy
attitudes (including general privacy concern (Q22), willingness to provide per-
sonally identifiable information to website (Q27), experience of privacy invasion
(Q32), and Westin’s index (Q33, see Westin (1968)), and trust disposition5. Ad-
ditionally we include questions designed to elicit the understanding of Extended
Validation certificate (coded as 1 if subject provided a right explanation of what
does EV certificate mean in Q20, 0 otherwise) and cookies (coded as 1 if subject
provided a right explanation of what does web cookie mean in Q21, 0 otherwise),
and number of the third-party assurance authorities (e.g., TRUSTe, VeriSign,
etc.) with which subject is familiar (Q18). We also included the number of con-
nections in the primarily used online social network (Q35) and whether subject
uses real or pseudonymous name there (Q36). In contrast to the models that
consider consumers’ personal characteristics as one of the dimensions directly
influencing trust (e.g., Chen and Dhillon (2003); Gefen et al. (2003); Kim and
Benbasat (2003); Bart et al. (2005); Ray et al. (2011)) we include them in the
analysis as covariates.
2.2.2.4 The effects of cognitive heuristics and biases
The consumes’ judgments regarding companies’ trustworthiness may be affected
by a number of cognitive heuristics and biases. Understanding of such phenom-
ena may help to de-bias the decision-making process and improve the accuracy
of judgments. Apart from the already mentioned theories (e.g., ELM, social
exchange and signaling theory, theory of reasoned action and planned behavior,
etc.), the theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) has a great potential in ex-
plaining the process that brings various factors into action to change the online
2“Urban” index was coded as 1 if subject lives in a city with >10,000 habitants (i.e. if
answered 3, 4, or 5 in Q9), 0 otherwise.
3“Technical proficiency” index was coded as 1 if subject knows at least one programming
language (Q12), 0 otherwise.
4The “frequency of online purchases” index is computed using a single-factor measurement
model whereby answers to question Q16 are modeled as ordered logit (Cronbach’s alpha =
0.8854).
5The “trust disposition” index is computed using a single-factor measurement model
whereby answers to Q45-Q47 are modeled as ordered logit and answers to Q48-Q49 are mod-
eled as logit (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7696).
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trustworthiness perceptions. The notion of bounded rationality refers to the
limitations imposed by the nature of human mind and exogenous conditions,
and claims that individuals are constrained to make a decision using limited
computational resources and time (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). This argument
is further supported by limited capacity model (Lang, 2000) and prominence-
interpretation theory of online credibility (Fogg, 2003) that argue that due to
not infinite cognitive capacity individuals select only salient attributes for mes-
sages processing, which require an optimal level of cognitive effort to achieve a
sufficiently efficient outcome (Pirolli, 2005). To reach that balance and make
an adaptive choice people often employ cognitive heuristics (Hilligoss and Rieh,
2008; Sundar, 2008; Taraborelli, 2008; Metzger et al., 2010). Although such
mental shortcuts and rules-of-thumb sometimes result in biased decisions (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1975), more cognitively demanding information-processing
strategies are shown to be equally (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gladwell, 2007)
or even less effective in attempt to make a perfectly rational decision due their
complexity.
The results of focus group in Metzger et al. (2010) identify four heuristics
used by consumers in assessment of online credibility, which are relevant to
our study: reputation (or authority), endorsement (conferred credibility), con-
sistency, and expectancy violation. The reputation heuristic is based on the
consumers’ tendency to rely on familiar sources and alternatives rather than on
unrecognized ones (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). People driven by that heuris-
tic in our study may attribute a higher level of trustworthiness to a website
that carries products with reputable names, or to a company that operates in
business for many years and has a description of its history on the website.
Alternatively, reputation heuristic may be a product of the authority heuris-
tic, which suggests that degree of being an official authority or the information
source is an important criterion of credibility assessment (Hilligoss and Rieh,
2008; Sundar, 2008). In our study the deployment of authority heuristic may
be triggered by the presence of independent third-party seals, security features,
such as icon of Extended Validation certificate compliance and trusted payment
facilitators (e.g., PayPal). Moreover, it may indirectly enhance the effect of
the presence of key staff members’ names and photos on the company’s website,
providing a proof of existence of real people behind the intangible web interface.
The endorsement heuristic (Hilligoss and Rieh, 2008), or conferred credibility
(Flanagin and Metzger, 2008), is related to the confirmation bias and consensus
(or “bandwagon” (Sundar, 2008)) heuristic (Chaiken, 1987), under which people
perceive a source of information as trustworthy without scrutinizing the content
if others already trust it. Projecting the observations in Metzger et al. (2010)
on our study, we expect endorsement heuristic to have an impact on credibility
perceptions through the reliance on consumers’ feedback and reviews, online and
oﬄine ratings, and recommendations from friends in online social network. The
impact of the latter factor is additionally supported by the liking/agreement
heuristic (Chaiken, 1987) that suggests that individuals tend to believe that
people they like possess the correct beliefs and to agree with their opinions.
The consistency heuristic predicts that information, which is similar across
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various sources, is supposed to be credible (Metzger et al., 2010). Our study
does not presume cross-validation of information. However, in case it did, the
consistency heuristic could increase the effectiveness of feedback if reviews on
company’s website and independent forums, or online and oﬄine ratings coin-
cided. This proposition can be addressed in the future research.
The first three heuristics are related to the notion of social proof (Cialdini,
1993), or social confirmation: if other users trust, use, and recommend some
website, then one can also perceive it as trustworthy. However, such strategy is
not perfect, as it may lead to misconception between credibility and popularity
(Metzger et al., 2010), and in certain cases, to erroneous reliance on fraudulent
information from manipulated opinions and fake reviews (Mayzlin, 2006; Hu
et al., 2011a,b; Streitfeld, 2011; Kost, 2012; Tuttle, 2012).
Finally, the expectancy violation heuristic arises in the situations where web-
sites’ content does not conform to the users’ expectations (Metzger et al., 2010)
and as consequence of arousal, distraction, and increased attention to the viola-
tion (Burgoon et al., 2007) reduces the perceived trustworthiness of that website.
In our study the effect of this heuristic may be illustrated by the situation in
which website quality and design do not match the standards and norms (e.g.,
presence orthographic and typographic errors, broken links, suspicious banners,
etc.), or when website provides some unsolicited information or services not re-
quested by the user (or what Sundar (2008) calls intrusiveness heuristic). It
may take a form of company’s products appearing on the unrelated websites,
notifications about use of cookies, presence of the third-party websites’ links,
tracking, social network recommendations, remembering of the users’ personal
information, such as shipping address, credit card details, or login and password.
Figure 2.1graphically represents the proposed research model and related
hypotheses. In our survey we asked people to consider each statement indepen-
dently from other statements as if each item was describing a new company and
to a full extent (i.e. nothing else beyond the information in a particular state-
ment is known about each company). We did so to avoid the interaction effects
and to elicit not the overall credibility perception towards a company and its
website that possess a number of potentially contradictory characteristics but
to assess a level of credibility attributed to each aspect separately. Therefore,
although we grouped various aspects into distinct factors, these factors are not
independent when considered together for an overall assessment of company’s
credibility or willingness to purchase from its website. For instance, we expect
intercorrelation among privacy, security, and reputation, where fair practices
regarding users’ personal information contribute to the perception of how rep-
utable the company is. At the same moment, reputable company is expected to
aim at maintaining its reputation with respect to users’ personal data as well,
and therefore, to deploy high privacy and security standards. Similarly, a com-
pany with good reputation is expected to care about its image, and as website
is a one of the channels for communication of brand image, such company is
expected to exert efforts in creating a high quality website, while well designed
website provides users with positive signals about reputation of the company
as a whole. In contrast, website with poor quality raises doubts about profes-
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sionalism of the people who built it, including their ability to ensure fair data
collection and secure storage of this data, and therefore, creates concerns about
privacy and security protection.
The discussion can be extended to the correlation between the effects of
certain factors on trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions. Sub-
constructs may be correlated as well. For example, user may experience lower
concern about data collection if he is aware about how this information will be
processed and if he is given control over his information. The lack of or doubts
about company’s background may be mitigated by positive reviews from other
customers, etc. Moreover, we expect positive correlation between trustworthi-
ness perceptions and purchase intentions, so that users, who developed a per-
ception of trust towards a company, will be more willing to purchase a product
or service from its website.
H6: Trustworthiness perceptions are positively correlated with purchase in-
tentions.
Thus, we aim to test the influence of four main factors (security, privacy, rep-
utation, and website quality) on trustworthiness perceptions and on purchase
intentions, and to compare the magnitude of impact of certain aspects in partic-
ular. We will then test intercorrelations among those factors, and the relation
between trust and willingness to buy. Finally, we will run the robustness check
with respect to individual characteristics.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Data collection
Based on the related literature, we made a preliminary selection of the attributes
and discussed them during two focus group sessions. The least prominent fac-
tors were sorted out. Then with 117 participants from the Mobile Territorial
Lab (MTL) community we ran an online survey about trustworthiness percep-
tions and purchase intentions on the elaborated list of 32 statements about
firms’ characteristics and the aspects of their websites (hereinafter, items). The
advantages of running the survey with MTL community members include low
costs and wider demographic profile compared to a student pool usually used
for academic research and criticized for being not representative of the general
population. Each member of the MTL community (the total of 132 people) was
contacted by the researcher and offered a chance to take part in the study. One
hundred eighteen participants agreed to participate, and 117 eventually com-
pleted the online survey. Due to budgetary limits and because MTL community
members already receive a monthly payment for participation in the subject pool
for various studies, we offered a lottery-based compensation for participation in
our survey as an incentive. Finally, we collected responses about demograph-
ics, prior Internet experience, online shopping acceptance, technological literacy,
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Figure 2.1: Research model
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privacy attitudes and concerns, and trust disposition through exit questionnaire
(appendix A.2) and used them as control variables in statistical analysis.
2.3.1.1 Focus group
As a preparatory stage for the survey two focus group6 sessions were conducted
in December 2014 in the Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory
(CEEL), the University of Trento, Italy. During these roughly one-hour ses-
sions the groups of six students (in the first session) and of seven students
(in the second session) were asked in interactive setting about their perceptions,
opinions, beliefs, attitudes, concerns, and habits towards e-commerce and online
privacy. Participants were free to express their opinion and talk with other mem-
bers. However, following the rules and principles of the focus group technique,
a moderator (prof. Luigi Mittone) and assistant (Alisa Frik) administrated the
discussion.
Participants expressed fairly high level of privacy concerns (“I’m not fa-
mous, but I’m concerned about my personal life and information”). Although
one participant said: “Who cares about privacy nowadays!” others found the
topic “relevant” and as “one of the most important”, “fundamental”, and “cen-
tral arguments of the Internet use”. In general, participants seemed to be quite
pessimistic about the current state of privacy and called it “utopian” and “dis-
appearing” concept.
As examples of privacy violations (personally experienced or known from
other sources) participants mentioned hacking attacks on email services, iCloud,
Playstation store, Twitter and Ebay platforms, PayPal and Yahoo password
databases; Facebook behavioral targeted advertising and tracking of browser
activity; consequences of losing mobile phone (access to personal files and ac-
counts by unknown person, sending embarrassing messages and photos on behalf
of the victim, etc.). As the reaction to instances of privacy violations online,
the majority of participants described their discomfort, anger, irritation, fear,
anxiety, and embarrassment, while the rest admitted their preparedness to such
consequences (“I would not be surprised”, “One should expect that”) and per-
ception of control over their data and ability to protect themselves from such
violations (“It would be partially my fault, I should have protected my privacy”).
As barriers of online shopping acceptance respondents indicated hazard of
fraud, fishing, identity theft, data misuse, and general absence of trust. This
observation proves the relevance of perceptions of trust to online shopping be-
haviors and necessity of examining the issue in detail.
After the discussion, several statements were added to the list, e.g., about
password creation requirements, friends’ evaluation and opinion about the firm
via a special widget incorporated into website’s design as social network is gain-
ing more weight in the seller-buyer communications. Some statements were
corrected and clarified. For example, the statements about positive feedback
6Focus group is an exploratory technique widely used in market research, which collects
through a moderated discussion the qualitative data from a small group of people on their
opinions, beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes regarding a certain topic.
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raised a discussion about their source and nature. Participants appeared skep-
tical about the fact that company has only positive feedback, suspecting it in
falsification of reviews or deleting unpleasant ones. Thus, we included three
different items to reflect the distinction: (1) about positive reviews on the com-
pany’s own website, (2) about positive reviews on independent websites and
forums, and (3) about the presence of both positive and negative reviews about
the company on its website.
Based on the results of focus group the list of 32 statements about firms’
attributes was developed. Qualitative results obtained in focus groups confirmed
the relevance of the topic, while discrepancy among participants’ opinions and
attitudes proved the necessity of in-depth investigation of the issue.
2.3.1.2 Survey
As privacy attitudes are heterogeneous and context-dependent (Acquisti et al.,
2016b), in this study we tried to focus on the more durable socially held judg-
ments, and understand the “common knowledge” and type of cues that trigger
the perception of trustworthiness rather than ask for personal opinions. There-
fore, the survey was designed to capture perception about normatively appro-
priate privacy attitudes about the issue through incentivized elicitation method
(Krupka and Weber, 2013). Participants were explicitly explained that the best
strategy is to answer what they believe the majority of participants would choose
rather than express a personal opinion about the argument. This method also
permits to incentivize the choices and, therefore, elicit more accurate decisions.
Subjects were asked to read the list of statements (appendix A.1) about
attributes of the firms and their websites (the order of items was randomized
across participants). Firms were assumed to be retailers of homogeneous prod-
ucts and services hypothetically present on the online market. Each statement
described the company completely, so that participants did not need to guess
or imagine other characteristics beyond the provided description.
2.3.2 Measurements
After reading each statement, participants answered two questions on 12-point
Likert scale. The response categories were assorted into 6 groups as it is shown
in tab. 2.1.
After collection of the responses one statement and the related question were
chosen at random. The score and category chosen by the majority of survey
respondents were determined. Participants’ who chose the “most popular” re-
sponse for the picked item entered the raﬄe and 10 “winners” were chosen at
random. They received a USB flash drive of 32 or 16 Gb (with a market price
of 20 or 13 Euro, respectively) depending on whether they assigned an exact
score or only a category as in the majority of respondents.
Statistical analysis of the result of the survey is presented in the next section.
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Table 2.1: Survey questions
How trustworthy with respect to
privacy the Web site of this
company appears to the majority
of other people, in your opinion?
How it is likely that other people
will purchase products and
services from the Web site of this
company, in your opinion?
Category Score Category Score
Very untrustworthy 1-2 Very unlikely 1-2
Untrustworthy 3-4 Unlikely 3-4
Somewhat untrustworthy 5-6 Somewhat unlikely 5-6
Somewhat trustworthy 7-8 Somewhat likely 7-8
Trustworthy 9-10 Likely 9-10
Very trustworthy 11-12 Very likely 11-12
2.4 Results
We tested the research model using two-step structural equation modeling (SEM),
where in the first stage we developed and evaluated the measurement model, and
in the second stage we developed and evaluated the full structural model (Gerb-
ing and Anderson, 1988). First, we ran SEM estimations on groups of items
as endogenous observed variables and predicted the indices for sub-constructs
as latent variables. Then we ran SEM estimations using predicted values of
sub-constructs as endogenous observed variables, surveyed demographic char-
acteristics and other covariates as exogenous observed variables, and predicted
the indices for trust (T) and purchase intentions (P) as latent variables. Ap-
pendix A.5 summarizes the information about SEM path estimation. For the
assessment of goodness of fit, we used absolute and incremental fit indices. Ab-
solute fit indices include root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA)
and standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR), while incremental fit
indices include comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI). The
conventionally acceptable values of RMSEA and SRMR should be ≤ 0.08, while
the values of CFI and TLI are considered acceptable if ≥ 0.90 (Browne et al.,
1993; Hu and Bentler, 1999; Hair et al., 2010). Tab. A.7 shows that the research
model achieved the satisfactory level of goodness of fit.
Appendix A.3 summarizes the main statistics on measurements of trustwor-
thiness perception and purchase intention by item. The highest evaluations of
trustworthiness perception and purchase intention were assigned to the items
ensuring privacy and security practices adoption, third-party certificates and
high ratings in media, together with company’s reputation, background, and
variety of secure payment options. The lowest scores were assigned to the hypo-
thetical websites that have low quality of content and design, are involved in the
connections with third parties or actively try to encourage users to connect var-
ious accounts with the company’s website, store users’ personal details with or
without consent, and offer recommendations based on the personal information
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about user.
Large standard deviation and variance may be related to the lack of partic-
ipants’ attention to the task, considerable diversity of opinions on the matters,
or to the fact that the “collective perceptions” regarding web-based concepts
are not mature enough yet due to fairly “young” and highly dynamic environ-
ment of the Internet, diversity in the level of technological literacy and intrinsic
individual characteristics.
2.4.1 Reliability and validity
For the assessment of reliability we carried out confirmatory factor analysis with
Varimax rotation. Using the Kaiser extraction criterion we retained only factors
with eigenvalue > 1 for each construct. The resulting factor loadings were high
(0.54-0.91); degree of uniqueness was within acceptable level of < 0.6 (0.18-
0.6), for all items except LT1, QT1/QT3, QP1/QP3 (appendix A.4). Internal
consistency of the resulting indices was good, Cronbach’s α > 0.7 (0.84-0.93),
except for the website quality. Therefore, appendix A.4 demonstrates that the
reliability of the measurement model is sufficient for all constructs and sub-
constructs except website quality.
We tested two types of validity for the analysis of unidimensionality: conver-
gent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity defines the extent to which
each item converges to measures of other items that theoretically should be re-
lated. According to Hair et al. (2010) convergent validity exists if standardized
factor loadings of each scale item is > 0.7, average variance extracted (AVE) is
> 0.5, and composite reliability (CR) is > 0.7. Appendix A.5 shows that all
constructs except QT satisfy these criteria demonstrating sufficient convergent
validity.
Discriminant validity defines the extent to which an item diverges from other
items that theoretically should not be related. The discriminant validity exists if
AVE exceeds the shared variance measured as squared correlation for each pair
of constructs and sub-constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2006;
Bove et al., 2009). Appendix A.5 shows that this criterion is not satisfied for
all pairs of constructs and sub-constructs and that privacy, security, and repu-
tation indices, including feedback and awareness, are often highly correlated. It
suggests including the covariance between them in the path estimation model.
2.4.2 Relationship between trust and purchase intentions
The results indicate significant positive relationship between trustworthiness
perceptions and purchase intentions7, at the aggregate level (i.e. between T and
P) and at the sub-construct level (i.e. between ST and SP, QT and QP, etc.) as
suggested by correlation and covariance coefficients (appendix A.6). This finding
supports the hypothesis 6 about positive relationship between trustworthiness
perceptions and purchase intentions.
7Pairwise correlation coefficients for each item are also positive and significant on 0.01 level
and vary between 0.59 and 0.88 with average of 0.74.
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Generally, positive correlation means that participants would be more likely
to purchase from a trustworthy website and less likely to purchase from untrust-
worthy website. However there were some cases where valence of perception and
behavioral intention were misaligned: participants rated some companies as un-
trustworthy with respect to personal information, but still were likely to pur-
chase from them. Such misalignments of perceptions and behavioral intentions
provide evidence for so-called “privacy paradox”, i.e. the occasional inconsis-
tency and disagreement between self-reported high level of privacy concerns and
privacy-undermining behavior (Spiekermann et al., 2001; Berendt et al., 2005;
Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Acquisti and Gross, 2006; Barnes, 2006; Norberg et al.,
2007; Acquisti et al., 2016b).
Fig. 2.2 shows the distribution of ratings for trustworthiness perceptions
and purchase intentions by item.
Figure 2.2: Mean values of the Likert scale scores of trustworthiness perceptions,
and purchase intentions, by item
About 2.83% of the times participants reported negative intentions to buy
from a website regardless of its positive value of trustworthiness. For example,
privacy policy and password-composition requirements on the company’s web-
site (AT/AP items 1 and 3, and ST/SP 2) do not make participants necessarily
more likely to purchase from the website even though it is perceived as trustwor-
thy. This may be related to the fact that privacy is one of the factors influencing
purchasing intention but not the most important driver of purchasing decision.
In contrast, 14.3% of the times participants reported positive intentions to buy
from the website to which they assigned a negative value of trustworthiness.
This was particularly common for the BT/BP 3, LT/LP 2, 3, and 7, NT/NP
2 and 3, FT/FP 6, meaning that presence of the famous brands, widget from
social network sites, possibility to access the website using social network ac-
count (so called “social login”), request of permission to access the geographical
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location or of the information about tastes and preferences, inferring of such
information using tracking technologies, and remembering the user’s address
for future deliveries have no or negative effect on perception of trustworthiness,
however, it positively affects the purchase intention.
Most of the above-mentioned factors that trigger positive purchasing inten-
tion but negative trustworthiness perception offer privacy-invasive approaches
to improve or speed up shopping experience. Thus, the misalignment observed
in our survey may be related to the calculation of the credibility expectations
that involves weighting of the expected costs and benefits implied by the deci-
sion to trust (Sztompka, 1999; Lane and Bachmann, 1998). Similar calculative
approach was documented in privacy domain as “privacy calculus” (Laufer and
Wolfe, 1977; Culnan and Armstrong, 1999; Dinev and Hart, 2006). However,
people often fail to perform such calculation, for example due to immediate grat-
ification (or present) bias, which refers to the individuals’ preference for short-
term returns (Anderson, 1971; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2000), and discounting
future costs and benefits (Laibson, 1994; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Jehiel
and Lilico, 2010). In this perspective, website that offers the services that facili-
tate the online shopping process but are not privacy-friendly (e.g., remembering
of the personal details, recommendation systems based on behavior tracking)
may generate a high willingness to buy even in the presence of low trustworthi-
ness perception with respect to one’s privacy, because the result of purchasing
transaction occurs immediately, while outcome of the risks related to privacy un-
trustworthiness are uncertain in magnitude, value, probability, and time (John,
2016).
Consumers engage in e-commerce with a primary goal to purchase a prod-
uct or service online, not to protect their personal information. Therefore,
prominence-interpretation theory (Fogg, 2003) and low salience of the privacy-
related factors with respect to shopping-related factors at the moment of pur-
chasing decision process provide further explanation to the observed phenomenon.
Moreover, in uncertain situations people tend to rely on contextual cues (Ac-
quisti, 2004; John et al., 2011a). Websites are usually in control of such cues, as
they make the decisions about website design, choice architecture, content, and
structure of the information presented to the user. As websites’ primary goals
are related to business outcomes, they may firstly highlight shopping benefits,
and draw less attention to (or even deliberately drive it away from) the potential
privacy concerns and issues. In this case subjects are more likely to give a larger
weight to the evidently and saliently presented benefits of a certain feature of
online shopping experience rather than elaborate and assign the values to the
potential risks that the decision may entail in privacy domain in the future.
Yet another explanation of why calculus may fail is related to the assump-
tion of rational decision-making about trustor-trustee symmetry, while trust
relationship between online vendors and consumers in reality is often asymmet-
ric. Therefore, as predicted in Weber et al. (2004), with increase in dependency
of trustors on trustees, the former (in our case consumer) decreases cognitive
effort and information search required to assess credibility accurately, positively
judges ambiguous information, and is inclined to engage in initial trust. In
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other words, as online e-commerce relationship often takes the form of take-it-
or-leave-it offer, consumers have only limited decision options, while companies
are in charge of creating and offering such options. For instance, a company can
decide how much and what information to request from the user in exchange
for providing the access to its mobile application. Even though the company
asks the permission to access some personal information, the resulting outcome
is conditioned on the user’s consent. Therefore, if consumer does not allow the
access to requested information, she does not have the access to a service the
company provides. If the minority of the companies employed the invasive per-
mission settings, users would have an opportunity to deny the access to their
personal information and choose another company that provides similar services
without requirement to reveal extensive amount of personal data. But prolif-
eration and acceptance of invasive permission settings as a common business
practice often leaves consumers without a choice (apart from saying “yes” or
“no” to the use of a service) and, therefore, raises the user-website asymmetry
in which users are more dependent on the conditions created by the websites
than the latter are dependent on the consumers’ choices. This situation makes
users engage in initial trust if they want to use a certain service discounting
some concerns that may accompany such a decision.
Moreover, combination of various factors is a tradeoff per sé. In our ex-
periment we asked subjects to consider each factor independently, but real-life
decisions are influenced by a simultaneous impact of a number of factors and
their interaction effects. Consider for example, a website that requests some
personal information in order to create an account and remembers a credit card
number for future transactions but imposes strict password-composition require-
ments, ensures compliance with privacy regulations, and demonstrates security
certificates. Request of personal information may create a privacy concern, but
compliance with the privacy regulations and strict password-composition re-
quirements mitigate them, by ensuring consumers that the information he pro-
vides will be treated fairly and securely. Similarly, remembering of the credit
card details may be useful for faster future check-out process, but may raise a
security concern. Presence of the security certificate mitigates such concern by
ensuring consumer that the provided credit card details will be stored securely
and protected from unauthorized access or use. Therefore, negative and positive
aspects mitigate each other and the final decision and purchase verdict depend
on the outcome of this interaction.
As a result of behavioral and cognitive biases discussed above consumers
sometimes are willing to make a purchase from a website that is engaged in
privacy invasive practices but facilitates or encourages purchasing process. This
might explain why in certain situations, especially when the primary goal with
which consumer enters the online space is purchase and not privacy protection,
consumers make decisions not in favor of the latter. Thus, one should not rely on
trust-related factors as the main predictors of sales, however, he should consider
important mediating effect of trustworthiness perceptions on purchase intention.
In the next section we will discuss what factors in particular are more or less
influential for the consumers’ choices.
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2.4.3 Factors influencing trust and purchase intentions
2.4.3.1 At construct level
Standardized path coefficients (tab. A.6) suggest that all sub-constructs have
significant effect on trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions on the
0.001 level, except for the quality of website. QT appears to have the smallest
effect on trust, yet significant on 0.05 level. QP does not influence significantly
purchase intentions. Therefore, our findings provide the support for H1, H2,
and H4 for both trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions, and for
H3 regarding the effect on trust.
As shown in appendix A.3, on average, websites’ compliance with security
regulations (ST and SP) results in the highest positive estimations otworthiness
perceptions and purchase intentions, followed by awareness about employed pri-
vacy practices (AT and AP), company’s background (BT and BP), and feedback
(FT and FP). Poor website quality (QT and QP) leads to the lowest negative
estimation of trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions, followed by
the collection (LT and LP) and control (NT and NP) over personal information.
Therefore, companies with positive feedback and background appear to cos-
tumers as more trustworthy and elicit higher willingness to purchase from their
websites. Moreover, ensuring consumers’ awareness about security and privacy
protection, by providing informational notices (e.g., about use of cookies or prac-
tices related to collection, storage, sharing, and use of personal data), demon-
strating the proof of compliance with privacy and security protection standards
and regulations approved by independent authorities (such as Extended Vali-
dation certificates, privacy seals, etc.), enforcing password-composition require-
ments further improves users’ trustworthiness perceptions and purchase inten-
tions. At the same moment invasive practices of data collection and providing
to users the limited control over this information (or poor communication of
such control opportunities) lead to consumers’ negative assessment of trustwor-
thiness and subsequent purchase intentions. Although insufficient investment of
time, money, and effort in the website design and low attention to the content
quality do not have a significant direct impact on willingness to purchase, it may
have an indirect effect through negatively influence trustworthiness perception,
because of the correlation between trust and purchase intention demonstrated
earlier.
In line with the low discriminant validity and high correlation indices, the
covariance between some pairs of sub-constructs in our model is also significant
(tab. A.8), for instance, between LT and BT, FT, NT; FT and NT; NP and
FP, LP. This means that the company collecting users’ personal information
will be perceived as more trustworthy if it provides to the users control over the
collected information, or has positive reputation, including positive background
and feedback from other consumers. Similarly, practices involving collection
of users’ information (for example, for feeding the recommendation system, or
for using the credit card details and shipping address for future orders and
transactions) will increase purchase intentions more if it will be accompanied
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by the control over collected information. Such control may further enhance
the positive effect of consumer feedback on trustworthiness perceptions and
willingness to purchase.
Therefore, in order to build trust and increase consumers’ purchase inten-
tions companies should pay more attention to the way they present information
about their reputation, including background, customer feedback and reviews,
privacy- and security-related practices, and protection means. Moreover, they
need to ensure a satisfactory level of the quality of this information, together
with website content and visual appeal. Firms should grant users more con-
trol over their information, including traditional forms of consent or permission
management, ability to modify/delete private data or deny the access to per-
sonal information, and also by providing a choice among alternative ways to
access the website content (i.e. not only in in exchange for the personal infor-
mation, but also on “freemium” or subscription basis for a small fee that allows
avoiding private data collection, for example). We will now analyze in detail
what practices tested in our survey are more effective in building trustful and
effective buyer-seller relationships.
2.4.3.2 At item level
Consumer feedback Although one might find presence of solely positive
feedback about the company on its website (FT/FP 5) subjective or suspect of
fake reviews, on average, participants assigned a higher rating of trustworthi-
ness and purchase intentions to such companies compared to the firms that have
both positive and negative feedback (FT/FP 1 and 2)8. For the latter condition,
having reviews on the company’s own website (FT/FP 2) is not statistically dif-
ferent from such reviews on independent websites or forums (FT/FP 1) in terms
of building trust and increasing purchase intentions9. Therefore, regardless of
the fact that solely positive feedback is often fraudulent subjects tend to trust it
more than a mixture of positive and negative reviews. Although it is easier for
companies to manipulate reviews on their own websites than on the independent
forums, subject do not seem to trust the latter ones more. Hence, our results
support H5b but not H5a.
Ranking source The source of information about elevated position of the
company matters for purchase intention, but not for trustworthiness percep-
tions10. Namely, high rating of the company in traditional media (FT/FP 3),
8Tests of the difference between (a) FT1 and FT5: t-test Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.83; (b) FP1 and FP5: t-test: Pr(|T|
> |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.97; (c) FT2
and FT5: t-test: Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.01. Statistical
power = 0.55; (d) FP2 and FP5: t-test: Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob
> |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.96. N=117.
9Tests of the difference between (a) FT1 and FP2: t-test Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.15; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.13. Statistical power = 0.13; (b) FP1 and FP2: t-test: Pr(|T|
> |t|) = 0.10; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.06. Statistical power = 0.16. N=117.
10Tests of the difference between (a) FT3 and FT4: t-test Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.14; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.18. Statistical power = 0.12; (b) FP3 and FP4: t-test: Pr(|T|
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such as TV and radio, results in a higher willingness to purchase from its web-
site compared to the companies whose high ranking was acknowledged in online
media sources (FT/FP 4). This finding suggests that respondents’ willingness
to purchase tend to rely on traditional media more than on online channels as
the source of information about company’s ratings and reputation. This may
be because users are more experienced and familiar with traditional media, and
feel more confident in relying on those sources. Moreover, the content published
in traditional media is more likely to go through editorial review and approval
(Johnson and Kaye, 2000). Hence, H5c is supported for purchase intentions but
not for trustworthiness perceptions.
Access conditions The subtle difference between items LT/LP 4 and LT/LP
5 is that the latter describes a more strict access policy not allowing users to
view the website’s content without registration, while the former permits visual-
ization of the content without sharing personal details and requests registration
only when customers decide to place an order. However, average scores on
both trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions for the websites with
restricted access conditions did not significantly differ from the websites em-
ploying more privacy-friendly practices11, providing no support for H5d. This
finding may be related to the fact that restricted access condition is a com-
mon practice nowadays and thus does not raise strong concerns. Most online
vendors require customers to create accounts on their websites. Such accounts
not only help sellers to monitor customers’ activity, but also allow consumers
to keep track of their own transactions, save and compare products in the cart,
save personal information (e.g., credit card details and shipping address) for
future transactions etc. Therefore, consumers may perceive benefits from regis-
tering on a certain website that in some cases outweigh corresponding privacy
concerns.
Source of information for recommendations In contrast to our expecta-
tions that transparency regarding how the information about consumers’ tastes
and preferences is collected will be granted with a higher level of trustworthiness
perception and willingness to buy, explicitly asking people about their prefer-
ences (item LT/LP 2), on average, did not result in different trustworthiness
and purchase intentions scores than using of obscure tracking technologies to
gather such information about users (item LT/LP 3)12, providing no support
for H5e. However, generally, the trustworthiness perceptions scores were nega-
tive for both items. Therefore, we can conclude that respondents equally dislike
> |t|) = 0.03; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.03. Statistical power = 0.24. N=117.
11Tests of the difference between (a) LT4 and LT5: t-test Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.21; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.25. Statistical power = 0.12; (b) LP4 and LP5: t-test: Pr(|T|
> |t|) = 0.39; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.14. Statistical power = 0.09. N=117.
12Tests of the difference between (a) LT1 and LT3: t-test Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.99; (b) LP1 and LP3: t-test: Pr(|T|
> |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.9995. N=117.
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the collection of the information about their tastes and preferences, no matter
implicitly or explicitly.
App permissions In support of H5g, providing an opportunity to edit at
least partially the list of permissions before installation of the company’s mobile
application (NT/NP 5) significantly improves both the trustworthiness percep-
tion and purchase intention compared to the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer (NT/NP
4)13. Moreover, allowing users to modify app permissions is able to even alter
the sign of purchase intentions, i.e. while respondents said to be unlikely to
purchase from an app that inevitably accesses their personal data, providing
a chance to edit the access permissions at least partially resulted in a positive
willingness to make a purchase. Therefore, companies may benefit from enforc-
ing privacy-friendly policies, not only on their websites but also in their mobile
applications.
Besides the general effects of certain factors, such as reputation, security,
privacy, and website design, we emphasize the importance of how these factors
are then implemented. Appendix A.7 summarizes the results of hypotheses test-
ing. Our results suggest companies to pay close attention to the way they design
and implement their practices. For example, in order to build with customers
the trustworthy relationships, which then positively affect purchase intentions,
companies should try to avoid negative feedback, not through the review manip-
ulation and fraud but through service improvement and consumers’ needs satis-
faction. Regarding the platforms, both independent forums and brand websites
are effective in building trust. Firms should also enhance users’ privacy and
provide control over their personal information, for example through introduc-
tion of the privacy-friendly policies and editable lists of access permissions, and
limiting collection of the users’ personal data, either explicitly asking for it, or
through opaque tracking technologies, such as cookies, algorithmic recommen-
dation systems, etc. Although Internet media is gaining power, overtaking and
sometimes even substituting oﬄine channels in ability to build reputation and
trust, companies should not forget to sustain and promote their image in tradi-
tional media, as it has a stronger influence on purchase intentions according to
our results.
2.4.4 Robustness check
As a robustness check we controlled for the respondents’ individual character-
istics by introducing surveyed variables as observed exogenous covariates in the
second stage of structural equation model estimation. In our model we assume
that individual characteristics directly affect the latent variables that represent
subjects’ trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions.
The results show that females and older subjects tend to have a lower level
of trustworthiness perceptions, while those who use real names rather than
13Tests of the difference between (a) NT4 and NT5: t-test Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.99; (b) NP4 and NP5: t-test: Pr(|T|
> |t|) = 0.00; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.00. Statistical power = 0.96. N=117.
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pseudonyms in Facebook are more disposed to trust. The latter observation
suggests that the use of real identity in social networks may serve as a proxy
for low privacy concern or high general trust disposition, which was found a
significant predictor of trust in Gefen (2000); Kimery and McCord (2002); Kim
and Benbasat (2003); Teo and Liu (2007). However, the number of connections
(friends) in Facebook is negatively correlated with T and P. Although a big
number of online social network connections could signal low privacy concern,
it may actually decrease the level of users’ trust as the audience to which one’s
personal information and activity is exposed gets larger.
Number of years that subject uses Internet is another factor that positively
influences both trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions. This factor
reflects elevated familiarity and experience with the Internet and is related to
the enhanced adoption of e-commerce. Carlos Roca et al. (2009) argue that
experienced Internet users may be more familiar with security technologies and
therefore feel more comfortable about trusting the online shopping websites.
Our result is in line with Corbitt et al. (2003) that found positive correlation
between Internet experience and trust.
Subjects whose source of income is less independent and reliable (i.e. part-
time job or spouse’s support rather than full-time job) tend to have lower trust-
worthiness perceptions and, not surprisingly, lower purchasing intentions.
In contrast to our expectations, subjects’ knowledge of programming lan-
guages as a proxy for technical skills, preference of online shopping versus of-
fline, its frequency, and personal experience of privacy invasions did not have a
significant effect on trust. Neither did the level of monthly expenditures, online
shopping preferences and frequency has an impact on purchase intentions.
Direct measure of general privacy concern and Westin’s privacy index both
show that privacy-concerned subjects are less likely to trust the websites and
buy from it. This finding further supports our claim about important relation
between privacy, trust, and purchase intentions, suggesting companies to pay
rigorous attention to customers concerns and ensure their personal information
protection.
We observed that although almost half of the respondents recognized a sym-
bol of websites’ compliance with the Extended Validation certificate, only 72%
of them understood correctly what this certificate means14. This misalignment
may indicate potential misconceptions and misbeliefs about privacy and security
signals. Qualitative analysis of the responses show that these misconceptions
include the expectations that a website with a green padlock in the URL ad-
dress bar will require registration for access or will constantly guard privacy of
the users. Moreover, familiarity with privacy seal authorities, recognition of the
Extended Validation certificate’s green padlock and the actual understanding of
its meaning did not significantly affect T and P. This findings are in line with
previous research, which shows that although the website possessing indepen-
dent certificates in reality are more likely to be untrustworthy than uncertified
14Note that participants had access to various sources of information during the survey and
had opportunity to find and submit the correct explanation. Therefore, those shares of correct
answers reflect the lower bound.
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websites (Edelman et al., 2006), users tend to follow heuristics and shortcuts in
relying on these assurances without verification of authenticity and not always
understanding the meaning (Rifon et al., 2005; LaRose and Rifon, 2007), be-
cause according to signaling theory, in assessment of credence quality consumers
may directly rely on cues (Zeithaml, 1988; Schlosser et al., 2006; Tang et al.,
2008) even when they are not credible or interpretable (Duncan and Moriarty,
1998; Rao et al., 1999; Ray et al., 2011).
Similarly, 41% of the participants misunderstand the concept of web cookies.
The respondents’ explanations about meaning of this term range from “treats
and sweets” to “informative windows”, “users’ feedback sent to the website to
guarantee monitoring of the use”, “files that permit a faster access to the In-
ternet”, and “some form of advertising”. Some respondents called Web cookies
“spies” and “garbage” that may be justified if considered metaphors. One of the
respondents correctly drew the connection between cookies and subsequent re-
ceiving of targeted advertising, but erroneously concluded that one must enable
cookies in order to avoid privacy invasion.
These findings suggest that the level of “privacy literacy” and awareness is
still relatively low and requires consumer education. Misunderstanding may lead
to the distortion of consumers’ expectations and subsequent exploitation of such
beliefs for fraudulent or malicious purposes. Therefore, these findings suggest
further examination of the issue. Improvement of communication of privacy
and security related information to the consumers is showed to be important
not only for policy makers and privacy advocates but also beneficial for the
business as enhanced trust contributes to increase in purchase intention.
2.4.5 Description of the subject pool
We distributed our survey to the Mobile Territorial Lab community members.
This community has been created by Telecom Italia SKIL Lab and used as exper-
imental environment for human-behavior analysis and interaction studies. The
members of the community were selected and recruited among representative
population of Italian mobile and Internet users. In contrast to most academic
studies based on the students’ responses we ran the survey with adults, rep-
resentative of Italian Internet users population. Moreover, our sample is also
representative of the European online shoppers population (Reinecke, 2015)15.
Appendix A.2 summarizes the statistics about demographics and responses to
the final questionnaire. 89% of the respondents are 35+ years old with 63%
of the respondents being women, and the female respondents are on average
younger than the male respondents16. 36% of respondents have only secondary
education and 55% have bachelor or master degree, mostly in formal sciences,
followed by social and humanity sciences. 77% of the subjects lived for the most
1553-74% of 25-74 year-old EU-28 Internet users bought or ordered goods or services for
private use over the Internet in 2014 (with negative relationship between age and percentage
of online shoppers). 47% of those online shoppers have low education, 65% have medium
education, and 78% have high education; 70% are employed.
16T-test: p=.0338 and Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = 0.04.
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part of their lives in cities with 10,000+ inhabitants. 94% has full- or part-time
jobs as the main source of income.
Nine respondents out of ten use Internet since more than 5 years, on average
for about 19 hours a week. Fig. 2.3 summarizes frequency of use of the Internet
for various purposes.
Figure 2.3: Heat map: distribution of the participants’ responses about fre-





















































Eighty eight percent of respondents (which corresponds to 93% of males
and 85% of females) use the Internet for online shopping (35% often and 53%
sometimes), although slightly less than a half prefers to buy from a physical
store rather than online. Most commonly respondents make online purchases
for up to 500 Euro at least once a year (fig. 2.4).
Sixty three percent of the respondents do not know any programming lan-
guage, while 18% know at least one and other 18% know 2-3 programming
languages.
Seven out of ten respondents are familiar with at least one certificate author-
ity or agency that focuses on ensuring compliance with the security and privacy
regulations.
Generally, 44% of the subjects found it difficult to answer the survey. It
may be related to the number of the items to be evaluated, each on two distinct
constructs. Reducing the number of items and separating the tasks of evaluating
trustworthiness perception and purchase intention in between-subject design
could reduce the respondents’ fatigue and improve the reliability of metrics.
Sixty-eight percent of the respondents are concerned about their online pri-
vacy; however, other 28% appeared to be rather indifferent, with remaining
4% being unconcerned. However, according to the Westin’s Privacy Segmenta-
tion Index almost half of the respondents were classified as unconcerned, with
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Figure 2.4: Heat map: proportions of the participants’ responses about fre-































































Figure 2.5: Distribution of the answers about % of the times participants refused
to provide personal information or left the website
equal division of the rest between pragmatists and fundamentalists (27% each).
Among various Internet issues the highest level of concern was assigned to the
group related to privacy (62% are concerned about online activities being mon-
itored and about personal information being stolen (77%) or misused (80%)),
followed by concern about pornography being too accessible (76%), about receiv-
ing too many unsolicited email (56%). In response privacy concerns participants
admitted to refuse or leave, on average, almost every second website request-
ing personal information (fig. 2.5). The alternative strategy of providing false
information is less common and is used on average only in 10% of the times.
Underlining motives of refusal or providing falsified information can be com-
bined into 3 main groups:
• privacy concerns: as an important reason for 93% of the respondents is
the request of particularly sensitive information, lack of information about
how personal data will be used (for 89%), the value of personal information
exceeding the value that user would receive from the website (for 88%),
and concerns about personal data being intercepted or stolen (for 82%);
• trustworthiness: bad reputation of the company (for 93%), lack of trust
(for 91%) or familiarity (for 88%); and
• unsolicited correspondence: SMS (89%), email (79%), mail (75%).
CHAPTER 2. 89
Moreover, general preference to be anonymous was an important reason of re-
fusal for 73% of the respondents, too much time required to fill out the forms
(for 63%), and finally, lack of familiarity about how the technology works (for
54%).
A third of respondents personally experienced incidents of unauthorized use
of their personal information by a company and almost a half (42%) - of privacy
invasions.
Sixty seven percent of participants are not willing to provide personally
identifiable and demographic information to websites while 19% feel indifferent
about that. Almost two thirds would not provide it for the marketing purposes
even in exchange for monetary incentives. Information about tastes and pref-
erences are ready to share with websites a slight majority of the participants
(38%), while 28% are indifferent about that. 69% would trade this information
for marketing purposes if compensated. However, 80 to 90 percent of the re-
spondents voluntarily revealed in the survey the names of their favorite books or
films, sports and hobbies, even though it was irrelevant for the study informa-
tion and questions were optional, i.e. could have been skipped without answer.
It is possible that respondents draw a potential benefit of revealing preferences
to the marketers that can target the relevant offers to them, while personally
identifiable information seem to be less relevant for the marketing purposes and
even raise a concern about price discrimination among savvy users.
A third of the respondents do not have a profile in social networks. Among
those who have at least one account, Facebook is the most popular (37%),
followed by Google + (12%), Twitter (6%), and Instagram (7%). A quarter of
the respondents actively use 2 or more social networks. Since Facebook is the
most popular social network among our respondents, we will further analyze
this population: 56% of our Facebook users have no more than 100 connections
on the website, and 15% have 100-200 or 300-500 connections. While 59% are
convinced that their Facebook account is private and only friends can see it,
this might be not entirely true, since some pieces of information, for example,
name and profile picture are visible to the public. Taken into account that
94% of our respondents use real name, 69% use real photo and other 10% use
their real photo with other people, the actual situation may not meet the users’
expectations about their privacy on Facebook. Given that 32% never changed
their settings while other 32% changed them only right after the registration,
the situation seems even less optimistic from privacy prospective.
Finally, based on the “trust disposition” index, on average, our participants
appear to be rather trustful than not trustful.
2.5 Conclusion
Based on previous research and the results of two focus group sessions we created
a list of websites’ attributes and tested their impact on users’ purchase intentions
and perceptions of trust with respect to privacy through a survey with 117 adult
respondents.
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First, we found that privacy, security, and reputation factors strongly af-
fect trustworthiness perceptions and purchase intentions, while website quality
plays a smaller role in building trust and has no effect on willingness to buy. On
average, the websites with enhanced security, transparency regarding consumer
privacy, and positive background and feedback deserved positive trustworthiness
perceptions and purchase intentions scores, while practices related to personal
information collection and control, and poor website quality raised concern re-
garding websites’ trustworthiness and lowered the average willingness to buy
from them. Intuitively, while privacy- and security-related aspects influence in
the first place the perceptions of trustworthiness with respect to privacy, more
shopping-relevant cues, such as selection of products with reputable names and
payment options, are strong predictors of purchase intention. However, some
factors, e.g., firms’ background and rating in media, are important mediators
for both constructs. Although we asked participants to evaluate each item in-
dependently from other items, we eventually found positive correlation among
some factors, which suggest the companies to design the multifaceted complex
approach of trust relationships with customers.
Second, we found positive relation between trust and purchase intentions.
It means that generally participants were more likely to purchase from a trust-
worthy website and less likely to purchase from untrustworthy website. This
finding draws an attention of companies to the importance of building trustful
and privacy-friendly relationships with their customers. However, in some cases
participants that rated the companies as untrustworthy were still likely to pur-
chase from their websites. This misalignment may be related to a tendency of
expected benefits to outweigh the potential privacy costs resulting in willingness
to make a purchase from a website that is engaged in privacy invasive practices.
In other words, when a website offers a functionality that is expected to improve
or facilitate online shopping process, but at the same time raises privacy con-
cern, users’ decision to trust and make a purchase from this website depends on
whether benefits will eventually exceed costs, or vice versa. As individuals tend
to discount future outcomes and to prefer short-term returns, immediate and
evident benefits of improved shopping experience (which is also the main goal
of engaging in e-commerce) may outweigh uncertain potential future privacy
costs (which is a by-product of online interactions rather than a primary com-
ponent). Moreover, privacy-related aspects may be presented on the website in
a less salient way than shopping-related features, further enhancing underesti-
mation of the weight of privacy components in the calculus of a final outcome of
a decision. Finally, the asymmetric structure of the relationship between online
seller and buyer put the latter in a position, which requires the latter to engage
in initial trust accepting some risks in order to carry out a transaction. Such
situations may force consumers to accept “take-it-or-leave-it” offer regardless
concerns related to this decision.
Our findings suggest that leveraging the factors that positively influence
trustworthiness perceptions may help companies to build trust that, in turn,
affects consumers’ purchase intention. First of all, companies should ensure se-
curity of their websites and, importantly, communicate the created level of secu-
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rity to the customers, for example, by introducing strong password-composition
requirements and safe payment options, and demonstrating the compliance with
security standards. Second of all, companies should pay great attention to the
privacy-related issues, limit the collection of user data to the well-defined and
user-friendly scope, be transparent about collection, storage, use, and sharing
of this data, and give users control over their personal data. The forms of con-
trol should also evolve and improve over time together with the development of
related technology and legislation. Companies should exert an effort in creating
positive reputation, including presentation of the information about company’s
background, real people behind the website, allowing users to leave their feed-
back and respond to their concerns and questions. Firms, especially not well-
known ones, should invest time, money and effort in creating a good-quality
website which contains accurate and up-to-date information, as in situations of
uncertainty visual appeal becomes an important peripheral cue and quality of
the content signals the quality of the company itself.
Third, we found that participants trusted and wanted to purchase from the
websites with solely positive feedback more than from the websites with mixed
(both positive and negative) reviews, no matter whether it is published on the
company’s own website and on independent websites. Therefore, companies
should pay attention to the customer negative feedback, try to solve the issues
to achieve a higher level of consumer satisfaction and to publicly answer to
the negative comments in order to maintain reputation. Respondents trusted
online and oﬄine source of companies’ rankings in a similar way, however, the
traditional sources appeared to have a greater impact on willingness to purchase.
Therefore, companies should not forget to sustain their reputation in traditional
media, even though the online sources of information are getting more and more
popular nowadays. Our results suggest to limit or avoid tracking of customers’
data, especially the third-party one, as users dislike it even more than first-party
tracking. Moving away from “take-it-or-leave-it” offers and granting consumers
with more control and choice is expected to benefit trust relationships and
increase purchase intentions.
Finally, we found that people that use real name in Facebook rather than
a pseudonym and are experienced in using the Internet, generally tend to trust
the websites more, while females, older subjects, people with less independent
source of income (i.e. without full-time job), higher levels of privacy concerns,
and larger number of connections (“friends”) in Facebook are less disposed to
trust. Similarly, less independent source of income, privacy concerns, and num-
ber of Facebook connections negatively affect purchase intentions, while Inter-
net experience has a positive effect. Therefore, in designing the trust-building
strategies companies should be especially attentive to the above-mentioned tar-
get groups. Technical skills, the amount of monthly expenditures, frequency and
preferences of online shopping, trust disposition, personal experience of privacy
invasion, familiarity with privacy assurance agencies, Extended Validation icon,
and understanding of the concepts of cookies and security certificates do not
have significant effect on trust and willingness to purchase.
Moreover, we observed a relatively low level of “privacy literacy” among our
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respondents, as 30 to 40 percent of subjects have demonstrated the misunder-
standing of the basic privacy and security concepts. Such misconceptions may
distort users’ expectations, lead to inefficient communications of the informa-
tion, and cause economic or psychological harm. For example, the website that
saliently present a notification about use of cookies may be perceived as less
trustworthy than the one that hide it or collect information silently. Alter-
natively, users that think that cookies are essential for a faster access to the
Internet, as one of our subjects pointed out, they may enable cookie storage
without fully understanding the consequences it will have on their privacy. Im-
provement of communication of the privacy- and security-related information to
the consumers is important not only for policy makers and privacy advocates
but also beneficial for the business since the enhanced trust contributes to the
increase in purchase intentions.
The present study has some limitations. First, it is based on the self-reported
answers about hypothetical companies. Although it provides theoretical model
and useful empirical insight about the factors influencing trustworthiness per-
ceptions and purchase intentions, lab or field experiment with real e-commerce
websites will further improve the external validity, accuracy of results, and allow
testing interaction effect among various factors. Second, we used willingness to
buy as a measurement of behavioral intentions, while future research may an-




Privacy Protection and Risk
Attitudes, with a New
Experimental Method to
Elicit the Implicit Monetary
Value of Privacy
3.1 Introduction
The inspiration for this paper comes from our dissatisfaction with the cur-
rently established methods for assessing the value of privacy. The most popular
methods include 1) experiments asking participants for their willingness to pay
(WTP) to avoid getting private information revealed to others (alternatively,
willingness to accept (WTA) payment to reveal their information), 2) surveys
asking respondents for their feelings about a range of possible scenarios involv-
ing privacy, and for information about the way they handle various privacy
concerns. While indeed suitable for a variety of applications, those methods
suffer from two main weaknesses: 1) they are not incentivized (surveys) and
2) they do not correspond to the type of decisions that most people face when
thinking about privacy (WTP and WTA experiments). Indeed, it rarely hap-
pens in real life to get offered payment for private information or to be asked
to pay for information protection from a well identified, immediate and certain
threat. Most of the time instead, people have to decide how much to invest to
protect their information from a non-specific threat that may or may not be
realized in the future and that has uncertain consequences. This means that
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actual privacy decisions are motivated by a mix of risk aversion and a desire to
protect private information. We propose to disentangle those two aspects.
We make three main contributions in this paper:
1. We offer a new method to generate a privacy concern in the laboratory.
We ask our subjects to fill a questionnaire about their opinions on a set
of controversial, sensitive and socially relevant topics. This method over-
comes the disadvantages of other methods used in privacy-related lab ex-
periments, such as measuring and disclosing intelligence test scores, which
create a dichotomous division between bad and good types and also suffer
from an overconfidence bias. By covering multiple contexts, our question-
naire makes it very likely that at least one issue will be sensitive for an
individual and, hence, induce a privacy concern for that individual. Our
method does not require that individuals tell the truth about their own
opinion. While eliciting information that is sensitive in the laboratory
context, the personal information we obtained cannot be misused to dam-
age the subjects materially, which helps to overcome legal constraints in
the collection, storage, and use of personal information.
2. We test the analogy between standard financial risk attitudes and attitudes
to privacy risk in a laboratory setting. We measure privacy attitudes in
a context of risk by letting participants decide whether to take part in
privacy lotteries, where the loss is a loss of privacy. Namely, we offer
participants the option to play privacy lotteries that result in personal
information disclosure with a certain probability. We compare decisions
in such lotteries with decisions to incur risk in lotteries involving monetary
outcomes. We find that attitudes to privacy risk correlate with attitudes
to financial risk, as the best predictor for decisions in privacy lotteries is
attitude to financial risk. We test this result for robustness by introducing
the risk of a privacy shock in one treatment – there might be personal
information disclosure regardless of the individual’s effort to protect it.
This does not alter choices in privacy lotteries. We also test this result
for an order effect, and find that subjects lose interest in protecting their
privacy if preferences in privacy lotteries are elicited after the monetary
ones.
3. Based on those findings, we offer a novel methodology of implicit elic-
itation of equivalent monetary values for one’s personal information by
comparing choices in monetary and in privacy lotteries. Our two-step
indirect elicitation method allows us to obtain implicit monetary values
for privacy, corrected for risk preferences in so far as those influence the
decision to incur privacy risk. Our method can be applied for any type
of private information; it is not limited to the particular type of personal
information about opinion on sensitive social topics that we used in our
experiment. Indeed, the loss of privacy can be in the financial domain,
about health, about one’s social network, etc.... Moreover, this method is
not limited to the exposure of subjects to a risk of personal information
CHAPTER 3. 95
revelation but may be applied to a range of other risks, such as unau-
thorized sharing with third parties, use of contact details for unsolicited
marketing purposes, exposure to fraudulent activity, etc. We argue that
our method is more suitable than direct and explicit valuation methods
for the purpose of accurately evaluating and comparing the perceived dis-
utility of privacy risk in various domains, especially when direct elicitation
is not feasible or may undermine the validity of the study.
The paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 reviews related literature and
presents our hypotheses; section 3.3 describes the experimental design and
methodology; section 3.4 provides an analysis of the data and tests of the hy-
potheses; section 3.5 provides a discussion and robustness check of our results;
section 3.7 describes our method of estimation of monetary value for privacy;
and section 3.8 summarizes our findings and concludes.
3.2 Related work and hypotheses
With the more widespread use of the Internet for a wider range of daily activities,
the interest in privacy issues has spread beyond a personal concern, raising a
debate about privacy issues from economic, legislative, technological and policy
perspectives.
The empirical validation of privacy models, and further elaboration of poli-
cies and solutions in terms of regulation, protection, exchange and use of per-
sonal information raise a serious measurement challenge: what value does per-
sonal information have, to whom, and under what conditions? Two main ap-
proaches that researchers took to investigate these issues are surveys and exper-
iments.
A Jupiter Research survey (Leathern, 2002) reported that 36% of US respon-
dents would allow tracking of their Internet activities for a US$5 discounts. A
similar fraction of European respondents agreed to trade their e-mail addresses
for money or a chance to win a prize (Symantec, 2015). However, another survey
found that 91% of Americans disagree with the statement that "If companies
give me a discount, it is a fair exchange for them to collect information about me
without my knowing" (Turow et al., 2015, p. 3). Although numerous surveys
report high privacy concerns in the general population of both the U.S. and Eu-
rope (see Turow et al., 2015; Madden and Rainie, 2015; Eurobarometer, 2015),
the hypothetical questions in surveys and the complexity of privacy attitudes
make it difficult for the researchers to quantify the preferences of participants
and predict their behavior. Acquisti et al. (2016a) remark that stated prefer-
ences usually differ from observed behavior and suggest that privacy attitudes
are idiosyncratic, subjective, context-dependent, and dynamic, i.e. change over
time (see also John et al., 2011b).
In order to address issues in quantifying privacy preferences and to estimate
the value people assign to their personal information, researchers have turned
to experimental and empirical methods. A field experiment of Beresford et al.
(2012) elicited an average willingness to accept 1 Euro in discounts in order
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to provide date of birth and monthly income to an online DVD store. Gideon
et al. (2006); Tsai et al. (2011); Egelman et al. (2013) demonstrated that some
customers were willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective
websites, while Hann et al. (2007) found that “among U.S. subjects, protec-
tion against errors, improper access, and secondary use of personal information
is worth between US$30.49 and US$44.62” (p. 29). Anecdotal evidence in
Grossklags and Acquisti (2007) suggests that people accept even small rewards
of 25 cents to sell their personal information, but are not ready to spend the
same amount for its protection. Huberman et al. (2005), using experimental
auctions, found a correlation between trait’s desirability and bid for protection
from revelation of information about this trait. For instance, they showed that
young people were more likely to reveal their age than the older population (on
average, for US$3.62 and US$18.05, respectively). Similarly, the higher is the
perceived discrepancy between one’s own and the average weight of other sub-
jects, the lower is the willingness to reveal the information about one’s weight.
Benndorf et al. (2014) elicit a willingness to sell contact details for 15 Euro and
Facebook data for 19 Euro in their incentivized experiment using a DBM mech-
anism. 10 to 20% of their participants did not want to sell personal information
for any price. As one can see even from the limited sample of findings presented
above, privacy preferences differ dramatically across individuals and studies.
All those studies ask people directly for their willingness to sell or protect
information. However, Wilson and Brekke (1994) claim that explicit measure-
ments may limit the motivation, opportunity, and ability of people to retrieve,
translate and report mental contents. Sometimes such contents are even not
accessible to introspection. Moreover, subjects are more inclined towards ex-
treme values in explicit measures than in implicit measures (Schwarz, 1999).
In contrast, implicit measures provide an assessment of mental content without
intentional deliberate processing and awareness about the relation between de-
rived response and mental content (Nosek and Greenwald, 2009), and therefore,
avoid limitations typical for self-reported estimations (Nosek et al., 2011). Em-
pirical studies showed that neither of the measuring techniques is “truer” than
another (Banaji et al., 2004), and that both explicit and implicit measures may
have a stronger or weaker predictive power in various domains (Nosek et al.,
2011). Therefore, in our study we develop a new, implicit measurements of
personal information (dis)utility but we also elicit the same measurements as
previous studies for comparison (e.g., Westin’s Privacy Index, WTA/WTP, gen-
eral privacy concern). We do not claim to find an absolute value for privacy, but
offer a novel experimental approach of eliciting behavior in an incentive com-
patible way that can be applied in various domains for a better understanding
of individuals’ preferences.
To the best of our knowledge, our experiment is the first attempt to test the
relation between risk and privacy attitudes in a laboratory setting. Dinev and
Hart (2006) found that privacy risks and concerns are closely and positively re-
lated. Our first hypothesis is that decisions to protect personal information will
be correlated with attitude to risk; participants who are risk-averse in monetary
lotteries will also be risk-averse in privacy lotteries.
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H1: The willingness to protect personal information from the risk of reve-
lation will increase with aversion to the risk of a monetary loss.
We will test this hypothesis by checking if there is a correlation between the
willingness to protect personal information elicited in privacy lotteries and the
risk tolerance level elicited in monetary lotteries. We will test this result for
robustness by running a treatment with an unavoidable risk of privacy shock –
under the assumption that losing control on the decision to take a privacy risk
changes attitudes to that risk. We will also check if the order of elicitation (first
monetary risk then privacy risk vs. vice versa) primes our subject to think of
privacy like a monetary good.
Our second hypothesis is that direct valuation methods and privacy attitudes
elicited in surveys will correlate with the willingness to incur a privacy risk.
H2: The willingness to protect personal information from the risk of rev-
elation will increase with WTA/WTP for privacy protection and will correlate
with survey measures of privacy attitudes.
If the above hypotheses are verified, then we will feel justified in deriving
an implicit monetary value of privacy by comparing decisions in monetary and
privacy lotteries. We will compare this indirect elicited implicit value of privacy,
as derived from decisions in our experiment, with directly elicited explicit values
of privacy.
3.3 Experimental design
Subjects were asked to make a sequence of binary choices between safe and risky
options. Subjects faced two types of lotteries: monetary lotteries that imply
changes in monetary outcome; and privacy lotteries that imply the disclosure
of personal information.
3.3.1 Personal information
In order to create privacy concern, we combine different sources of data (that we
will collectively refer to as personal information): standard personal informa-
tion and personal information that was elicited in the lab. Our standard privacy
items were the name and surname of participants. Those remained unknown
to others unless the outcome of the experiment was such that the subject had
to reveal them at the very end of the experiment. We also took photos of each
subject upon arrival in the laboratory. Combined together, those pieces of data
can be classified as personally identifiable information according to McCallister
(2010). Moreover, from full name and photo one could potentially infer ad-
ditional information, e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, and sometimes even religious
views and health issues (for example, myopia due to the use of eyeglasses).
Our source of private information consisted of answers to a questionnaire (ap-
pendix B.1), with 14 questions about opinion on potentially sensitive or socially
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relevant topics, such as abortion, illegal immigration, and appropriate methods
of birth contraception. This questionnaire was filled in before subjects received
instructions about the experiment (appendix B.3). This personal information
was then put under the risk of disclosure in the laboratory experiment.
Multiple mechanisms were design to create and enhance privacy concern in
the laboratory setting. There is no right or wrong answer in such a survey,
and opinions create a “personal image”, potentially exposing differences in opin-
ion among the subjects.1 The psychological literature states that the fear of
being isolated from other people imposes a psychological cost on subjects ex-
pressing unpopular opinion (see Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Kim, 1999; Clemente
and Roulet, 2015).2 Behaviors and opinions that deviate from group’s norms
and expectations are also more likely to be ridiculed or even punished by the
group (Griskevicius et al., 2006; Janes and Olson, 2000; Kruglanski and Web-
ster, 1991). Our experimental design did not preclude creation of the group
identity, which would be undesirable in our study, because high level of famil-
iarity among participants makes it easier for the subjects to predict group’s
norm and respond accordingly, while uncertainty about the consequences of
personal information revelation strengthen privacy concerns and psychological
discomfort related to expressing an opinion. Nevertheless, majoritarian opinion
may represent the “norm” in our context. If the information was to be revealed
to others, responses to the preliminary questionnaire appeared not in a general
summary, but in a comparative form, confronting the answers of the individual
with the share of people with contradictory opinion. Such presentation allowed
to compare the subjects’ responses with the prevailing view, which can be con-
sidered a norm, locally emerged in a group of subjects participating in a certain
experimental session. Our design also aimed at avoiding the truth-telling issue.
There was no way to escape the possibility that one’s expressed opinion will
conflict with the opinion of a portion of other participants, and this did not
depend on whether one’s expressed opinion corresponds to one’s truthfully held
opinion. Moreover, since questionnaire questions were presented in the form of
multiple choice options rather than open questions, participants did not have
opportunity to explain or defend their positions.3 The potential fear of being
“misunderstood” is expected to further enhance the discomfort with regard to
information disclosure and privacy concern. Therefore, no matter whether the
subject answered truthfully or not, the risk of public revelation of the opinions
together with name, surname and photo, the uncertainty of consequences, the
1Even if a participant did not report a truthful answer, he sent a signal about his type
that would contradict the position of people from an opposite group. Intra-class correlation
coefficient among answers on preliminary questionnaire equal to 0.56, proving that we managed
to achieve this goal with a good level of nonconformity among participants, in the sense that
a large proportion of subjects expressed opinions that differed from others. See shares of
answers to the preliminary questionnaire, mean and standard deviation in appendix B.1.
2Nonetheless, nonconformity could appear advantageous in certain circumstances, e.g., if
subjects attempt to emphasize their uniqueness or individuality (see Argyle, 1957; Hollander,
1958; Maslach et al., 1985; Snyder and Fromkin, 2012, etc.).
3Indeed, during the experiment several participants raised the question about such a pos-
sibility and expressed concern about absence of such.
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fear of public “shame” in case of deviation from an established local group norm,
is expected to cause privacy concerns.
There are a few other experimental studies that synthetically produce per-
sonal information for the purpose of investigating privacy attitudes. Rivenbark
(2012) used a public good game to endogenously generate valuable private in-
formation for further elicitation of values and beliefs. Grossklags and Acquisti
(2007) used quiz performance to estimate willingness to sell or protect personal
information. Feri et al. (2016) created sensitive information via a logic test
score connected to the real name of the participant. The personal information
we elicit in the lab is less artificial and more broadly relevant than the syn-
thetic information generated in those experiments. Our method overcomes the
disadvantages of using intelligence test scores, which create a dichotomous di-
vision between bad and good types and are affected by an overconfidence bias
(Griffin and Varey, 1996; Wallsten, 1996), whereby people have a tendency to
believe that they belong to a group with a test score above median. Moreover,
our questionnaire covers multiple contexts, thus increasing the probability of
capturing an issue that is sensitive for an individual and, hence, of inducing a
privacy concern without falling into issues with truth-telling. While eliciting
information that is sensitive in the laboratory context, the personal informa-
tion we obtained cannot be misused to damage the subjects materially, which
helps overcome legal constraints in the collection, storage, and use of personal
information.
3.3.2 Elicitation method
We elicited risk attitude by asking subjects to make choices between gambles
in a variation of multiple price list (MPL) designs that are commonly used in
experimental economics. MPLs are easy to understand for participants and
are incentive compatible (Miller et al., 1969; Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison
and Rutström, 2008; Andersen et al., 2006). Subjects were offered 8 lists, each
requiring 11 decisions between two options: safe options and risky lotteries (fig.
3.1). Subjects were asked to indicate the option they preferred to play for
every row. The order of MPL menus within each task was randomized across
participants.
The option A offered a safe payoff x, while option B offered an outcome y,
which was decreased by c with probability 1− p in monetary tasks. In privacy
tasks, outcome y came with a probability 1 − p of having to disclose private
information. We varied option B across tables, while safe payoffs x in option
A was lowered from the top row to the bottom row. According to Maier and
Rüger (2010), keeping the probabilities fixed and varying only the outcomes
helps to avoid the issue of probability weighting, assumed in standard paramet-
ric prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Moreover, comparison of
numeric outcomes is easier for participants than comparison of event probability.
We set p = 70% (so the probability of a loss of money or of privacy disclosure
equals 30%) because while 50/50 chance is more neutral and rather suitable
for monetary lotteries, a 50% probability of personal information disclosure is
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of one of the MPL menus in the privacy task
too high with respect to what may be consistent with real world probabilities
of privacy breaches. However, setting p higher would lead us into a domain of
probabilities that are difficult for subjects to grasp intuitively.
Monetary lotteries In the monetary task we presented to subjects menus
of choices between safe payoffs x and lottery L, while varying payoff y and the
loss c. c was either a loss of 10 ECU, 30 ECU, or 50 ECU (c = 10, 30 or 50), or
a gain of 30 ECU (c = −30). Payoffs x varied from slightly above y to slightly
above y − c if c was a loss, and from y − c to y if c was a gain. Appendix B.5.1
shows MPL menus as they were presented to the subjects. We varied losses and
gains to be able to condition our measure of risk aversion for a subject to the
level of loss he is facing. This is because we do not know in advance what value
a subject attaches to privacy, and we therefore need to consider risk aversion
for a range of possible values.
Privacy lotteries In the privacy task, we showed to the subjects the same
menus of choices as in monetary lotteries, except that we replaced monetary loss
c with an obligation to reveal private information. That is, in the risky options,
subjects got y ECU, but with probability 1− p their personal information was
disclosed to other participants in the lab. Values of x, y, and p were the same
as in monetary task (see the corresponding MPL menus in appendix B.5.2).
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The proposed risk elicitation technique is not limited to the type of data
used in our experiment and can be easily adapted and applied to other kinds
of personal information. For example, privacy lotteries could also imply revela-
tion of financial and health information or of information from social network
accounts. Our method allows the measurement of the (dis)utility of privacy risk
in various domains.
3.3.3 Treatments
We designed two conditions to check robustness to an order effect: in the first,
the privacy lotteries appeared prior to the monetary lotteries; in the second,
the monetary lotteries appeared before the privacy lotteries. We also ran two
treatments to test the effect of control deprivation: in the basic treatment the
outcome of the experiment depends solely on the choice of the participants,
providing them with full control over their personal information; in the shock
treatment participants faced a risk of privacy shock, i.e. probability of revelation
of their personal information independently from the choices in the experiment.
We discuss those treatments in section 3.6.
We thus have a 2×2 treatment design (basic vs. shock, and privacy first vs.
monetary first). Subjects were assigned to each of the four groups at random.
Treatments were implemented as between-subject, so that each participant faced
either a situation where the risk of privacy shock was present or absent and
either the monetary or the privacy task appeared first. Within-subject analysis
allows comparison between the choices of every participant across the two tasks
(monetary and privacy lotteries).
3.3.4 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the Cognitive and Experimental Economics
Laboratory between May, 4th and June, 8th 2015. A total of 148 subjects
were recruited for 8 experimental sessions, in groups of 15-21 participants per
one-hour session, among undergraduate students at the University of Trento,
Italy. Appendix B.8 summarizes the demographic characteristics4. On average
subjects obtained 8.83 Euro per person, including a 3.00 Euro participation fee.
When invited to participate, our subjects were not told that the scope of the
study was related to privacy. However, they were given an opportunity to decline
participation in the experiment after reading instructions for the experiment and
the questions of our preliminary opinion questionnaire. The payment of show-
up fee was guaranteed independently on that decision. Thus, we controlled for
self-selection related to reluctance to respond to the questionnaire or jeopardize
privacy. All invited subjects decided to go through with the experiment.
To improve the clarity of decision consequences, we employed the prior in-
centive system (PRINCE) (Johnson et al., 2015a). Instead of picking one of the
decisions for payment only at the end of the experiment, we distributed closed
4The demographic characteristics were similar across all sessions.
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envelopes with a description of the real choice situation that will determining
an individual’s payoff before the experiment started.5 This system makes it
more obvious to the participants that any situation might be relevant for them,
and which decision is relevant depends on the chance that has already realized
at the moment they picked an envelope. Therefore, it was more obvious to
participants that they have to consider each decision they make as potentially
payoff-relevant. Johnson et al. (2015a) claims that PRINCE system improves
understanding that the payoff-relevant decision is chosen at random, and gives
better reassurance that this is true randomization, i.e. that the experimenter is
not deceitful. This also makes isolation of each decision “maximally salient” (p.
3) and makes the issue of hedging across decisions (Holt, 1986) less important.
We introduced the risk of privacy shock in the shock treatment by adding 24
envelopes that determined the payoff independently from the choices made in
the experiment. Thus, with 21% probability subject would pick up an envelope,
which implies sure payoff of 35, 55, 65 or 75 ECU and revelation of personal
information, no matter which choice they had made in the tables.6
After subjects picked at random an envelope, they entered the laboratory
and took their randomly assigned seat. After completion of the preliminary
questionnaire subjects read the instructions for the first part of the experiment.
Once all participants answered correctly to the control questions (appendix B.4)
they proceeded to the first task of the experiment. After participants finished
the first task, they read instructions for the second part of the experiment.
Upon completion of the second task participants answered a final questionnaire
(appendix B.2) about the experiment, basic demographic information, attitudes
towards privacy, WTA and WTP for personal information, risk, self-disclosure,
fairness, and trust.
At the end of each session subjects came one-by-one to the experimenter’s
table and opened their envelopes. The situations described in the envelope were
implemented. In the situations, where personal information had to be disclosed
to other participants, the subjects stood in front of the audience in the lab,
experimenter verified his name and surname from the ID card and announced it
aloud. Other participants saw on the screen the personal photo and the answers
that subject gave in the preliminary questionnaire. To emphasize the inequality
aspect mentioned in section 3.3.1, we presented the summary of the answers
to the preliminary questionnaire in a form of comparison with the fraction of
participants who answered in a different way, e.g., “John Smith agrees that it is
morally justified to abort after discovering serious disability in the fetus, while
93% of other participants does not agree”.
We now proceed to the description and analysis of the experimental results.
5Decision-makers find it easier to condition on the events determined in the past rather
than in the future (see Keren, 1991; Shafir and Tversky, 1992; Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and
Lee, 2005; Bardsley, 2010).
6Note, that our design avoids an issue of compound lottery. Since subject picks an envelope
at random before the experiment, the presence of privacy shock is determined by the state of
the nature. Thus, the only risky decision a subject is free to make is to choose option B in
MPL menus instead of safe option A.
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Table 3.1: Interval estimation of ror across MPL tables.
MPL Range of Lottery option Elicitation interval
table safe outcomes for ror
(in ECU)
1 46 - 56 Get 55, but Pr=.3 to lose 10 −7% < ror < 13%
2 38 - 68 Get 65, but Pr=.3 to lose 30 −18% < ror < 47%
3 30 - 80 Get 75, but Pr=.3 to lose 50 −25% < ror < 100%
4 35 - 65 Get 30, but Pr=.3 to gain 30 −32% < ror < 26%
3.4 Results
In total our data set is made out 88 binary choices made by 148 individuals.
In 95.86% of cases participants switched from the safe to the risky option in a
MPL table only once.7 They thus demonstrated monotonic preferences across
lotteries.
3.4.1 Risk preferences
For our measurements of risk attitude, we calculate the rate of return (“ror ”)
required by each subject to take the lottery. A subject who is indifferent between
safe payoff x and monetary lottery L = (y, 1−p; y−c, p) requires a rate of return
of:
ror =
y · p+ (y − c) · (1− p)− x
x
(3.1)
Expressed another way, x · (1 + ror) = y · p+ (y − c) · (1− p).
We use the midpoint of the interval in which a subject switches between the
safe and the risky option as our measurement of x, the certainty equivalent of L.
Adopting the idea that back-and-forth switching behavior could be the result
of indifference (see Andersen et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2012; Charness et al.,
2013), we use the mean value between the lower bound of the first switch and
the upper bound of the last switch in MPL table as our estimate of x in cases
where subjects switched more than once.
Tab. 3.1 shows that with our choice of monetary lotteries, we are able to
obtain an estimate of the risk premium even for very high or low values of ror.
If a subject never switched in a table then we consider the level of ror to be
unobserved for that subject in that table. If a subject never chose to play a
lottery in any table for any value of the safe alternative then we consider this
subject to be infinitely risk-averse. If a subject always chose the lottery rather
than any safe option then we consider this subject to be infinitely risk-loving.
We compute ror, the average ror by individual. On average, the level of
ror was 11%. We find that 127 subjects (86% of the total) were risk averse
(ror > 1%), 16 subjects (11% of the total) were risk seeking (ror < −1%), and
7This is consistent with proportions of 93.4-94.5% observed by Holt and Laury (2002).
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5 subjects (3% of the total) were risk neutral (ror ∈ [−1%, 1%]). Of the risk
averse subjects, 3 subjects (2% of the total) never took any risk (ror > 100%).
We did not observe any subject always taking a risk (ror < −32%).
Those results are consistent with Holt and Laury (2002), which find that
about two-thirds of the subjects in their experiments were risk averse when all
prizes are below US$4.00. They note that risk aversion increases when payoffs
are scaled up. This explains our higher proportion of risk-averse subjects since
the highest possible outcome was 8 Euro in our experiment (plus 3 Euro as
show-up fee). We will discuss the dependence of ror on the magnitude of the
loss c in the lottery in section 3.7.
3.4.2 Privacy preferences
We compute an index of attitude to privacy r isk (“IAPR”) defined as the value
that equates the certainty equivalent x of the lottery and the expected value of
the lottery, y ·p+(y−IAPR)·(1−p), whereby the value of privacy is IAPR. The





This value represents the equivalent in monetary terms of the risk of a “loss of
privacy” (i.e. personal information disclosure). Positive value of the IAPR can
be translated into a dis-utility of the risk of personal information disclosure,
while negative value of the IAPR can be attributed to the utility of the risk of
personal information disclosure (“privacy exhibitionism”). We draw the reader’s
attention to the fact that the IAPR is not a monetary equivalent of privacy loss,
but of the risk of such a loss. In other words, the IAPR takes into account both
the value attached to privacy by a subject and his level of aversion to risk. We
explain later how we disentangle the two.
We compute an interval estimate of the value of the IAPR as implied by
individual switching points in the MPL menus of the privacy task (tab. 3.2).
Namely, we use the midpoint of the switching interval as our measurement of
x when subjects switched only once, and the mean value between the lower
bound of the first switch and the upper bound of the last switch in MPL tables
when subjects switched more than once. Tab. 3.2 shows that with our choice
of privacy lotteries, we are able to obtain a value of IAPR as long as it is no
higher than 150 ECU (15 Euro) and no lower than -100 ECU (-10 Euro).
Of the 148 subjects in our experiment, 49 subjects or about 33% of our
sample had a mean value of IAPR = 5 ECU, which corresponds to 0.5 Euro.
This value corresponds to the mean IAPR for subjects who consistently preferred
a safe payoff to the same safe payoff with a risk of privacy disclosure, but
switched to the risky option as soon as the lottery outcome exceeded the safe
payoff. IAPR = 5 ECU is therefore the cut-point separating subjects who
liked the opportunity of disclosing their information in at least one table from
subjects who disliked doing so on average.
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Table 3.2: Interval estimation of IAPR, in Experimental Currency Unit (ECU).
(1 ECU = 0.1 Euro).
MPL Range of Lottery option Elicitation interval
table safe outcomes for the IAPR
(in ECU)
5 46 - 56 Get 55, but Pr=0.3 of −3 < IAPR < 30personal information disclosure
6 38 - 68 Get 65, but Pr=0.3 of −10 < IAPR < 90personal information disclosure
7 30 - 80 Get 75, but Pr=0.3 of −17 < IAPR < 150personal information disclosure
8 35 - 65 Get 30, but Pr=0.3 of −100 < IAPR < 0personal information disclosure
In total, 94 subjects (64% of the total) had mean values of IAPR higher than
5 ECU (privacy protective), of which 14 never took any privacy risk (IAPR> 150
ECU), 49 subjects (33% of the total) were close to indifferent to the risk of
personal information disclosure (IAPR= 5 ECU) and 5 subjects (3% of the
total) had a mean value of IAPR lower than 5 ECU (exhibitionists). There
were no subjects who always chose the risky option (IAPR< −100 ECU). The
mean of IAPR for those subjects for which it was measured (90% of the total)
was 25 ECU (2.5 Euro).
The majority of our subjects were thus averse to privacy disclosure, a large
minority was indifferent and a small minority appeared to enjoy privacy disclo-
sure and was ready to pay for it. This contrasts with WTA and WTP which
were all higher than or equal to zero. It might be that subjects did not re-
alize they could express negative values for their WTA or their WTP; future
experiments on privacy should be careful to make participants aware that they
can also express willingness to pay to disclose personal information rather than
assuming that all participants are unwilling to disclose.
With the exception of a few subjects, most of our subjects were not comfort-
able with personal information disclosure. A substantial number of participants
chose safe options in privacy lotteries, demonstrating the presence of privacy
concerns. This is because even though synthetically generated personal infor-
mation can hardly be misused to harm participants after the end of the study,
reputation created on the basis of expressed opinions remains even outside of
the lab after the experiment. The salience of conformist opinion was increased
by presenting opinions along with statistics on the opinion of peers on the same
issue. Together with observed diversity of opinions this served to reinforce pri-
vacy concern. We indeed observed some degree of nervousness and anxiety for
subjects whose information was eventually disclosed to others in the lab. Many
participants also mentioned privacy concerns in the open-ended question of the
exit survey.
While the majority of people attributed a positive value to personal infor-
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mation and did tend to protect it from disclosure, we found, as a number of
studies suggest, that some people, in contrast, wanted to make their personal
information and opinions public. Such differences reflect differences in goals,
attitudes personality traits and other factors (see Zywica and Danowski, 2008;
Krasnova et al., 2009; Ross et al., 2009; Correa et al., 2010). This minority
tendency to disclose is consistent with the use of social technologies, such as on-
line social networks, blogs, etc., and could be especially prevalent for the active
users of such technologies, extensively present in the population of students,
and, consequently, in our sample.8
3.5 Are individuals who are more risk-averse also
less willing to reveal private information?
To test the first hypothesis stated in section 3.2, we run a first set of interval
regression to take account of right-censoring in our data on IAPRi. The first
set of regressions take the following form:
IAPRi = β0 + β1 · rori + β2 · Shocki + β3 ·Orderi + β4 · Tablek + ...+ ik
(3.3)
where IAPRi is average IAPR for individual i across tables k ∈ [5, 8], except
if the individual never switched in any table, in which case we code IAPRi >
150 ECU. rori is average ror for subject i from his choices in tables k ∈ [1, 4] –
we include in our regressions a dummy equal to 0 if rori > 100%, 1 else, which
we interact with rori. Shocki takes value 0 for participants assigned to the basic
treatment and value 1 for those assigned to the shock treatment; Orderk takes
value 0 if monetary task appeared before privacy task, 1 otherwise; Tablek is a
control for differences in IAPR across tables.
We also include other variables measuring attitudes to privacy from survey
responses. In particular, we use explicit self-reportedWTA for privacy disclosure
(Q6 in the final questionnaire, appendix B.2) and WTP for privacy protection
(Q7). Socio-demographic indicators include gender, age, field of study, level of
education, nationality, parents’ education, size of the locality (city, town, vil-
lage. . . ) and income level (monthly spending) (Q8 to Q15). Other measures of
privacy attitudes include general privacy concern (Q16), experience of privacy
invasions (Q21), questions to compute Westin’s Privacy Index (Q22, see Westin,
1968), and questions to compute a self-disclosure index (Q309). Based on Fogel
and Nehmad (2009), we also asked how subjects deal with private information
online (Q17 to Q20, summarized in an index of online information revelation10),
8Only about 5% of our participants indicated they were not members of any online social
network.
9The self-disclosure index is computed as sum of a, c, d, f, and i minus b, e, g, h and j.
10The index of “online information revelation” is computed using a single-factor measure-
ment model whereby answers to questions Q17 and Q19 are modeled as ordered logit and
answers to questions Q18 and Q20 are modeled as logit.
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the number of their oﬄine and online friends (Q23 and Q25), the online social
network they use (Q24)11, and their privacy settings in online networks (Q26 to
Q29, summarized in index “privacy online”12). We also collected other variables
related to privacy concerns in the experiment: number of known other partic-
ipants (Q3), trust in the use of information by the experimenter (Q5), and an
index of conformity to the opinion of others in the preliminary questionnaire
(average percentage of participants who agree with one’s opinion). This latter
variable is designed to take account of a possible exacerbated privacy concern
for those subjects who know or think that their opinion does not fit with the
majority. Finally, we elicit general and domain specific risk attitude (Q31 and
Q32, summarized in index “risk”13) and level of trust in others (Q33 to Q37,
summarized in index “trust”14).
We also run a second set of regressions using a panel random-effects interval-
data regression model where we input the number of safe choices made in privacy
risk tables as our dependent variable, and the average number of safe choices
made in monetary risk tables instead of rori as an independent variable. This
regression method allows us to take account of censoring below and above if a
subject always chose option A or option B in a given MPL table. This second
set of regressions takes the following form:
safe_privacyik = β0 + β1 · safe_monetaryi + β2 · Shocki + β3 ·Orderi+
+ β4 · Tablek + ...+ ik (3.4)
whereby safe_privacyik is the number of safe choices made by individual i
in table k, k ∈ [5, 8] and safe_monetaryi is the average number of safe choices
made by individual i in tables k, k ∈ [1, 4].
Tab. B.11 shows results of various specifications for our first set of regressions
(appendix B.7). Tab. B.12 shows results of various specifications for the second
set of regressions (appendix B.7). We first discuss the impact of risk and privacy
preferences on the decision to incur privacy risk before discussing treatment and
order effects.
Our regressions show that the ror measure of aversion to risk in monetary
tasks is a significant positive predictor of the IAPR measure of aversion to
risk in privacy task. We find the same positive significant relation between the
number of safe choices made in monetary lotteries and in privacy lotteries. This
supports the first part of our first hypothesis: subjects who are more risk-averse
in monetary lotteries are also more risk-averse in privacy lotteries.
1180% indicated Facebook, so the variable is coded as 1 for Facebook, 0 for others.
12In the “privacy online” index, Q26 to Q29 are coded as 1 if a subject answered 1 in Q26,
1 or 2 in Q27, 1 in Q28 and 1 in Q29 , and 0 otherwise. We then sum those variables.
13The “risk index” is computed using a single-factor measurement model whereby answers
to questions Q31 and Q32 are modeled as ordered logit.
14The trust index is computed using a single-factor measurement model whereby answers
to questions Q33, Q34 and Q35 are modeled as ordered logit and answers to questions Q36
and Q37 are modeled as logit.
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We also find that WTA and WTP both predict higher IAPR, whereby the
IAPR increases by an average of 0.5 ECU (= 0.05 Euro) for every Euro in-
crease in WTA, and by an average of 2 ECU (= 0.20 Euro) for every Euro
increase in WTP. There is therefore a relation between our implicit measure
of privacy risk aversion and explicit measures of valuations for privacy, but
that relation is rather weak. The weak relation with WTA shows that WTA is
not only overstated15 but also less tightly related with observed behavior than
WTP. Another factor that independently relates to the IAPR is the experience
of a violation of privacy in the past (Q21). Westin’s fundamentalists have sig-
nificantly higher values of the IAPR under some specifications. The general
question about privacy concern Q16 is significantly related to the IAPR in the
panel random-effect regressions. The results of our regressions show that none
of the socio-demographic questions influences the IAPR or the number of safe
choices made, except being a foreigner (non-Italian), which increases the num-
ber of safe choices made in privacy lotteries. Those additional findings support
our second hypothesis: subjects who express more concern for privacy and/or
express higher values for protecting their private information are also less likely
to take the risk of having to reveal private information.
In terms of contributions of privacy and monetary risk attitudes to explaining
attitudes to privacy risk, the McFadden’s pseudo R2 of our full model is 10.7%
for IAPR regressions and 8.9% for safe choice regressions.16 Of this, about 40%
is contributed by measures of risk attitude in monetary lotteries, 40% by the
combination of WTA and WTP, and the rest by survey measures of privacy
attitudes and socio-demographic variables.17
Overall, therefore, attitudes to privacy risk do not appear to fundamentally
differ from attitudes to monetary risk: 1) subjects who express more concern
for privacy and who are ready to pay more to protect it or who require more
money to reveal it, are also less likely to take a risk in privacy lotteries, in the
same way as they are less likely to take risk when potential losses are higher.
2) subjects who are more risk averse when faced with monetary lotteries are
also more risk averse when faced with privacy lotteries, which is also consistent
with privacy having a monetary equivalent. We discuss this hypothesis further
in section 3.6, where we measure the effect of our shock treatment and how the
order of elicitation affects preferences.
While we do find some correlation between WTA/WTP and the IAPR or
15WTA observed in our experiment is 8 times higher than WTP, which is in line with
the 7.17 mean WTA/WTP ratio found by Horowitz and McConnell (2002) across 45 studies
about a variety of goods. Grossklags and Acquisti (2007) reports ratios between 4 and 36
times depending on type of information (quiz results, weight, favorite vacation destination,
and number of sexual partners). For a review, see Horowitz and McConnell (2002); Roth
(2006).
16McFadden’s pseudo R2 compare the log-likelihood LL0 of the null model with only an
intercept to the log-likelihood LLFull of the full model: R2 = 1− LLFull/LL0.
17We measure contribution as the percentage of the difference in log-likelihood between the
null model and the full model that is achieved by a model with the respective variable alone.
An alternative measure of contribution is by considering by how much the log-likelihood
decreases when removing one variable. In that case, the contribution of the measure of
monetary risk attitude is lower.
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number of safe choices in privacy tasks in our regressions, and while this corre-
lation is robust to a number of regression specifications, this pattern holds only
in the aggregate. Indeed, we find large divergences between WTA and WTP at
the individual level, and wide discrepancies between those values and the IAPR.
Different measures of aversion to private information disclosure are certainly not
always consistent at the individual level; many individuals behave in ways that
are inconsistent with their expressed WTA and WTP. In other words, implicit
and explicit measures do not always coincide, even though they do correlate at
the aggregate level.
Our results should not be interpreted to mean that subjects who are more
risk-averse have a higher utility for personal information. Indeed, IAPR is only
a way to index decisions in privacy lotteries, and does not take into consideration
risk-tolerance levels. It is not an estimate of a subject’s utility of personal
information. It reflects both value for personal information and readiness to
take risk in lotteries (and possibly some other factors, e.g., loss aversion). The
true value for privacy of a risk averse subject is lower than IAPR. We offer
later a method to retrieve monetary values of privacy corrected for risk aversion
but we first check that the relation between monetary and privacy risk aversion
is robust across treatments.
3.6 Treatment effects
Before trying to retrieve monetary values of privacy from decisions under risk,
we need to check that behavior under privacy risk is of the same nature as be-
havior under monetary risk. Indeed, it is not at all obvious that subjects deal
with privacy risk in the same way as with monetary risk. We were particularly
concerned about the issue of control over private information. Prior research
has indeed identified control or the lack thereof as an important driver of risk
attitudes and behaviors (Weinstein, 1984; Harris, 1996; Slovic, 2000; Nordgren
et al., 2007). It could be that privacy has worth only in so far as one has got
control over its probability of disclosure. Suppose indeed that you know that
whatever you do, your private information is at risk of being revealed. Then you
have to mentally anticipate this disclosure and prepare for it. Avoiding having
to anticipate privacy disclosure may be a large part of why some people are
averse to privacy risk. Therefore, forcing our subjects to have to anticipate pri-
vacy disclosure might reduce their willingness to protect their information. One
can make opposite arguments however. Some subjects may have a maximum
allowable level of risk they are ready to take with their private information,
and may therefore take more care to protect their information if it is already
under risk so as not to exceed this threshold. In order to settle the question, we
therefore test the effect of depriving participants of control over their personal
information in a complementary treatment.
As an additional robustness check we also tested whether the order of elic-
itation of attitudes to monetary and privacy risk had an effect on subjects’
decisions. Indeed, asking subjects first about monetary risk and then about
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privacy risk may induce them to think of a loss of privacy in the same way as of
a monetary loss, so we need to check whether the correlation between attitudes
to monetary and privacy risk also holds when privacy risk attitudes are elicited
first.
3.6.1 Loss of control
Control over personal information flows is often seen in the privacy literature as
a prerequisite for privacy protection (e.g., Kang, 1998; Solove, 2006). A Mad-
den and Rainie (2015) survey found that while 74% of Americans thought that
control over personal information is very important, only 9% of them believed
they had such control. Online social networks have moved towards providing
a more granular control over privacy settings to their users, which seems to
be a response to their privacy concerns. However, a “control paradox” arises,
whereby higher perceived control over personal information can lead to a de-
cline in concerns about privacy and an increase in information disclosure, even
when the associated risks are very high (John et al., 2011b; Brandimarte et al.,
2013). Using dynamic lotteries in a lab experiment, Feri et al. (2016) found that
subjects were less likely to disclose their personal information after receiving a
breach notification, which jeopardized their personal information. Unlike Feri
et al. (2016), which focused on the dynamic effect of breach notifications, we
focus on differences between treatments with and without the possibility of a
privacy shock. Furthermore, instead of measuring subjects’ willingness to sell
their personal information, we look into their willingness to take the risk of
revealing it.
In our experiment, we therefore test the effect of reducing control over the re-
lease of personal information by introducing the possibility of a “privacy shock”
(probabilistic disclosure of personal information, even when the participant al-
ways chose the safest option in privacy lotteries). We compare treatments with
the possibility of such a shock to treatments where participants can guarantee
through their decisions that no revelation of private information will occur. We
look at the number of safe choices and IAPR taking into account all individual
decisions and controlling for individual effects. Neither the panel regression of
the number of safe choices nor the regression on IAPR in appendix B.7, nor
the tests on the cumulative distribution function of safe choices and IAPR by
treatment show any treatment effect.18
Thus, we conclude that the introduction of a privacy shock does not lead
people to change their attitude towards protection of personal information. In
18Tests of the difference in the number of safe choices: two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test:
Prob > |z| = 0.84; t-test: Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9996; Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions
test: corrected p-value is 0.99; ANOVA: coefficient is -0.0002, P>|t|=1.00; Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations rank test: Prob=0.84. N=592 (268 and 324 in shock and basic treat-
ments, respectively). Statistical power is 0.05.
Tests of the difference in IAPR: two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.41;
t-test: Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.91; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: corrected p-value is 0.79; ANOVA:
coefficient is -0.30, P>|t|=0.91; Kruskal-Wallis rank test: Prob=0.41. N=375 (171 and 204 in
shock and basic treatments, respectively). Estimated statistical power is 0.05.
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other words, even when complete control over personal information is taken
away, whereby one introduces a risk of information disclosure that is independent
of one’s choices, people keep on considering the level of risk that remains under
their control in the same way as if they had full control over whether to incur
this risk. This finding suggests that the utility function for privacy risk is
inelastic with regard to the level of control over personal information disclosure.
Depriving people of control over their personal data has a negligible effect on
their willingness to protect it from disclosure.
3.6.2 Order effect
Theories of selective information processing state that focus on a primary task
reduces attention to a secondary task (Kahneman, 1973). If the monetary lot-
teries are presented prior to the privacy ones, subjects could keep their focus
on monetary outcomes and calculation of expected values, “learned” from the
monetary lotteries, when making decisions in the privacy lotteries. In this case,
due to selective attention, the emphasis on monetary values could drive away
attention to the evaluation of personal information utility. The latter could be
even perceived as irrelevant for decision-making when the monetary context is
set up in advance (Broadbent, 1957, 1982; Pashler and Sutherland, 1998; Dukas,
2004; Lachter et al., 2004).
In contrast, playing privacy lotteries first could draw more attention to the
personal information (dis)utility. Moreover, the time delay between genera-
tion of personal information by answering the sensitive questions, and putting
these responses under risk of disclosure, is shorter when the privacy lotteries are
played right after the completion of the preliminary questionnaire rather than
in the second part of the experiment. Adjerid et al. (2013) found that even 15-
second delay between demonstration of privacy notice and disclosure decisions
was sufficient to distract participants and mute the risk perception.
To test the order effect we consider the number of safe choices and IAPR
across different ordering of monetary and privacy tasks in the experiment. Sta-
tistical tests and cumulative distribution function show a significant order effect
in privacy task: subjects made more safe choices in the privacy lotteries and
had higher IAPR when privacy tasks appeared before the monetary tasks.19 A
similar effect is observed also in terms of the percentage of subjects who took
only safe alternative in privacy tables (20% when privacy task first vs. 12%
19Tests of the difference in the number of safe choices: two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test:
Prob > |z| = 0.01; t-test: Pr(T < t) = 0.01; Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions
test: corrected p-value is 0.04; ANOVA: coefficient is 0.77, P>|t|=0.02; Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations rank test: Prob=0.01. N=592 (312 and 280 in monetary and pri-
vacy tasks first conditions, respectively). Estimated statistical power is 0.66.
Tests of the difference in IAPR: two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Prob > |z| = 0.028;
t-test: Pr(T < t) = 0.03; Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test: corrected p-
value is 0.10; ANOVA: coefficient is 5.53, P>|t|=0.06; Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations
rank test: Prob=0.03. N=375 (206 and 169 in monetary and privacy tasks first conditions,
respectively). Estimated statistical power is 0.45.
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when monetary task first).20 The proportion of people who behaved as if they
had close to zero value for privacy – switching to the risky choice as soon as
its payoff was higher than the safe choice – was significantly lower when pri-
vacy lotteries appeared first than when monetary lotteries appeared first (25%
vs. 36%, respectively). 21 One of the possible explanations is that doing the
monetary task first could prime people to consider personal information in the
same terms as money, while doing the privacy task first induces people to think
about personal information in a different way that translates into more privacy
risk aversion.
While cumulative distribution function and statistical tests show that values
of the IAPR are greater when privacy task appears first, coefficients on this
condition dummy in regressions (appendix B.7) are not consistently significant.
However, we find that the relation between the IAPR and ror is stronger when
privacy task appeared first (fig. B.3b).22 This suggests that in the condition
where the privacy task was presented before the monetary one, the decision in
privacy task was largely driven by risk attitudes, while risk aversion played a
smaller role when the privacy task was presented after the monetary task. In
the latter case, the attention of participants may have been drawn to monetary
outcomes rather than to risk evaluation or privacy concerns.
3.7 Implicit monetary values for privacy
Various studies suggest strong relation of risk attitudes and individual decisions
across different contexts (such as work, personal finance, and health (Soane
and Chmiel, 2005), food risky for health (Lusk and Coble, 2005), and insur-
ances (Petrolia et al., 2013; Menapace et al., 2016)). Dohmen et al. (2011)
find the evidence that the general willingness to take risk explains about 60%
of variability in risk attitudes, while only about 5% variability is captured by
the domain-specific risk preferences (car driving, sports and leisure, health, fi-
nancial matters, and career). Although, for the best of our knowledge, there
is no empirical evidence of correlation between risk tolerance levels elicited in
gamble task to the context of privacy, we showed that risk attitudes are of a
similar nature in the monetary and the privacy context; subjects react to the
risk of a privacy loss in ways that are consistent with privacy loss being of the
same nature as a monetary loss. We can therefore estimate monetary values
of privacy by taking account of the risk tolerance level that was elicited in the
monetary task. Since we elicited both monetary and privacy risk aversion, we
can disentangle risk preferences from the (dis)utility of personal information
disclosure.
20Excluding MPL table 4, proportion test Pr(Z < z) = 0.01. Pearson chi2(1) = 5.32 (Pr =
0.021). Estimated power is 0.63.
21Two-sample test of proportions: Pr(Z > z) = 0.00. Estimated power is 0.83.
22Results from regressions confirm that there is no significant relation between ror and
the IAPR if monetary lotteries are presented first, while the relation is significant if privacy
lotteries are presented first.
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Willingness to take risk depends both on how large relative variation in
payoffs are in the lottery (standard deviation σ) and on whether the lottery
involves gains or losses. In our menu of lotteries, there is a linear relation
between σ and |c| – standard deviation in lottery outcomes increases linearly
with the absolute value of the loss/gain c – so we can simply replace the relation
between ror and σ with a relation between ror and |c| to take into account
standard deviation. As for differences in risk attitude when faced with gains vs.
when faced with losses, a visual inspection of individual ror as a function of c
reveals that ror increases with c, the size of the loss (fig. 3.2). A regression of ror
on c and |c|, whereby ror(c) = rorα · |c|+rorβ ·c gives out an estimate of average
rorα = 1.96h and rorβ = 3.47h (N = 534, R2 = 57%, F (2, 532) = 353,
p < 1h).23 This implies that subjects require a rate of return that increases
by 3.47 + 1.96 = 5.43h for each additional unit of loss (c > 0), and decreases
by 3.47 − 1.96 = 1.51h for each additional unit of gain (c < 0). Subjects
are thus risk-loving, on average, when faced with a lottery that involves gains,
while they are risk averse when faced with a lottery that involves losses of the
same magnitude. This is predicted by prospect theory when, as in our case,
probabilities of loss or gain are low (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Figure 3.2: Boxplot of the individual level of ror by level of loss in monetary
lotteries.
We can therefore obtain per-subject estimates of ror for different possible
levels of valuation of privacy by estimating individual by individual a regression
23We do not want to allow for a constant in such regressions as then we would have ror(0) 6=
0 which implies requiring a return on an asset with no risk. Allowing a constant in our
regressions does not change the results and the constant is not significantly different from
zero.
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of the form ror(c) = rorα · |c|+rorβ ·c.24 Consider thus an individual with level
of risk aversion represented by the couple (rorα, rorβ). Suppose this individual
is indifferent between safe payoff x and a risky option with payoff y and a
probability 1 − p of personal information disclosure. Then, for this individual,
privacy loss is equivalent to a monetary loss of magnitude vp such that x · (1 +
rorα · |vp|+ rorβ · vp) = y · p+ (y − vp) · (1− p).
Solving for vp, the implied equivalent monetary loss (or gain) from personal
information disclosure corrected with risk attitude is thus25:
vp =
y − x
1− p+ x · (rorα + rorβ) if vp > 0 (3.5)
vp =
y − x
1− p+ x · (−rorα + rorβ) if vp < 0 (3.6)
Our method for correcting the IAPR with ror to obtain a value of privacy vp
has the advantage of being able to easily condition the level of ror on the level of
vp. The value of vp can differ significantly from the value of the IAPR . Indeed,
unwillingness to take a risk of personal information disclosure may be due to
either high risk aversion or high dis-utility from such disclosure. We saw that
aversion to privacy risk and aversion to monetary risk were positively related,
but as fig. B.2 shows, there are a number of individuals with high monetary
risk aversion and low privacy risk aversion, and vice-versa. There are many
participants with the same aversion to privacy risk but they have distinct risk
attitudes, and therefore will have different values of vp. A subject who values
privacy positively but has a high level of risk aversion (high rorα and rorβ) will
have lower value of vp than a subject who also values privacy positively but is
less risk-averse.
Using formula 3.5, we obtain values of average individual vp that are dis-
tributed more smoothly than the uncorrected average IAPR (fig. B.1). Average
individual vp is 1.50 Euro, compared with an average WTP of 1.92 Euro and
an average WTA of 16.12 Euro. The distribution of values of vp is also more
consistent with those of WTP than with those of WTA.
We identify 4 individuals with negative values of privacy, compared with
126 with positive values for privacy. This does not include the 14 individuals
who never took privacy risks, neither does this include 3 individuals who never
took monetary risk, both type of individual for whom only a lower bound (resp.
upper bound) estimate of vp is available. Our estimates of vp show that there
are individuals with implicit negative values of privacy (see fig. B.1). This
implies that enjoying revelation of private information may occur, at least in
our sample and given our method for generating private information.
24This is subject however to having individual estimates of ror when the lottery implies a
gain and when the lottery implies a loss. If not, then either rorα or rorβ is set equal to 0.
25Those formulas imply that it is possible theoretically that we would obtain values of vP
that are positive if we assume vp is positive, and negative if we assume that vp is negative.
This happens however only for one subject with our data. In that case, we assume that vp is
positive if y − x is positive and vice-versa.
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We find no significant correlation between estimates of vp, those of WTA
and those of WTP. The lack of consistency is surprising given that WTA and
WTP were elicited after the experiment was finished, so the subjects had had
time to evaluate their attitude to privacy. This underlines again the difficulty
for people to give direct monetary equivalents for something like privacy which
is not generally experienced as being a tradable good. Welfare evaluations of the
impact of privacy losses should therefore not be based on valuations derived from
direct elicitation of WTP or WTA payment for private information disclosure.
Rather, they should be elicited, like in this experiment, indirectly and in such a
way that one can retrieve implicit monetary equivalents from similar decisions
involving money rather than privacy. We showed in this experiment that at least
in the case of information about opinion on sensitive social topics, people seemed
to behave when faced with privacy risk in similar ways as they behaved when
faced with monetary risk, thus allowing us to compute monetary equivalents of
the value of privacy.
We test our estimates of vp for robustness by measuring risk aversion levels
when assuming that our subjects have a CRRA utility function u(x) = xr
and when assuming that our subjects have a CARA utility function u(x) =
1 − e−αx. Given a risk aversion coefficient r in the CRRA case, we obtain
vp = y − (x
r−p·yr
1−p )
1/r. Given a risk aversion coefficient α in the CARA case,
we obtain vp = y − ln( e
−αx−p·e−αy
1−p )
−1/α. Estimates of vp with those alternative
methods are consistent and very highly correlated with our main estimates.
3.8 Conclusion
We presented novel methods for (1) the generation of privacy concerns in a
laboratory setting, (2) the elicitation of the (dis)utility of the risk of personal
information disclosure, and (3) the disentangling of risk attitudes from privacy
attitudes in decisions involving risk of personal information revelation. We
found that implicit and explicit measures of the value of privacy differ substan-
tially. Implicit elicitation technique may help to avoid the expressions of socially
desirable answers and beliefs, thus revealing the true preferences of the subjects.
We ran a laboratory experiment with 148 subjects and collected 13,024 ob-
servations on choices made between sure monetary payoff and lotteries of two
types. Lotteries in monetary domain served to elicit monetary risk preferences,
while privacy lotteries elicited willingness to protect from disclosure the per-
sonal information that included name, surname, photo, and responses to the
preliminary questionnaire about opinion on sensitive and socially relevant top-
ics. Additionally we manipulated the order in which monetary and privacy
lotteries were presented to the subjects and the level of control they had over
personal information by introducing privacy shocks in the form of a chance of
eventual personal information disclosure regardless of the choices made. We ap-
plied the prior incentive system to provide transparent and tangible economic
incentive (Johnson et al., 2015a).
We found a consistent positive relationship between monetary and privacy
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risk aversion. This supports the idea that willingness to protect personal infor-
mation may be driven at least in part by risk aversion rather than only, or even
mainly, by differences in values for personal information and privacy attitudes.
This may also serve as an explanation of the privacy paradox: when people take
risks of personal information revelation even though they express high levels of
privacy concerns, this may be due to their high level of risk tolerance rather than
being an inconsistency.When asked about their privacy attitude or WTP/WTA
for privacy, people respond both based on their value for privacy and their at-
titude to risk. This is why it is very important to know individual attitude to
risk in order to properly evaluate individual attitudes to privacy as such.
We also found that the introduction of a privacy shock, under which personal
information was compromised independently of the choices of participants, did
not affect the willingness to take risk in privacy tasks. Taking control over pri-
vacy away from participants did not either encourage or discourage them from
protecting it. Finally, we found qualified support for the existence of an order
effect, whereby presenting privacy lotteries prior to monetary ones leads to a
more privacy-protective behavior. We interpret this to mean that either pri-
vacy attitudes are affected by an immediacy effect (subjects make more privacy
protective decisions right after answering private questions), or that thinking
about financial risk first leads subjects to think of privacy in monetary terms,
thus possibly leading to less risk averse behavior. This finding may find appli-
cation in the creation of privacy policies, in the timing of privacy decisions and
in the design of personal data marketplaces. Emphasizing monetary benefits
before asking for privacy-related choices may lead to higher disclosure. Con-
versely, asking for privacy choices first may result in more protection of one’s
personal data.
Our proposed elicitation method can be applied to different types of pri-
vate data that could allow future research to compare the inferred (dis)utility
of privacy risk in various domains, for example, towards financial, health, social
network and other personal information. The method is also applicable to vari-
ous types of privacy risk, e.g., sharing data with third parties, hacking attacks,
use of personal information for marketing purposes and unsolicited advertising,
etc.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work trying to separate two
determinants of attitudes to privacy risk - basic willingness to disclose personal
information and risk aversion. We found many risk-averse people who were
comparatively ready to take risks with personal information disclosure. This
indicates that they were actually quite willing to disclose this information. In-
deed, for a risk-averse person to take a decision that is risky for his privacy,
the willingness to disclose his personal information should be high enough to
outweigh his general tendency to avoid risk. In contrast, people with a high
value for personal information (and thus large dis-utility from its disclosure)
should love risk enough to “convince” them to expose their privacy to risk. This
observation suggests that many choices that aim to protect privacy may be mis-
takenly attributed to a concern about personal information disclosure, while in
fact being driven by general risk aversion. Such mistaken attribution would lead
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to inaccurate evaluations of the (dis)utility of personal information disclosure.
Indeed, correction with risk attitude in our study reveals the existence of some
people who are “privacy exhibitionists”, i.e. subjects with negative utility for
personal information. This subset of people does not appear when considering
other measures. Privacy researchers should make sure that their methods to



















ST1 SP1 The Company has published
assurances from independent third
parties and their icons on Website
ST2 SP2 The Company has a
password-composition policy, i.e. it
imposes requirements for password
creation on its Website (e.g., length,
obligatory including of numbers and
letters of different register, etc.)
ST3 SP3 Green padlock icon is present in the
location bar to the left of the Web
address verifying that the
Company’s Website uses Extended
Validation certificate
ST4 SP4 Several payment options are
available on the Website of the
Company (like credit cards, PayPal,
Web wallets, bank transfer, etc.)
Privacy PT PP
Collection LT LP
LT1 LP1 Notifications, banners and ads
about products you searched once
on the Company’s Web site appear
when you are visiting other Website
LT2 LP2 In order to recommend
products/services that you can be
interested in, the Company’s
Website asks about your tastes and
preferences
LT3 LP3 In order to recommend
products/services that you can be
interested in, the Company’s
Website uses specific technologies to
track your behavior and figure out
your preferences








LT4 LP4 The Company allows an access to
the content of its Website without
registration but requires to provide
some personal information in order
to place an order and purchase
products and services from it
LT5 LP5 The Company requires to provide
some personal information in order
to get an access to its Website and
contents
LT6 LP6 The details of user’s credit card are
remembered by the Company’s
Website for future purchases
LT7 LP7 The user’s address is remembered
by the Company’s Website for
future deliveries
Control NT NP
NT1 NP1 The Company’s Website (not
browser) asks you to remember your
login and password in order to enter
quickly next time you will visit it
without necessity to type
NT2 NP2 The Company’s Website asks your
permission for using you current
location
NT3 NP3 The Company’s Website allows you
registration via other Web sites
(e.g., sign up through linking
Facebook or Google profile)
NT4 NP4 The Company’s Website’s mobile
application can’t be installed
without permission to access some
information (e.g., location, device
model, profile, activity history, etc.)
NT5 NP5 The Company’s Website’s mobile
application can’t be installed
without permission to access some
information but you are allowed to
partially edit the list of permissions









AT1 AP1 The Company’s Website clearly
explains how customer’s information
is going to be used and how it will
be shared with other companies and
third parties
AT2 AP2 Informational text about use of
cookies is clearly present on the
Website as a fixed banner
AT3 AP3 The general privacy policy is clear
and easy to understand
Reputation RT RP
Background BT BP
BT1 BP1 Key names and photos of real
people behind the Company’s Web
site are shown
BT2 BP2 The Company’s Website carries
products/services with reputable
brand names
BT3 BP3 The Company runs business and
has its Website for many years
BT4 BP4 The background of the Company
(history from establishing to
nowadays) is described on its
Website
Feedback FT FP
FT1 FP1 The Company has both good and
bad feedback, positive and negative
reviews from other users and
customers on independent Websites
and forums
FT2 FP2 The Company has both good and
bad feedback, positive and negative
reviews from other users and
customers on its Website
FT3 FP3 The Company has a high ranking in
traditional media (TV, radio,
printed editions, etc.)








FT4 FP4 The Company has a high ranking in
online sources (like BizRate,
Consumer reports Online eRatings,
etc.)
FT5 FP5 The Company has good feedback
and positive reviews from other
users and customers on its Website
FT6 FP6 There is a widget on the Company’s
Website that tells you which people
with whom you are friends on





QT1 QP1 The visual appearance and manner
of the Company’s Web site is not
professional (amateur looking)
QT2 QP2 The Company has broken links and
typographical errors on its Website
QT3 QP3 The Company’s Website has
suspicious banners, ads and links to
third party unrelated Websites
end of the table
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A.2 Final questionnaire and summary statistics
1. What do you think was the purpose of the experiment? (Max 200 words)
2. How difficult was it for you to make a decision? (1= Not Difficult at All
(7%), 2 = Not Very Difficult (49%), 3 = Somewhat Difficult (39%), 4 =
Very Difficult (5%))
3. What is your gender (1 = Male (37%), 2 = Female (63%))
4. What is your age? (1 = < 18 years (0%), 2 = 18-25 years (0%), 3 = 26-30
years (1%), 4 = 31-35 years (10%), 5 = 36-40 years (44%), 6 = > 41 years
(45%))
5. What is your field of study? (1= Social Sciences (Economics, Sociol-
ogy, Low, etc.) (29%); 2 = Technical sciences (Informatics, Engineering,
Architecture, etc.) (32%), 3 = Medical sciences (Medicine, Nursing, Phar-
maceutics, etc.) (2%), 4 = Humanities and Arts (Literature, Languages,
Arts, etc.) (23%), 5 = Natural Sciences (Chemistry, Physics, Mathemat-
ics, etc.) (14%), 6 = Education science and pedagogics (0%), 7 = Agri-
culture (Agriculture, Veterinary, etc.) (0%), 8 = Other Applied Sciences
(specify) (0%)).
6. What is the highest level of education you have completed up to now? (1
= High school diploma or less (36%), 2 = Secondary school (17%), 3 =
Bachelor’s Degree (38%), 4 = Master’s Degree (7%), 5 = Doctoral degree
(3%), 6 = Other (specify) (0%))
7. What is your nationality? (1= Italian (99%), 2 = Other (1%))
8. Did your parents complete their secondary education? (1 = None of my
parents completed secondary education (26%), 2 = Only one of my par-
ents completed secondary education (37%), 3 = Both parents completed
secondary education (37%))
9. Where did you live for most part of your life? (1 = Village with < 1 000
inhabitants (7%), 2 = Town with 1,000 – 10,000 inhabitants (16%), 3 =
City with 10 001 – 100,000 inhabitants (32%), 4 = City with 100,000 –
1,000,000 inhabitants (43%), 5 = Big city with population > 1 million
inhabitants (2%))
10. What is your main source of income? (1 = Job (full-time) (67%), 2 = Job
(part-time), 3 = Scholarship (27%), 4 = Parents (5%), 5 = Spouse (1%),
6 = Other relatives or members of family (0%), 7 = Bank loan (0%), 8 =
Other (specify) (0%))
11. How much do you spend every month? (including food, clothes, rent,
utilities (heating, water), education, entertainment, etc.) (1 = < 500 Euro
(2%), 2 = 501-800 Euro (21%), 3 = 801-1200 Euro (32%), 4 = 1201-2000
Euro (31%), 5= > 2000 Euro (15%), 6 = Prefer not to answer (0%))
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12. Which programming language are you able to use (more than one answer
is allowed)? (1 = Java / Java Script, 2 = C / C++, 3 = Python, 4 = Ruby,
5 = Matlab, 6 = HTML, 7 = R, 8 = I do not know any programming
language, 9 = Other1)
13. Since how many years are you using Internet? (1 = Less than 1 year (0%),
2 = 1-2 years (2%), 3 = 3-5 years (7%), 4 = 5-8 years (11%), 5 = More
than 8 years (80%))
14. How many hours do you spend online per week? (Mean = 17.96; sd =
15.26; min = 0; max = 70)




(d) Personal finance (banking, stock trading)
(e) Current events (news, sports, weather)
(f) Travel-related (research, reservations)
(g) Product information gathering
(h) Making purchases from online merchants
(i) Communicating with others (chat/email/Social Network)
(j) Other (specify)
(1 = Often; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = Never)
16. How often do you buy products/services online that cost3:




(e) More than 1000 Euro
163% of respondents do not know any programming language. Respondents who knew at
least one, on average, know 2 programming languages.
2Using single-factor measurement model we computed two indices: a) an index of using
Internet for utilitarian purposes (mean = -6.32e-09; sd = 0.15, min = -0.33; max = 0.28;
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.4625) based on the responses about the use of Internet for educational,
work-related, personal finance, and product-information gathering purposes; and b) an index
of using Internet for hedonic purposes (mean = 1.66e-09; sd = 0.19, min = -0.42; max = 0.30;
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6110) based on the responses about the use of Internet for entertainment,
current events, travel-related, making purchases, and communication purposes.
3Using single-factor measurement model we computed an “Online shopping frequency”
index (mean = -2.29e-09; sd = 0.56, min = -0.37; max = 3.30; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8854)
based on the responses.
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(1 = Never; 2 = Once a year; 3 = Several times a year; 4 = Once a month;
5= Several times a month; 6 = Once a week; 7 = Several times a week )
17. “I prefer to buy products and services from physical store rather than
online”. (1 = I totally disagree (10%), 2 = I somewhat disagree (47%), 3
= I somewhat agree (31%), 4 = I totally agree (12%))
18. What agencies that specialize on users’ online privacy and security are
you familiar with? More than one answer is allowed. (1 = VeriSign (44%
are familiar), 2 = Entrust (15%), 3 = TRUSTe (35%), 4 = BBBOnline
(Better Business Bureau Online) (1%), 5 = AIPC Webtrust (1%), 6 =
WebAssured (8%), 7 = Pretty Good Privacy (6%), 8 = Thawte (8%), 9
= Other (specify) (29%)4)
19. Do you recognize the label that represents the compliance of the web site
with the Extended Validation certificate? (1 = No (55%), 2 = Yes (45%))
20. Please, explain what does the Extended Validation certificate mean? (1
= specify; 2 = I do not know what it is5)
21. Please, explain what do cookies mean? (1 = specify; 2 = I do not know
what it is6)
22. Are you concerned about your privacy online? (1 = Not concerned at
all (6%), 2 = Somewhat unconcerned (28%), 3 = Somewhat concerned
(56%), 4 = Very concerned (10%))
23. Rate your level of concern over the following Internet issues7:
(a) It’s too hard to use
(b) It’s too hard to find what I want
(c) Someone could be monitoring what I do online
(d) It’s too expensive Pornography is too easily accessible
(e) It’s too cluttered
(f) It’s too slow
(g) I get too much junk eMail
(h) My personal information will be stolen
(i) Someone will misuse the personal information I give them
(j) Information will be censored
4Sixty-nine percent of the respondents were familiar with 1 agency, 20% - with 2 agencies,
8 % - with 3 agencies, 3 % - with 4 agencies, and 1% - with 5 agencies.
555% of the respondents understood the meaning of EV certificate correctly.
669% of the respondents understood the meaning of cookies correctly.
7Using single-factor measurement model we computed an index of privacy being a motiva-
tion for concern related to the use of Internet (mean = -1.69e-09; sd = 0.39, min = -1.1; max




(1 = Not at all concerned; 2 = Somewhat unconcerned; 3 = Somewhat
concerned; 4 = Very concerned)
24. If asked to provide personal information, how often (in percentage) do
you refuse to give the requested personal information / leave the web site?
(mean = 45.09%; sd = 31.18; min =0%; max = 100%)
25. If you do provide personal information to web sites, how often (in per-
centage) do you provide false information (if at all)? (mean = 9.77%; sd
= 16.26; min =0%; max = 90%)
26. If you have refused to disclose personal information or given falsified in-
formation, how important to you were the following issues8:
(a) I am unfamiliar with how the technology works
(b) I am unfamiliar with the company/individual running the site
(c) The company/individual running the site does not have good repu-
tation
(d) I don’t trust the company/individual running the site
(e) The site does not disclose how they plan to use my information
(f) The value I will receive from the site is not worth the information I
give
(g) I generally prefer to be anonymous
(h) They asked for particularly sensitive pieces of information
(i) I am concerned that the information will be intercepted or stolen
(j) It takes too much time to fill out the forms
(k) I am concerned I will receive junk mail if I give my home address
(l) I am concerned I will receive junk email if I give my email address
(m) I am concerned I will receive junk SMS/calls if I give my (mobile)
telephone number
(n) Other (specify)
(1 = Not one of my reasons; 2 = Not very important; 3 = Somewhat
important reason; 4 = Very important reason)
8Using single-factor measurement model we computed two indices: a) an index of privacy
concern being a reason for not providing or providing falsified information (mean = 0.008; sd
= 0.47, min = -1.97; max = 0.49; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7980) based on the responses about
statements 5-9; and b) an index of trust issues being a reason for not providing or providing
falsified information (mean = -0.003; sd = 0.41, min = -1.68; max = 0.28; Cronbach’s alpha
= 0.9015) based on the responses about statements 2-4 in Q26.
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27. How willing are you to provide personally identifiable information and
demographics to web sites? (1 = Not willing at all (3%), 2 = Not very
willing (63%), 3 = I am indifferent (19%), 4 = I would not mind (11%), 5
= Very willing (3%))
28. Would you be more willing to provide personally identifiable information
and demographics for online advertising purposes if the website compen-
sated you for your information? (1 = No (62%), 2 = Yes (38%))
29. How willing are you to provide information about your tastes, interests
and preferences without personal identification to web sites? (1 = Not
willing at all (5%), 2 = Not very willing (28%), 3 = I am indifferent
(28%), 4 = I would not mind (30%), 5 = Very willing (9%))
30. Would you be more willing to provide personal information about your
tastes, interests and preferences for online advertising purposes if the web-
site compensated you for your information? (1 = No (31%), 2 = Yes
(69%))
31. Have you personally experienced incidents whereby your personal infor-
mation was used by some company or e-commerce website without your
authorization? (1 = No (66%), 2 = Yes (34%))
32. Have you personally been the victim of what you felt was an invasion of
privacy? (1 = No (57%), 2 = Yes (43%))
33. Please indicate to which extend you (dis)agree with the following state-
ments9:
(a) Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is
collected and used by companies
(b) Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about
consumers in a proper and confidential way
(c) Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level
of protection for consumer privacy today
(1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Somewhat agree; 3 = Somewhat disagree; 4 =
Strongly disagree)
34. If you are a member of an online social network, which do you use the
most actively? (more than one answer is allowed) (1 = Facebook (56%
use it), 2 = Google + (19%), 3 = Twitter (9%), 4 = My Space (0%), 5 =
Instagram (10%)6 = Other (specify) (9%), 7 = I am not a member of any
online social network (29%))
9We computed a Westin’s Privacy index (Westin, 1968): 1 = Unconcerned (0-1 privacy
concerned answers); 2 = Pragmatists (2 privacy concerned answers); 3 = Fundamentalists (3
privacy concerned answers). Statement 1 of Q33 was reversed coded.
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35. How many connections do you have on Facebook? (1 = < 50 (20%), 2 =
51-100 (15%), 3 = 101-200 (9%), 4 = 201-300 (4%), 5 = 301-500 (9%), 6
= 501-700 (1%), 7 = 701-1000 (1%), 8 = 1001-2000, 9 = > 2000 (0%), 10
= I do not have a profile on Facebook (39%))
36. What do you use as your user name in Facebook? (1= Real name (57%),
2 = Pseudonym, and nobody knows who I am in real life (3%), 3 =
Pseudonym, but everybody knows who I am in real life (0%), 4 = I do
not have Facebook account (39%))
37. What do you use as profile picture in your primary social network? (1 =
Real photo of me (42%), 2 = Real photo of me with other person/people
(6%), 3 = Photo of other person or celebrity (1%), 4 = Photo/image of
non human being (5%), 5 = No photo at all (4%), 6 = I do not have a
Facebook account (39%), 7 = Other (3%))
38. What are your privacy settings on Facebook? (1 = Public. Everybody
can get access to my profile and read my entries (7%); 2 = Private. Only
my friends can get access to my profile and read my entries (36%); 3 =
My profile and entries are mostly public and partially private (3%); 4 =
My profile and entries are mostly private and partially public (12%); 5 =
I have different accounts for public and private entries (0%); 6 = I do not
have a Facebook account (39%); 7 = Other (please describe in details)
(3%))
39. Did you ever change your privacy settings on Facebook? (1 = Never (20%);
2 = I changed privacy settings on Facebook immediately after registration
(20%); 3 = I changed privacy settings on Facebook several times (20%);
4 = I changed privacy settings on Facebook after someone misused my
personal information (1%); 5 = I do not have a Facebook account (39%);
6 = Other (please describe in details) (0%))
40. What is your favorite movie? (1 = Specify (85%); 2 = I do not wish to
say (15%))
41. What is your favorite book? (1 = Specify (82%); 2 = I do not wish to say
(18%))
42. What is your favorite sport? (1 = Specify (89%); 2 = I do not wish to say
(11%))
43. What is your hobby? (1 = Specify (91%); 2 = I do not wish to say (9%))
44. Imagine that 2 people do the same job in the same company. Both have
the same qualification, but the person A works more productively than
person B. Is it fair that person A gets a larger remuneration? (1 = Yes,
it’s fair (94%); 2 = No, it’s unfair (6%))
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45. “In general, one can trust people . . . ” (1 = I totally agree (4%); 2 = I
somewhat agree (43%); 3 = I somewhat disagree (50%); 4 = I totally
disagree (3%))
46. “Nowadays one cannot rely on anyone . . . ” (1 = I totally agree (7%); 2 =
I somewhat agree (67%); 3 = I somewhat disagree (23%); 4 = I totally
disagree (3%))
47. “When dealing with strangers it’s better to be careful before trusting
them. . . ” (1 = I totally agree (11%); 2 = I somewhat agree (52%); 3
= I somewhat disagree (37%); 4 = I totally disagree (0%))
48. Do you think that the majority of people. . . (1 = “. . . would exploit you
if they had an opportunity . . . ” (45%); 2 = “. . . would try to be fair to
you . . . “ (55%))
49. Do you think that people most of the times. . . (1 = “. . . try to be
considerate of others” (72%); 2 = “. . . follow their own interests” (28%)10)
10Using single-factor measurement model we computed a “trust disposition” index based on
the responses to Q45-49 (mean = 2.13e-09; sd = 0.42; min = -0.91; max = 0.83; Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.7582).
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A.3 Summary statistics of values
Table A.1: Summary statistics of values of trustworthiness perceptions
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Variance Min Max
QT3 2.97 3 1.98 3.92 1 11
QT1 3.30 3 1.85 3.43 1 10
QT2 3.31 3 2.17 4.70 1 12
LT6 3.69 3 2.66 7.05 1 11
LT1 3.91 4 2.31 5.33 1 10
NT4 4.16 4 2.64 6.96 1 12
FT6 4.53 4 2.63 6.93 1 12
NT2 4.74 4 2.65 7.03 1 12
NT3 4.90 5 2.60 6.76 1 12
LT2 4.92 5 2.57 6.59 1 11
LT3 5,03 4 2.64 6.99 1 11
LT5 5.13 5 2.66 7.05 1 12
LT7 5.40 5 2.73 7.44 1 12
LT4 5.41 6 2.74 7.49 1 12
NT5 5.61 6 2.66 7.06 1 12
NT1 5.69 6 2.82 7.94 1 12
FT1 5.81 6 2.41 5.81 1 12
FT2 6.07 6 2.53 6.42 1 12
AT2 6,18 6 2.84 8.06 1 12
BT2 6.52 6 2.73 7.47 1 12
BT4 6.57 6 2.65 7.02 1 12
FT5 6.80 7 2.77 7.68 1 12
FT4 6.84 7 2.87 8.26 1 12
BT1 7.06 7 2.90 8.38 1 12
FT3 7.12 7 2.82 7.93 1 12
ST4 7.22 7 3.01 9.06 1 12
BT3 7.46 8 2.80 7.84 1 12
ST1 7.53 8.5 3.12 9.72 1 12
ST3 7.57 8 2.81 7.87 1 12
AT3 7.75 8 3.04 9.26 1 12
AT1 7.84 8 2.91 8.50 1 12
ST2 7.93 8.5 2.85 8.15 1 12
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Table A.2: Summary statistics of values of purchase intentions
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Variance Min Max
QP3 2.83 2 2.06 4.26 1 12
QP1 3.04 3 1.85 3.43 1 10
QP2 3.26 3 2.30 5.27 1 12
LP6 4.61 4 3.13 9.80 1 12
LP1 4.73 5 2.54 6.47 1 11
NP4 4.92 5 2.82 7.94 1 12
LP5 5.83 6 2.74 7.49 1 12
NP2 5.97 6 2.78 7.73 1 12
LP4 6.05 7 2.92 8.51 1 12
NP3 6.08 6 2.78 7.71 1 12
FP1 6.20 6 2.64 6.95 1 12
LP2 6.24 6 2.79 7.79 1 12
NP5 6.26 6 2.74 7.51 1 12
FP6 6.48 6.5 2.98 8.87 1 12
FP2 6.53 6 2.72 7.41 1 12
NP1 6.59 7 2.91 8.47 1 12
LP3 6.59 7 2.83 8.00 1 12
AP2 6.61 7 2.87 8.22 1 12
LP7 6.69 7 2.97 8.83 1 12
BP4 7.20 7 2.47 6.08 1 12
BP1 7.58 8 2.68 7.20 1 12
FP4 7.79 8 2.87 8.25 1 12
SP1 7.80 8 3.19 10.16 1 12
SP2 7.81 8 2.77 7.70 1 12
SP3 7.86 8 2.80 7,82 1 12
AP3 7.90 8.5 2.84 8.09 1 12
AP1 7.91 8 2.82 7.93 1 12
FP5 7.95 9 3.07 9.45 1 12
BP2 8.03 8 2.77 7.68 1 12
FP3 8.26 9 3.00 9.02 1 12
SP4 8.47 9 3.02 9.14 1 12
BP3 8.53 9 2.68 7.21 1 12
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A.4 Confirmatory factor analysis of the measure-
ment model











Privacy PT - - 0.8688
















































end of the table
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Privacy PP - - 0.8659
















































end of the table
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A.5 Structural equation model estimation results





p-value AVE CR R-sq
Security
ST ST1 0.757 0.000 0.681 0.895 0.573
ST2 0.892 0.000 0.795
ST3 0.816 0.000 0.666
ST4 0.830 0.000 0.689
SP SP1 0.740 0.000 0.680 0.894 0.548
SP2 0.841 0.000 0.708
SP3 0.831 0.000 0.690
SP4 0.880 0.000 0.774
Privacy
Collection
LT LT1 0.579 0.000 0.448 0.849 0.335
LT2 0.739 0.000 0.547
LT3 0.705 0.000 0.498
LT4 0.609 0.000 0.371
LT5 0.753 0.000 0.566
LT6 0.553 0.000 0.306
LT7 0.719 0.000 0.516
LP LP1 0.709 0.000 0.488 0.869 0.503
LP2 0.806 0.000 0.650
LP3 0.733 0.000 0.537
LP4 0.616 0.000 0.379
LP5 0.708 0.000 0.502
LP6 0.583 0.000 0.340
LP7 0.713 0.000 0.509
Control
NT NT1 0.592 0.000 0.523 0.844 0.351
NT2 0.722 0.000 0.522
NT3 0.671 0.000 0.451
NT4 0.877 0.000 0.769
NT5 0.722 0.000 0.522
NP NP1 0.596 0.000 0.511 0.838 0.355
NP2 0.761 0.000 0.579
NP3 0.667 0.000 0.445
NP4 0.813 0.000 0.661
NP5 0.717 0.000 0.514






p-value AVE CR R-sq
Awareness
AT AT1 0.976 0.000 0.707 0.887 0.952
AT2 0.709 0.000 0.503
AT3 0.817 0.000 0.667
AP AP1 0.955 0.000 0.688 0.867 0.913
AP2 0.707 0.000
AP3 0.808 0.000 0.652
Reputation
Background
BT BT1 0.856 0.000 0.702 0.904 0.732
BT2 0.850 0.000 0.723
BT3 0.765 0.000 0.585
BT4 0.876 0.000 0.767
BP BP1 0.850 0.000 0.722 0.912 0.722
BP2 0.839 0.000 0.704
BP3 0.856 0.000 0.732
BP4 0.855 0.000 0.731
Feedback
FT FT1 0.771 0.000 0.610 0.903 0.595
FT2 0.722 0.000 0.522
FT3 0.789 0.000 0.623
FT4 0.863 0.000 0.745
FT5 0.859 0.000 0.739
FT6 0.660 0.000 0.435
FP FP1 0.700 0.000 0.554 0.880 0.489
FP2 0.615 0.000 0.378
FP3 0.755 0.000 0.569
FP4 0.854 0.000 0.730
FP5 0.814 0.000 0.662
FP6 0.704 0.000 0.495
Website quality
QT QT1 0.504 0.000 0.452 0.696 0.254
QT2 0.903 0.000 0.815
QT3 0.535 0.000 0.287
QP QP1 0.556 0.000 0.517 0.743 0.309
QP2 1.000 0.000 1.000
QP3 0.492 0.000 0.242
end of the table
Note: R-squared is equal to Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation
coefficient.
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Table A.6: Structural model SEM estimation results
Latent
variable
Item variable Stand. path
coefficient
p-value AVE CR R-sq
Trust (T) ST 0.899 0.000 0.618 0.912 0.808
QT 0.224 0.039 0.050
BT 0.905 0.000 0.819
FT 0.863 0.000 0.745
AT 0.869 0.000 0.755
NT 0.744 0.000 0.553
LT 0.771 0.000 0.595
Control variables:
Q3: Female -0.054 0.000
Q4: Age -0.214 0.019
Q9: Urban 0.021 0.828
Q10: Income source -0.230 0.019







































Q49: Index of trust
disposition
-0.027 0.789




Item variable Stand. path
coefficient




SP 0.942 0.000 0.664 0.925 0.887
QP 0.126 0.296 0.016
BP 0.929 0.000 0.863
FP 0.910 0.000 0.829
AP 0.902 0.000 0.814
NP 0.761 0.000 0.580
LP 0.810 0.000 0.656
Control variables:
Q3: Female 0.011 0.819
Q4: Age -0.136 0.129
Q9: Urban -0.075 0.422
Q10: Income source -0.191 0.052







































Q49: Index of trust
disposition
-0.039 0.696
end of the table
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A.6 Goodness of fit, correlation, and covariance
Table A.7: Goodness of fit test results
Absolute fit indices Incremental fit indices
RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI














Security 0.057 0.029 0.994 0.989
Collection 0.084 0.082 0.958 0.941
Control 0.108 0.073 0.955 0.924
Awareness 0.080 0.016 0.996 0.982
Background 0.076 0.028 0.989 0.979
Feedback 0.105 0.055 0.953 0.928
Website quality 0.026 0.031 0.999 0.997






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.7 Summary of the hypotheses test results
Hypothesis Description Result
H1a Privacy -> Trust:
AT -> T Supported (p< 0.001)
NT -> T Supported (p< 0.001)
LT -> T Supported (p< 0.001)
H1b Privacy -> Purchase intentions:
AP -> P Supported (p< 0.001)
NP -> P Supported (p< 0.001)
LP -> P Supported (p< 0.001)
H2a Security -> Trust:
ST -> T Supported (p< 0.001)
H2b Security -> Purchase intentions:
SP -> P Supported (p< 0.001)
H3a Website quality -> Trust:
QT -> T Supported (p< 0.05)
H3b Website quality -> Purchase intentions:
QP -> P Not supported
H4a Reputation -> Trust:
BT -> T Supported (p< 0.001)
FT -> T Supported (p< 0.001)
H4b Reputation -> Purchase intentions:
BP -> P Supported (p< 0.001)
FP -> P Supported (p< 0.001)
H5a FT1 > FT2 Not supported
FP1 > FP2 Not supported
H5b FT1 < FT5 Supported (p< 0.001)
FT2< FT5 Supported (p< 0.001)
FP1 < FP5 Supported (p< 0.001)
FP2< FP5 Supported (p< 0.001)
H5c FT3 > FT4 Not supported
FP3 > FP4 Supported (p< 0.05)
H5d LT4 > LT5 Not supported
LP4 > LP5 Not supported
H5e LT2 > LT3 Not supported
LP2 > LP3 Not supported
H5f LT1 < LT3 Supported (p< 0.001)
LP1 < LP3 Supported (p< 0.001)
H5g NT4 < NT5 Supported (p< 0.001)
NP4 < NP5 Supported (p< 0.001)
continued on the next page
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Hypothesis Description Result
H6 Trust ~ Purchase intentions:
T ~ P Supported (p< 0.001)
AT ~ AP Supported (p< 0.001)
NT ~ NP Supported (p< 0.001)
LT ~ LP Supported (p< 0.001)
ST ~ SP Supported (p< 0.001)
QT ~ QP Supported (p< 0.001)
BT ~ BP Supported (p< 0.001)
FT ~ FP Supported (p< 0.001)
end of the table
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B.1 Preliminary questionnaire on opinions about
potentially sensitive and socially relevant top-
ics
This questionnaire is translated from the Italian original. We show options that
were offered to participants and the percentage of participants who chose each
option.
1. Experimentation of medications on animals can have an important impli-
cation for development of drugs for humans and is often distressing and
fatal for animals. Are you in favor or against medical experiments on
animals? (0. In favor - 72%; 1 Against - 28%)
2. Using genetically modified organisms in agriculture can help to fight hunger
in the world and can present a great danger to ecosystem. Are you in favor
or against implementation of such agricultural practices? (0. In favor -
46%; 1 Against - 54%)
3. Which of the following is the more appropriate penalty for rape? (0. Death
- 1%; 1. Chemical castration - 34%; 2. Life imprisonment - 35%; 3. Prison
sentence, less than life imprisonment - 30%)
4. Albeit rare, there are observed cases of serious complications as conse-
quences of vaccination. The choice not to undergo vaccination significantly
increases the risk of getting and transmitting potentially dangerous dis-
eases. Are you in favor or against obligatory vaccination? (0. In favor -
83%; 1. Against - 17%)
5. Billions of Euros are spent each year for aerospace research. Do you think
that this money should or should not be spent in other way? (0. Should
- 52%; 1. Should not - 48%)
6. Would you for any reason read your mate’s email, SMS or pose as him/her
online, without his/her knowledge and permission? (0. Yes, they shouldn’t
be keeping secrets anyway - 14%; 1. Yes, I’d be too curious not to - 6%;
2. Yes, if I suspected them of something - 35%; 3. Never - 45%)
7. Do you think it is morally justified or not justified to abort after discov-
ering serious disability in the fetus? (0. Justified - 58%; 1. Not justified -
42%)
8. Are you in favor or against legislation of prostitution? (0. In favor - 82%;
1. Against - 18%)
9. Which of following substances should be prohibited? (More than one
answer is allowed) (0. Alcohol - 3%; 1. Tobaсco - 7%; 3. Cannabis - 22%;
4. Cocaine - 85%; 5. Acids (LSD, ecstasy, etc.) - 82%; 6. Heroin - 89%;
7. None - 9%)
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10. Are you in favor or against adoption of children by homosexual couples?
(0. In favor - 56%; 1. Against - 44%)
11. Are you in favor or against the closure of Italian borders as a solution for
the problem of illegal immigration? (0. In favor - 25%; 1. Against - 75%)
12. Are you in favor or against euthanasia (i.e. the painless killing of a patient
suffering from an incurable and painful disease or in an irreversible coma)?
(0. In favor - 84%; 1. Against - 16%)
13. Some people believe that the trails left by aircrafts in the sky contain
chemicals that are inserted specifically to influence the population. Do
you think this is a plausible theory or not? (0. Plausible - 10%; 1. Not
plausible - 90%)
14. Which of the following methods of birth contraception do you consider
as the most appropriate? (0. Hormonal (oral pills, implants, injections,
patches, etc.) - 26%; 1. Barrier (condoms, cervical caps, diaphragms,
sponges with spermicide, etc.) - 67%; 2. Intrauterine devices - 1%; 3.
Sterilization (surgical or chemical) - 3%; 4. Behavioral (interrupted inter-
course, fertility awareness method based on the menstrual cycle, sexual
abstinence) - 2%; 5. None - 1%)
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B.2 Final questionnaire
1. What do you think was the purpose of the experiment?
2. How difficult was it for you to make a decision? (1. Very difficult, 2.
Somewhat difficult; 3. Not very difficult; 4. Not difficult at all)
3. Please, indicate how many of today’s participants you knew before the
experiment? If you did not know anybody in the lab please write zero.
4. Do you think that the remuneration for the experiment is appropriate?
(1. Yes; 2. No)
5. Do you trust that experimenters will not misuse the personal information
you gave in this experiment? (1. Yes; 2. No)
6. Suppose that you do not have to reveal your private information at the
end of the experiment, but the experimenter offers you money so that your
name, surname, photo, and answers to the preliminary questionnaire are
shown to other participants. What is the minimum amount (in Euros)
that you would be ready to accept for this?
7. Suppose that you have to reveal your private information at the end of
the experiment, but you can pay the experimenter so that your name,
surname, photo, and answers to the preliminary questionnaire are not
shown to other participants. What is the maximum amount (in Euros)
that you would be ready to pay for this?
8. What is your gender? (1. Male; 2. Female)
9. What is your age? (1. < 18 years; 2. 18-25 years; 3. 26-30 years; 4. 31-35
years; 5. 36-40 years; 6. 41-45 years; 7. 46-50 years; 8. 51-55 years; 9.
56-60 years; 10. > 61 years)
10. What is your field of study? (1. Social Sciences (Economics, Sociology,
Low, etc.; 2. Technical sciences (Informatics, Engineering, Architecture,
etc.); 3. Medical sciences (Medicine, Nursing, Pharmaceutics, etc.); 4. Hu-
manities and Arts (Literature, Languages, Arts, etc.); 5. Natural Sciences
(Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, etc.); 6. Education science and ped-
agogics; 7. Agriculture (Agriculture, Veterinary, etc.); 8. Other applied
sciences (specify)
11. What is the highest level of education you have completed up to now? (1.
Secondary education; 2. Bachelor’s Degree; 3. Master’s Degree; 4. PhD;
5. Other (specify)
12. What is your nationality? (1. Italian; 2. Other (specify))
13. Did your parents complete their secondary education? (1. None of my par-
ents completed secondary education; 2. Only one of my parents completed
secondary education; 3. Both parents completed secondary education)
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14. Where did you live for most part of your life? (1. Big city with population
> 1 million inhabitants; 2. City with 100.001 - 1.000.000 inhabitants;
3. City with 10.001 - 100.000 inhabitants; 4. Town with 1.000 - 10.000
inhabitants; 5. Village with < 1.000 inhabitants)
15. How much do you spend every month? (including food, clothes, rent,
utilities (heating, water), education, entertainment, etc.) (1. < 500 Euro;
2. 501-800 Euro; 3. 801-1200 Euro; 4. 1201-2000 Euro; 5. > 2000 Euro;
6. No answer)
16. Are you generally concerned about your privacy? (1. Not concerned at all;
2. Somewhat unconcerned; 3. Somewhat concerned; 4. Very concerned)
17. How willing are you to provide personally identifiable information and
demographics to websites in general? (1. Very willing; 2. I would not
mind; 3. I am indifferent; 4. Not very willing; 5. Not willing at all)
18. Would you be more willing to provide personally identifiable information
and demographics to websites in general if you were compensated for your
information? (1. Yes; 2. No)
19. How willing are you to provide information about your tastes, interests
and preferences without personal identification to websites in general? (1.
Very willing; 2. I would not mind; 3. I am indifferent; 4. Not very willing;
5. Not willing at all)
20. Would you be more willing to provide personal information about your
tastes, interests and preferences to websites in general if you were com-
pensated for your information? (1. Yes; 2. No)
21. Have you personally been the victim of what you felt was an invasion of
privacy? (1. Yes; 2. No)
22. Please indicate to which extend you (dis)agree with the following state-
ments (1. Strongly agree; 2. Somewhat agree; 3. Somewhat disagree; 4.
Strongly disagree):
23. Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected
and used by companies
24. Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about con-
sumers in a proper and confidential way
25. Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of
protection for consumer privacy today
26. Currently in your life, how many close friends would you say you have?
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27. If you are a member of online social networks, which do you use the most
actively? (The online social network chosen in this questions will be called
your primary social network hereinafter) (1. Facebook; 2. Google +; 3.
Twitter; 4. My Space; 5. Instagram; 6. LinkedIn; 7. FourSquare; 8.
Other (specify); 9. I am not a member of any online social network)
28. How many connections do you have in your primary social network?
(Write zero if you are not a member of any online social network)
29. What do you use as your user name in your primary social network? (1.
Real name; 2. Pseudonym, and nobody knows who I am in real life; 3.
Pseudonym, but everybody knows who I am in real life; 4. I am not a
member of any online social network)
30. What do you use as profile picture in your primary social network? (1.
Real photo of me; 2. Real photo of me with other person/people; 3. Photo
of other person or celebrity; 4. Photo/image of non human being; 5. No
photo at all; 6. I am not a member of any online social network; 7. Other
(specify))
31. What are your privacy settings in your primary social network? (1. Public.
Everybody can get access to my profile and read my entries; 2. Private.
Only my friends can get access to my profile and read my entries; 3. My
profile and entries are mostly public and partially private; 4. My profile
and entries are mostly private and partially public; 5. I have different
accounts for public and private entries; 6. I am not a member of any
online social network; 7. Other (please describe in details))
32. Did you ever change your privacy settings in primary social network? (1.
Never; 2. I changed privacy settings immediately after registration; 3. I
changed privacy settings several times; 4. I changed privacy settings after
someone misused my personal information; 5. I am not a member of any
online social network; 6. Other (please describe in details))
33. Please, read the following statements and using the scale below rate how
accurately each statement describes you, as you generally are now, not as
you wish to be in the future. Apart from being anonymous, your responses
will be kept in absolute confidence. (1. Very Inaccurate; 2. Moderately
Inaccurate; 3. Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate; 4. Moderately Accurate;
5. Very Accurate)
(a) I am open about myself.
(b) I don’t talk a lot.
(c) I disclose my intimate thoughts.
(d) I show my feelings.
(e) I reveal little about myself.
(f) I talk about my worries.
APPENDIX B. 153
(g) I bottle up my feelings.
(h) I prefer to deal with strangers in a formal manner.
(i) I act wild and crazy.
(j) I have little to say.
34. How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared
to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please, indicate a number
on the scale from 0 to 10, where the value 0 means: Unwilling to take risks
and the value 10 means Fully prepared to take risk.
35. In different areas you can behave differently too. How would you assess
your risk tolerance with respect to the following areas (please, indicate a
number on the scale from 0 to 10, where the value 0 means: Unwilling to
take risks and the value 10 means Fully prepared to take risk).
(a) in car driving
(b) in financial matters
(c) in leisure and sports
(d) in you professional career
(e) in your health
(f) in trusting strangers
36. “In general, one can trust people . . . ” (1. I totally agree; 2. I somewhat
agree; 3. I somewhat disagree; 4. I totally disagree)
37. “Nowadays one cannot rely on anyone . . . ” (1. I totally agree; 2. I
somewhat agree; 3. I somewhat disagree; 4. I totally disagree)
38. “When dealing with strangers it’s better to be careful before trusting
them. . . ” (1. I totally agree; 2. I somewhat agree; 3. I somewhat disagree;
4. I totally disagree)
39. Do you think that the majority of people. . . (1. . . . would exploit you if
they had an opportunity; 2. . . . would try to be fair to you)
40. Do you think that people most of the times. . . (1. . . . try to be considerate
of others; 2. . . . follow their own interests)
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B.3 Instructions
The following instructions are for the shock treatment, “privacy task first” con-
dition and are translated from the Italian original.
Welcome to the experiment!
The experiment will last about 60 minutes. Please make sure that you can
stay until the end. You will be paid 3 Euros for showing up on time (participa-
tion fee). You can earn more money but this depends on the choices you make
in this experiment and on chance. It is therefore important that you read the
following instructions carefully.
General rules
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the
experiment. If you have any doubts or questions, please raise your hand. An
assistant will then come to you and answer your question privately.
You received an envelope before the experiment. You are not allowed to
open it before the end of the experiment. You will have to open it in front of
an assistant.
If you do not follow those rules or disturb the experiment in other ways,
then we will ask you to leave the room and we will not pay you.
The Experiment
There are two parts in the experiment: the first part is described in a separate
sheet now, while you will get the description of the second part only after
completing the first task. You will be presented with tables of choices between
two options, one of which gives a certain payoff while the other gives an outcome
that depends on chance.
Payment
At the beginning of the experiment, you were asked to pick an envelope
from a bag. In total there were 112 envelopes. 88 of those envelopes describe a
choice situation that you faced during the experiment. If you got one of those
envelopes, then you will get the payoff corresponding to the choice you made in
the situation described in your envelope. This means that any of your choices
during the experiment could be the one that determines your payoff.
The other 24 envelopes give you a payoff that does not depend on your choice
(to be described later).
After having completed both tasks your final payoff will be calculated, each
ECU earned will be converted into Euro at the rate of 1 euro for 10 ECUs and
paid together with the show-up fee (30 ECUs = 3 euros). For example, if you
earned 48 ECUs from your decision during the experiment, then you will receive
48+30 ECUs = 78 ECUs =7,8 Euro in cash.
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Anonymity
Since your position in the lab corresponds to the number on a ball taken
from a box randomly we only know you by the number of your seat and not by
your name, surname or other credentials. Thus, we cannot establish any link
between your identity and the decisions you made in the lab, unless the outcome
of the experiment suggests revelation of your personal information so that we
need to check your name and surname from the ID card.
I. First part of the experiment
In the first part of the experiment, you are asked to make choices between
two options of the type described in the following table:
Row Option A Option B Choice
1 You get You get 35 ECUs but with probability 50%
13 ECUs your personal information is revealed to others
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Option A guarantees you a certain payoff, while option B is a lottery that
gives out a certain amount of ECUs, but implies some probability of having to
disclose your name, surname, photo and answers in the preliminary question-
naire (from then on " personal information") to other participants in the room
at the end of the experiment.
You will face 44 choice situations of the type described above. In each of
those situations, you must choose the option (A or B) that you prefer. Any of
those decisions might be the one that determines your payoff.
Random draw
If you chose option B in which your payoff depends on chance, then you will
have to toss a 10-sided die. Each side of the die shows a number, between 0
and 90 in steps of 10 (you can check that the die shows all possible numbers, 0,
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90). The probability of personal data revelation
defined in this option will be compared with the outcome of this toss:
1. If the outcome of the toss is strictly less than the probability of revelation
then your information will be disclosed;
2. If the outcome of the toss is more or equal to the probability of revelation
then your information will not be disclosed.
Envelopes
As explained before, you will get a payoff at the end of the experiment
that depends on what is in the envelope that you drew at the beginning of the
experiment. There were 112 envelopes, of which 68 relate to the first part of
the experiment:
a) 44 of the envelopes describe a choice situation from the first part of the
experiment. If you drew an envelope from those 44, then it will look as follows:
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Option A: You get 13 ECUs
Option B: You get 65 ECUs but with probability 50%
your personal information will be revealed to others.
Example: If you have chosen the option B in this situation, you will get 35
ECUs. Then if the outcome of the toss is strictly less than 50, your personal
information is revealed to others. If the outcome of the toss is more or equal to
50 then your personal information is not revealed to others.
b) 24 of the envelopes say that you have to reveal your personal information
to others, independently from your decisions during the experiment. You also
then get a certain payoff. The certain payoff may be either 55, 65 or 75 ECUs,
and each of those value is as likely as the other. If you drew an envelope from
those 24, then it will look as follows:
You get 65 ECUs but your personal information will be revealed to others.
In this case you get 65 ECUs and your personal information will be revealed
to others.
Procedure for personal information disclosure
If your personal information has to be disclosed to other participants, then
you will be asked to stand in front of the audience in the lab, we will verify your
name and surname from your ID card and we will announce your name. Other
participants will see on the screen your personal photo and the answers that
you gave in preliminary questionnaire, along with a short descriptive comment
comparing your answers with the answers of others as in an example below:
Seat #23:
- . . . agrees it is morally justified to abort after discov-
ering serious disability in the fetus, while 36 % of other
participants does not agree
- ... is in favor of chemical castration as appropriate
penalty for rape, while 87% of other participants did not
choose this option
- ...
II. Second part of the experiment
You have finished the first part of the experiment. Now, please, read carefully
the description of the second part of the experiment.
In this part you are also asked to make several choices between two options.
Consider the following table:
Row Option A Option B Choice
1 You get You get 52 ECUs but with probability 50%
37 ECUs you lose 14 of those ECUs
. . . . . . . . . . . .
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Option A guarantees you a certain payoff, while option B is a lottery that
gives out a certain amount of ECUs, but implies some probability of having to
give back some of those ECUs at the end of the experiment. In some tables,
option B gives out a certain amount of ECUs and some probability of getting
some more ECUs at the end of the experiment.
You must choose the option (A or B) that you prefer.
Random draw
If you chose option B in which your payoff depends on chance, then you will
have to toss the 10-sided die. Each side of the die shows a number, between 0
and 90 in steps of 10 (you can check that the die shows all possible numbers,
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90). The probability of gaining or losing ECUs
that is defined in this option will be compared with the outcome of this toss:
1. If the outcome of the toss is strictly less than the probability of loss/gain
then you will lose/gain some ECUs;
2. If the outcome of the toss is more or equal to the probability of loss/gain
then you will not lose/gain any ECUs.
Envelopes
As explained before, you will get a payoff at the end of the experiment
that depends on what is in the envelope that you drew at the beginning of the
experiment. There were 112 envelopes, of which 44 relate to the second part
of the experiment. If you drew an envelope from those 44, then it will look as
follows:
Option A: You get 37 ECUs
Option B: You get 52 ECUs but with probability 50%
you lose/gain 14 of those ECUs.
Example: If you chose option B in this case, then you will have to toss the
10-sided die. If the outcome of the toss is strictly less than 50, then you get
52-14=38 ECUs if the loss was indicated or 52+14=66 ECUs if the gain was




The following control questions are for the shock treatment, “privacy task first”
condition and are translated from the Italian original.
We want to make sure that you understand what each option means and
let you become familiar with interface of experimental tasks. Therefore, please
answer the questions in the examples below. Note that you will not be paid for
this.
You will be able to proceed to the next screen only after giving the correct
answer. You can try to answer each question several times. If you have ques-
tions, please, raise your hand and an assistant will come to you to give you an
answer.
Question 1.
Please now make choices for each row of the following table. We remind
you that this is for training only so it will not be taken into account when
determining your payment.
Row Option A Option B Choice
1 You get 29 ECU You get 62 ECU but with probability 10% __
you lose 24 of those ECU
2 You get6 ECU You get 10 ECU but with probability 0% __
you lose 2 of those ECU
3 You get 14 ECU You get 25 ECU but with probability 50% __
you lose 5 of those ECU
Question 2.
Suppose you are told: "You get 39 ECU but with probability 10% you lose
25 of those ECU". How many ECU will you get?
I will get with probability 90%__________ ECU and with probability
10% __________ ECU
Correct answer : 39 ECU; 14 ECU.
Question 3.
Suppose you have chosen the following option: “You get 13 ECU but with
probability 70% your personal information is disclosed to others”. You toss the
die and the outcome of the toss is number 70. What is your payoff in this case?
1. I get 13 ECU and the participation fee, my personal information remains
anonymous.
2. I get 13 ECU plus the participation fee, but my personal information will
be disclosed to other participants in the room in the end of experiment.
3. I get only participation fee.
4. I get nothing.
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Correct answer : 2.
Question 4.
Please consider the two options in table below and write down you choice in
the box to the right
Row Option A Option B Choice
1 You get 37 ECU You get 53 ECU but with probability 10%
you lose 14 of those ECU
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Suppose this choice is the one that is in your envelope, so it determines your
payoff.
Given your choice, what will be your payoff (in ECU) if the outcome of the









Correct answer : 1 (if A is chosen), 2 (if B is chosen).
Question 5.
Consider the table below:
Row Option A Option B Choice
1 You get 20 ECU You get 40 ECU but with probability 20% A
your personal information is disclosed
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Imagine that you have chosen Option A. Then in the end of the experiment
you open your envelope and it is written the following:
You get 40 ECU but your personal information is disclosed to others
What will be your payoff in this case including show up fee of 30 ECU?
1. 20 ECU, personal information remains anonymous
2. 20 ECU, personal information is disclosed
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3. 30 ECU, personal information remains anonymous
4. 30 ECU, personal information is disclosed
5. 50 ECU, personal information remains anonymous
6. 50 ECU, personal information is disclosed
7. 40 ECU, personal information remains anonymous
8. 40 ECU, personal information is disclosed
9. 40 ECU, personal information is disclosed if the outcome of the toss of the
die is less of equal to 20
10. 70 ECU, personal information remains anonymous
11. 70 ECU, personal information is disclosed
12. 70 ECU, personal information is disclosed if the outcome of the toss of the
die is less of equal to 20
13. I get nothing
Correct answer : 11.
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B.5 Multiple price list menus of choices
B.5.1 Monetary lotteries (MPL tables 1 to 4)
Table B.1: MPL table 1
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 56 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
2 You get 55 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
3 You get 54 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
4 You get 53 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
5 You get 52 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
6 You get 51 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
7 You get 50 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
8 You get 49 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
9 You get 48 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
10 You get 47 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
11 You get 46 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 10 of those ECU
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Table B.2: MPL table 2
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 68 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
2 You get 65 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
3 You get 62 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
4 You get 59 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
5 You get 56 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
6 You get 53 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
7 You get 50 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
8 You get 47 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
9 You get 44 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
10 You get 41 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
11 You get 38 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 30 of those ECU
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Table B.3: MPL table 3
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 80 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
2 You get 75 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
3 You get 70 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
4 You get 65 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
5 You get 60 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
6 You get 55 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
7 You get 50 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
8 You get 45 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
9 You get 40 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
10 You get 35 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
11 You get 30 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you lose 50 of those ECU
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Table B.4: MPL table 4
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 65 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
2 You get 62 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
3 You get 59 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
4 You get 56 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
5 You get 53 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
6 You get 50 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
7 You get 47 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
8 You get 44 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
9 You get 41 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
10 You get 38 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
11 You get 35 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
you gain 30 additional ECU
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B.5.2 Privacy lotteries (MPL tables 5 to 8)
Table B.5: MPL table 5
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 56 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
2 You get 55 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
3 You get 54 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
4 You get 53 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
5 You get 52 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
6 You get 51 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
7 You get 50 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
8 You get 49 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
9 You get 48 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
10 You get 47 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
11 You get 46 ECU You get 55 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
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Table B.6: MPL table 6
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 68 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
2 You get 65 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
3 You get 62 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
4 You get 59 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
5 You get 56 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
6 You get 53 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
7 You get 50 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
8 You get 47 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
9 You get 44 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
10 You get 41 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
11 You get 38 ECU You get 65 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
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Table B.7: MPL table 7
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 80 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
2 You get 75 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
3 You get 70 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
4 You get 65 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
5 You get 60 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
6 You get 55 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
7 You get 50 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
8 You get 45 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
9 You get 40 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
10 You get 35 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
11 You get 30 ECU You get 75 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
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Table B.8: MPL table 8
Row Option A Option B
1 You get 65 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
2 You get 62 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
3 You get 59 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
4 You get 56 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
5 You get 53 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
6 You get 50 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
7 You get 47 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
8 You get 44 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
9 You get 41 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
10 You get 38 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
11 You get 35 ECU You get 35 ECU, but with probability 30 %
your personal information is disclosed
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B.6 Summary statistics
Table B.9: Measures of risk aversion (in %) and (dis)utility of personal infor-
mation disclosure (in Euros)
ror IAPR vP WTA WTP
Min -11% -1.17 -3.54 0 0
Max 41% 12.50 10.85 200 30
Mean 11% 2.52 1.17 16.12 1.92
Std. deviation 10% 2.89 2.08 25.33 4.85
N 145 134 130 144 146
Note: Outliers for WTA and WTP (values that are 2 standard deviations away
from the mean) are excluded. Before exclusion WTA and WTP range between
0 Euro and 1000 Euro.
Table B.10: Explicit and implicit measures of (dis)utility of personal information
disclosure and privacy risk, in Euros.
By treatment By condition TotalBasic Shock Monetary first Privacy first
ror
Mean 10% 12% 10% 12% 11%
Std. deviation 10% 11% 10% 11% 10%
Observations 80 65 78 67 145
IAPR
Mean 2.53 2.52 2.25 2.85 2.52
Std. deviation 2.91 2.88 2.71 3.08 2.89
Observations 73 61 73 61 134
vP
Mean 1.27 1.04 1.16 1.18 1.17
Std. deviation 1.91 2.27 2.25 1.86 2.08
Observations 72 58 72 58 130
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Note: Outliers (values that are 2 std. deviations away from the mean) are not
shown.
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Figure B.2: Scatterplot of ror and (dis)utility of privacy risk, IAPR, by treat-
ment and by order of elicitation, with prediction line of linear regression and
95% confidence interval for forecast.
(a) By treatment
(b) By order of elicitation
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B.7 Regressions
Table B.11: Interval regression of IAPRi over rori.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rori
116.62** 113.62** 127.33*** 122.54*** 118.53***
[42.63,190.62] [39.21,188.02] [54.70,199.96] [50.27,194.81] [48.13,188.93]
rori > 100
109.76*** 106.08*** 67.47* 67.91* 75.08*
[49.29,170.23] [44.92,167.25] [10.01,124.93] [9.89,125.93] [12.79,137.36]
Treatment with privacy shock
-4.47 -11.65 -12.44+ -12.88+
[-19.81,10.86] [-25.87,2.56] [-26.88,2.00] [-27.62,1.86]
Condition with privacy elicited
first
8.11 3.19 5.50 -1.47
[-7.36,23.58] [-11.51,17.89] [-9.22,20.23] [-15.95,13.01]
Q3: Nr of participants known
-1.81 -1.03 0.20
[-7.27,3.64] [-6.77,4.71] [-5.91,6.31]









Q16: General privacy concern
7.28+ 5.42 6.12
[-0.93,15.50] [-3.06,13.90] [-2.39,14.64]


















Q30: Index of self-disclosure
1.23 1.01 0.81
[-0.75,3.21] [-1.00,3.02] [-1.26,2.89]




Index of risk attitude (Q31-Q32)
-4.42+ -6.56*
[-9.22,0.38] [-11.63,-1.50]
Index of trust (Q33-Q37)
1.11 0.90
[-3.24,5.46] [-3.56,5.36]
Q23: Number of close friends
0.92 0.21
[-0.59,2.43] [-1.30,1.72]




Constant 23.88*** 22.47** 8.88 7.83 -55.72
[12.67,35.09] [8.10,36.83] [-75.89,93.64] [-77.93,93.58] [-157.99,46.54]
Socio-demographic controls No No No No Yes
N 148 148 143 140 140
of which right-censored 14 14 13 13 13
log likelihood -725.56 -724.83 -685.57 -668.16 -655.90
LR χ2(degrees of freedom) 19*** (2) 21*** (4) 51*** (16) 55*** (20) 80*** (39)
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table B.12: Panel random-effects interval-data regression, number of safe
choices in privacy lotteries by table.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Safe choices in monetary
lotteries
0.632*** 0.659*** 0.617** 0.530** 0.489** 0.517**
[0.29,0.98] [0.30,1.02] [0.24,0.99] [0.17,0.89] [0.13,0.85] [0.18,0.86]
Table 6 -1.332*** -1.332*** -1.321*** -1.356*** -1.358***
[-1.81,-0.86] [-1.81,-0.86] [-1.81,-0.83] [-1.85,-0.86] [-1.86,-0.86]
Table 7 -1.799*** -1.800*** -1.795*** -1.840*** -1.841***
[-2.27,-1.33] [-2.27,-1.33] [-2.28,-1.31] [-2.34,-1.35] [-2.34,-1.35]
Table 8 9.500*** 9.498*** 9.498*** 9.427*** 9.426***
[8.70,10.30] [8.70,10.30] [8.68,10.32] [8.59,10.26] [8.59,10.26]
Treatment with privacy shock
-0.226 -0.791 -0.843 -1.070+
[-1.44,0.99] [-1.90,0.32] [-1.97,0.28] [-2.20,0.06]
Condition with privacy elicited
first
0.701 0.255 0.449 -0.0883
[-0.53,1.94] [-0.92,1.43] [-0.73,1.62] [-1.22,1.04]
Q3: Nr of participants known
-0.328 -0.327 -0.225
[-0.75,0.09] [-0.77,0.12] [-0.69,0.24]
Q5: Trust in experimenters
-1.671 -2.012 -0.0322
[-5.82,2.48] [-6.21,2.19] [-4.82,4.76]
WTA 0.0434*** 0.0434*** 0.0483***
[0.02,0.07] [0.02,0.07] [0.02,0.07]
WTP 0.134* 0.168* 0.164*
[0.02,0.25] [0.03,0.30] [0.03,0.30]
Q16: Generally privacy concern
0.721* 0.599+ 0.781*
[0.09,1.36] [-0.06,1.25] [0.13,1.43]

















Q30: Index of self-disclosure
0.0313 0.00860 0.00305
[-0.12,0.19] [-0.15,0.17] [-0.16,0.16]




Index of risk attitude (Q31-Q32)
-0.292 -0.472*
[-0.67,0.08] [-0.86,-0.08]
Index of trust (Q33-Q37)
0.163 0.124
[-0.18,0.50] [-0.22,0.46]
Q23: Number of close friends
0.0722 0.0259
[-0.05,0.19] [-0.09,0.14]




Constant 3.231** 1.672 1.737 2.705 2.956 -1.400
[0.78,5.68] [-0.92,4.27] [-0.86,4.33] [-4.69,10.10] [-4.50,10.41] [-9.81,7.01]
Socio-demographic controls No No No No No Yes
N observations 592 592 592 572 560 560
of which left-censored 5 5 5 5 5 5
of which right-censored 212 212 212 204 201 201
N individuals 148 148 148 143 140 140
log likelihood -1386 -1030 -1030 -982 -959 -944
Wald χ2 (degrees of freedom) 13*** (1) 810*** (4) 812*** (6) 803*** (18) 776*** (22) 802*** (41)
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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B.8 Summary of answers to the post-experimental
questionnaire
Mean SD Min Max
Part A: About the experiment
Q2. Ease of understanding
(0 very difficult, 3 not difficult at all)
2.14 0.61 0 3
Q3. Number of known other participants 1.28 1.31 0 5
Share which knew another participant (s) 66%
Q4. Appropriate remuneration (0 No, 1 Yes) 70%
Q5. Trust experimenters (0 No, 1 Yes) 97%
Q6. WTA, Euro 36.2 142 0 1000
WTA excluding outliers, Euro 16.1 25.4 0 200
Q7. WTP, Euro 10 83.7 0 1000






Q10. Field of study:
Social sciences 82%
Technical sciences 10%








Q13. Parents completed secondary education:
None of the parents 16%
One of the parents 25%
Both parents 59%
Q14. Size of city (inhabitants):
> 1 million 3%
100 001 - 1 000 000 16%
10 001 - 100 000 49%
1 001 - 10 000 28%
< 1 000 4%
Q15. Expenses per month:
< Euro 500 43%
Euro 501-800 41%
Euro 801-1200 11%
continued on the next page
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Part C: Privacy preferences, OSN activities and
self-disclosure
Q16. General privacy concern
(0 not concerned at all, 3 very concerned)
1.12 0.90 0 3
Q17. Willingness to provide Personal Identifying
Information (“PII”) to websites
(0 very willing, 4 not willing at all)
2.68 0.91 0 4
Q18. Provide PII to websites if compensated
(0 No, 1 Yes)
57%
Q19. Willingness to provide information about tastes,
interests and preferences to websites
(0 very willing, 4 not willing at all)
1.57 1.18 0 4
Q20. Provide information about tastes, interests and
preferences if compensated (0 No, 1 Yes)
86%
Q21. Victim of privacy invasion (0 No, 1 Yes) 34%




Q23. Number of close friends oﬄine 6.37 4.79 1 30







Not a member 5%
Q25. Number of connections in POSN 545 488 0 3200
Q26. Name in POSN (if use)
Real name 94%
Pseudonym, and nobody knows who I am in real life 2%
Pseudonym, but everybody knows who I am in real
life
4%
Q27. Profile picture in POSN (if use)
Real photo 74%
Real photo with other people 19%
Photo of other person 2%
Image of non human being 4%
No photo at all 1%
Q28. Privacy settings in POSN (if use)
Public 13%
Private 57%
continued on the next page
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Mean SD Min Max
Mostly public 11%
Mostly private 19%
Q29. Changed privacy settings in POSN (if use)
Never 15%




Q30. Self-disclosure index -1.86 3.61 -13 10
Part D: Attitudes to risk and trust
Q31. General risk attitude (0 averse, 10 risk -seeking) 5.91 1.6 1 10
Q32. Risk attitude in: (0 averse, 10 risk-seeking)
Driving 3.6 2.66 0 10
Finance 4.28 2.31 0 10
Sports 6.69 2.18 0 10
Career 4.63 2.34 0 10
Health 3.03 2.65 0 10
Trusting strangers 4.41 2.54 0 10
Q33. Trust people (0 agree, 3 disagree) 1.6 0.71 0 3
Q34. Cannot rely on people (idem) 1.82 0.72 0 3
Q35. Should not trust strangers (idem) 0.85 0.65 0 3
Q36. People try to be fair (0 No, 1 Yes) 33%
Q37. People follow their own interests (idem) 83%
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